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  This paper presents and analyses economic data on 167 international cartels that were 
discovered by antitrust authorities after January 1990. The median cartel had five corporate 
members and generated $1.2 billion in sales during the collusive period. Nearly 40% of affected 
sales occurred in the organic chemicals industries, half of which were sold to food, feed, and 
agricultural firms. On average, the cartels lasted nearly six years, but average durability declined 
by more than 60% from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. In the early 2000s more than 20 
international cartels were discovered each year, a rate six times faster than the early 1990s. The 
large size and longevity of these cartels, when combined with average monopoly overcharges of 
28%, cause a great deal of monetary harm to buyers. 
 
  Discovered cartels have met with increasingly harsh sanctions since 1990. Government 
authorities have imposed a total of $7.1 billion in fines on 870 companies and 62 executives, of 
which the United States (27%) and European Union (51%) are the major governments 
responsible. Private antitrust suits resulted in settlements totaling at least $3.4 billion. Some 32 
executives have been imprisoned. 
  
  Statutory penalties, if imposed at maximum levels, would extract about 12 times cartel 
overcharges, a level sufficient to deter most firms from forming or joining a cartel. However, 
applying optimal deterrence concepts to the characteristics of modern international cartels allows 
one to deduce that current antitrust enforcement is inadequate to deter cartel formation. This 
conclusion follows from low probabilities of detection, overly generous leniency policies in fine-
setting, the absence of private suits outside North America, the inability of most indirect 
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Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, 
Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement 
By 





  The sudden discovery of a global pandemic of illegal international cartels in the mid 
1990s, after a hiatus of a half century, is puzzling.  This burst in cartel activity, which tended to 
begin in the 1980s, parallels the increase international trade and capital movements often called 
globalization (Rodrik 1998)
1.  That a high share of these cartels sells ingredients to the food and 
feed industries adds another element of mystery to the puzzle.  Whatever the causes of this 
unexpected resurgence of global price fixing, the reaction of the antitrust-enforcement authorities 
has been fascinating.  If the burst in illegal price fixing exposes one of the dark sides of 
globalization, the strong responses of antitrust agencies to the challenge of global cartels may be 
one of the bright aspects.  This paper will address the effectiveness of anticartel enforcement 
worldwide. 
 
  The behavior of global cartelists has scandalized the public and provoked the world’s 
major antitrust agencies to impose unprecedented sanctions.  The executives of these companies 
engaged in overt communications (including face-to-face secret meetings) and made explicit 
agreements to control market prices and quantities sold.  These are conspiracies among 
putatively antagonistic rival suppliers intended to defraud customers by disabling normal 
competitive market forces.  In the antitrust literature they are termed “hard-core” or “naked” 
cartels (OECD 2002)
2.  Beginning with the announcement of the U.S. investigation of the lysine 
cartel in July 1995, literally thousands of articles have appeared in newspapers and magazines 
around the world that have covered the machinations of more than 50 global cartels.  Three 
books have been published on the subject, and two Hollywood movies have or will appear.
3   
 
  A large share of the discovered international cartels explicitly fixed prices in multiple 
continents. These “global cartels” have become a major focus of antitrust agencies, which have 
imposed “titanic fines” ($2 billion by the United States and $3.6 billion by the European Union) 
that have “dwarfed” the actions taken against previously convicted price-fixing conspiracies.
4  
                                                 
1 Rodrik (1998) and three accompanying articles show that data on globalization rates (relative to value added) for 
most high-income countries surpassed the rates of 1900-1913 by the 1970s or 1980s; the degree of globalization in 
the 1920s was also relatively high, but lower than pre-Word War I levels. These three periods also correspond to the 
three most intense periods of international cartel activity.  
2 Other kinds of cartels may be formed to establish industry technical standards, to impose trading rules to enhance 
market efficiency, to regulate commodity or financial exchanges, to support generic advertising campaigns, or 
engage in other forms of procompetitive behavior. 
3 Lieber 2000, Eichenwald 2000, and Connor (2001) are the books.  The movies are Anti-Trust (directed and starring 
Tim Robbins) and The Informant (reported to be in production in late 2002 by director Steven Soderburg).  It is 
notable that enforcement of a white-collar crime like price fixing could become a cinematic subject.  It is difficult to 
imagine that the deliberations of a public service commission or any other type of economic regulation could 
achieve quite the same dramatic potential. 
4 Hammond (2001b), but many other antitrust experts echo his sentiments.   
 
2 
For decades prior to 1995, U.S. prosecution of foreign companies or persons for price fixing was 
practically unknown, but since then 50% to 70% of the companies indicted by the U.S. 
Department of Justice have been foreign; moreover, the DOJ has convicted cartel executives 
from 12 foreign countries, sending many to prison. Canada and the European Union also pursued 
aggressive anticartel policies from the late 1990s.
5   
 
  International cartels successfully prosecuted by the U.S. DOJ have affected markets with 
more than $55 billion in sales (Kolasky 2002).  This is an understatement.  As explained in more 
detail below, the global sales of the international cartels in this paper’s original data set are 
estimated to exceed $540 billion.  The income transfers and social welfare losses generated by 




The general purpose of this paper is to survey and analyze the economic dimensions of 
private (i.e., non-government supported) international cartels discovered since January 1990 and 
to assess the effectiveness of legal sanctions imposed on them by the world’s principal antitrust 
agencies.  In particular, information has been collected on the membership, durability, affected 
commerce, and direct-purchaser overcharges of 167 international cartels, many of which were 
global in scope. Some of these measures must be estimated from partial information. Durability 
and membership is available for the great majority of the cartel cases included in this study.  
Affected sales or overcharges are available for the majority of cases in at least one jurisdiction 
and in several cases multiple jurisdictions.  These three characteristics positively correlate with 
the degree of economic injury engendered by cartel behavior. 
 
This paper also has several specific sub-objectives.  First, the data assembled will serve as a basis 
of future planned economic analyses of cartels. Information on the structure and behavior of 
cartels can be used to check on the validity of current theoretical models of overt collusion; 
moreover, empirical regularities in the data set can be used to identify “stylized facts” that guide 
the design of economic models of cartels yet to be developed. This paper explores why such a 
large proportion of these discovered cartels sold their products to buyers in two industry groups.  
The structure of cartel purchasers’ markets is an enforcement screening factor rarely cited in the 
literature.  The economic dimensions of the newest international cartels can be compared to 
those formed prior to World War I and in the interwar period of 1920-1940; such a comparison 
may reveal insights about the influence of broad historical conditions (degree of globalization, 
rigor of anticartel regimes, etc.) on cartel formation or effectiveness.  Other quantitative analyses 
are planned to measure the determinants of cartel durability and overcharges.   
 
  Second, considerable effort has been devoted to collecting information on fines, 
settlements, and other cartel sanctions.  These data are valuable simply as a way of charting new 
antitrust policies, but are also useful as elements in a variety of legal-economic analyses.  For 
example, one can evaluate the government-imposed and (in the U.S. and Canada) private 
antitrust sanctions relative to the economic harm caused by these cartels.  This analysis has 
important implications for the deterrence power of antitrust sanctions, many of which are based 
                                                 
5 In 2000-2002, the EC fined 42 companies that were guilty of global price fixing, and 23 (55 percent) were non-EU 
firms.   
 
3 
on seemingly arbitrary rules of thumb: maximum government fines of 20% of affected sales 
(with culpability modifications) in the case of the United States, 10% of annual corporate sales in 
the EU case, and 6% of corporate sales in Japan.   
 
  Third, one can analyze the pattern of leniency discounting by the world’s major antitrust 
agencies, which some writers have criticized as arbitrary, opaque, and unpredictable.   
Preliminary analysis of cross-jurisdiction antitrust fines shows a greater degree of consistency 
among the U.S., Canada, and EU than heretofore suspected.    
 
  Both the measures of sanction effectiveness and discounting practices have profound 
effects on the ability of public policies to deter cartels. A fourth sub-objective is to delve into the 




  All of the cartels analyzed in this paper are international schemes.  I will adopt the 
definition of international price-fixing agreements employed by the DOJ since about 1995.  In 
this context the term “international” will be reserved to describe a cartel’s membership 
composition.  That is, an international cartel is a conspiracy in restraint of trade that has or is 
alleged to have one or more corporate or individual participants with headquarters, residency, or 
nationality outside the jurisdiction of the investigating antitrust authority.  The participants may 
be convicted parties or, at the investigation stage of enforcement, may be the subjects or targets 
of a formal probe.  In practice, I have identified most of the cartels as international by using the 
country of registration of the parent companies participating in the cartel.  
 
  Focusing exclusively on international cartels is justified on several counts. Foremost is 
the fact that international cartels present prosecutors with distinctly greater challenges than 
purely domestic conspiracies.  The difficulties of obtaining evidence and testimony from sources 
located abroad are well documented by failed prosecutions in the early 1990s; lack of 
cooperation from foreign governments and courts added to these difficulties. Another 
justification is the notably greater publicity given international cases by journalists and the 
antitrust authorities themselves; this ensures that information more likely to be complete for 
international cartels than for modest domestic actions. Finally, the economic harm caused by 
international collusion tends to be greater than localized conspiracies.     
 
  This paper further categorizes international cartels into three degrees of geographic 
spread, namely, global, EU and national.  Global international cartels fixed or attempted to fix 
prices on at least two continents.  Most of the “global” cases examined herein involve cartels that 
targeted markets in “the triad” of the most industrialized regions of the world – Western Europe, 
North America, and East Asia. At a minimum, the term global will be reserved for cartels that 
colluded across two or more of those continents.  A large minority of the global cartels also 
conspired to fix prices in Africa, Latin America, Oceania, or other parts of Asia
6.  
 
                                                 
6 A special category is ocean liner conferences, four of which have been fined by the EC.   They are categorized as 
global because their rates affected commerce between Europe and one other continent.   
 
4 
 The  EU-wide cartels operate across two or more countries, but entirely within a single 
customs union, the European Union (EU). The EU is well along to becoming economically 
integrated into a single market and is beginning to resemble a unified sovereign state with a 
federal structure.  More importantly, the EU has one of the most active competition agencies, the 
Competition Directorate of the European Commission of the European Communities (EC). In 
fact, the EC has antitrust jurisdiction not only the EU proper but also a group of states that are 
members of the European Free Trade Agreement (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and, before 
they joined the EU, Finland, Sweden, and Austria).  This expanded antitrust zone is called the 
European Economic Area.    
 
  Mario Monti, EC Commissioner for the competition directorate, recognizes the 
distinction. In a speech about his unit’s anti-cartel activity in 2001, he said: “Some of the cartels 
were genuinely international, such as the vitamins cartel, while others affected only the European 
market” (Monti 2002:1). 
 
 The  national category contains the smallest cartels in a geographic sense, those few that 
had international representation but that operated in Asia, North America, or Europe and almost 
solely within a single national border
7. Although a rather awkward phrasing, these cartels may be 
thought of as “domestic” international cartels.   
 
  Categorizing cartels according to their geographic locus of operation is usually straight 
forward. The corporate members of global cartels subject to U.S., Canadian, or EU prosecution 
usually are identified as such by the press releases or reports of the prosecuting authorities. Joint 
raids or publicly revealed investigations by two or more of the major antitrust agencies are 
further indicators of probable global scope. In a small number of cases, the composition of the 
cartel allows one to infer how widespread the cartel operated. However, a few cartel cases 
required judgment about their categories that more information might require reclassifying them. 
 
 The  EU-wide cartels are signaled by the involvement of the EC as the prosecuting unit, 
because the EC is usually required to establish significant effects on trade between the Member 
States in order to investigate a potential violation.
8 However, the reverse is not true. Member 
States of the EU typically prosecute only nation-wide cartels with negligible cross-border effects, 
but their competition authorities may prosecute international cartels under EU law as well. The 
2003 prawns-fishing case in the Netherlands is the first example of this type. 
 
 The  national category has the largest number of international cartels, more than half of 
the total number. With a few exceptions, these are cartels prosecuted or investigated by European 
or North American national agencies for price fixing in only one nation. It is possible that as 
more information becomes available some of these cases may require reclassification as EU-
wide or global cartels. 
 
                                                 
7 A few “NAFTA” cartels that operated in both Canada and the United States are placed in this category. 
8 The vitamin B4 cartels are a case in point.  Three North American manufacturers agreed to cease exporting to 
Europe, and three European companies reciprocated.  All six met once, but thereafter operated separately as far as is 
known.  I treat them as two conspiracies, one centered in the NAFTA area and one EU-wide.  





  This paper samples international cartels that have been “discovered” because they were 
sanctioned or are likely to be sanctioned for a price fixing violation from January 1990 forward.  
By sanctioned is meant pleaded guilty, were judged guilty by a court of law or a commission, 
were indicted and are awaiting trial, were fined by an antitrust authority, or agreed to pay a civil 
settlement.  In a few cases, initial decisions made in the 1980s were appealed, with final 
decisions not issued until the 1990s.  Cartels officially under investigation by a public antitrust 
authority are considered to be likely to be sanctioned because so few investigations fail to result 
in a fine or indictment
9. 
 
  The year 1990 marks the first year that the current U.S. fine structure for antitrust 
violations was fully in place.  The present corporate leniency policy was adopted in 1993, and 
tougher investigative techniques were initiated in the early 1990s.  This more assertive U.S. 
anticartel regime led to higher rates of discovery and prosecution of international cartels and was 
emulated in some respects by the Canadian and EU authorities.  Monti (2002) dates the shift in 




  There are no industrial limits placed on the cartels in this paper’s data set. However, 
certain tables found in this paper frequently distinguish food and agricultural products from all 
others. This category is broadly conceived to include food, animal feeds, and beverages as well 
as the inputs purchased by food manufacturers or by agricultural producers. Some writers refer to 
these vertically linked industries as the food and agricultural system (Marion et al. 1986). In the 
late 1990s the great majority of large-scale cartels that were discovered and prosecuted were part 
of this collection of food-related industries, though the relative importance of these types of 
cartels diminished somewhat after 1999. Some examples follow.
10 
 
 Lysine is an essential amino acid, a building block of proteins that speed the development 
of muscle tissue in humans and animals.  The form of lysine that we cartelized in the 1990s is a 
dry powder manufactured by a fermentation process and purchased by manufacturers of prepared 
animal feeds.  Citric acid is an acidulant added to thousands of processed foods and beverages to 
enhance flavor and retard bacterial growth; a minor portion of industry output is used as an 
ingredient to replace phosphates in detergents.  Citric acid is sold in two forms: a diluted aqueous 
form shipped in tanks and a dry salt form, usually sodium citrate.  Since 1923, citric acid has 
been manufactured by a fermentation biotechnology.  There are about 18 commercially 
important vitamins or pro-vitamins, proteins found naturally in foods that become catalysts in 
regulating the metabolic functions of humans and animals.  Diets deficient in vitamins will cause 
diseases or functional impairments. Most bulk vitamins are sold primarily to feed manufacturers; 
food-grade vitamins are added to many processed foods and minor portions are sold to the 
                                                 
9 The Danish beer investigation by the EC was dropped after several years because of lack of evidence about a 
conspiracy. 
10 A number of familiar food/agricultural products were cartelized: sugar, beer served in hotels and restaurants, 
private-label beer, beef, prawns, cigarettes, and infant formula.   
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pharmaceutical industry.  Vitamins have been produced by synthetic chemistry since the early 
1930s, and this is now the dominant method of manufacture.
11 
 
  Brief mention is made of a few additional food-and-agricultural products that were 
cartelized in the 1990s.  Methionine is an amino acid added to animal feeds, swine in particular.  
Monosodium glutamate (MSG) and nucleotides are amino acids that enhance flavors of foods.  
Maltol, sodium erythorbate, and sorbates are chemical food additives that flavor or preserve 
foods.  MCAA (monochloroacetic acid) and organic peroxides are chemical intermediates used to 
produce pesticides.  What is striking about these products is that each of them are minor 
ingredients or components of more complex mixtures further processed by large numbers of 
manufacturer-buyers.  This characteristic helps facilitate collusion by ensuring highly inelastic 
demand.  In addition, market price information is both poor for buyers and asymmetric. 
 
  There is a high degree of overlap between these food-and-agricultural ingredients and 
cartels that affected the markets of organic chemicals used as intermediate inputs by other 
manufacturers. Each of the 32 products just mentioned in the two paragraphs immediately above 
is an intermediate organic chemical. In addition, another 30 or so organic chemical intermediates 
were cartelized (see Appendix Table 1 for a list). All told, about one-third of the international 
cartels in this study were formed by manufacturers of organic chemical intermediates, which 
comprise by far the largest industry in the data set. These industries have a long history of 
involvement in international cartels (Stocking and Watkins 1946). 
 
  Other manufacturing industries that formed international cartels include finished 
pharmaceuticals, paints and some inorganic chemicals; paper products; cement and concrete; 
petroleum products; metals and metal products; and plastic and rubber products (Appendix Table 
8). A number of cartels arose from a wide array of service industries: shipping; road and building 
construction; insurance; banking; and the distribution of petroleum products, to cite a few. 
                            
Organization 
 
  The following section offers a brief historical background to the phenomenon of 
international cartels. It also serves as a literature review that highlights some of the interesting 
issues in the treatment of international collusion by economists. The next section pulls together 
some generalizations about the relationship of cartel formation to market structure. The third 
section describes this paper’s original data set: its sources, major features, and descriptive 
patterns. The fourth section analyzes the effectiveness of international cartels discovered in the 
past two decades or so
12. The next section examines the anti-cartel measures taken by U.S, EU, 
and Canadian authorities, as well as private legal sanctions imposed by courts in the United 
States and Canada. These legal statistics feed into the paper’s last substantive section, which 
considers the deterrence power of corporate sanctions. 
                                                 
11 For more detailed information on the uses, technologies of production, and marketing channels for lysine, citric 
acid, and vitamins, see Chapters 4, 7, and 10 of Connor (2001). 
12 Previous empirical cross-sectional studies of discovered cartels offer statistics on a number of characteristics 
omitted in the present paper, such as trade association involvement, fixed costs relative to variable costs, the role of 
patents, disciplinary methods, exclusionary conduct, methods of policing agreements, and the social structures of the 





  International private cartels are at least 125 years old. (Schröter 1999)
13.  The German-
Swiss dyestuffs cartel that was established around 1880 is a prototype for the late 19th century 
international cartels.  It was an amalgamation of two pre-existing national cartels that through 
predatory behavior against smaller producers in the UK, France, and Italy was able to ensure 
Western European dominance for its Swiss and German members.  Word War I interrupted 
international cartels of this type, though most of them were re-established in the 1920s.   
 
  The interwar cartels were more ambitious in scope, often incorporating market-division 
or patent-pooling agreements with U.S. manufacturers that divided the Eastern hemisphere and 
the New World into two hegemonies (Hexner 1946, Stocking and Watkins 1946).  The interwar 
cartels of 1920-1940 were nearly always based in the most industrialized countries of Western 
Europe.  They adopted a wide variety of techniques to cartelize their home countries and 
international commodity trade. Besides agreements on prices and quantity shares for each 
member, patent pooling, common marketing agencies, and profit-sharing rules were common 
features of the interwar cartels.  Asian and companies were almost never formal cartel members. 
 
   By this time the United States had an effective anticartel law, the Sherman Act of 1890 
that made U.S producers wary of joining formal price-fixing agreements with European firms.  
In some cases, U.S. companies created subsidiaries that held the company’s foreign assets, and 
these affiliates did join naked cartels.  Many U.S. firms may have believed that cartel 
arrangements that merely created spheres of influence or involved patent-pooling agreements 
were legal under the Sherman Act, but events would prove them wrong.  From 1946 to 1950, a 
crusading U.S. Attorney General made the criminal prosecution of scores of these interwar 
cartels his highest priority.  Aided by public revulsion about the assistance given by these cartels 
to the rise of National Socialism and the rearming of Germany during 1933-1941, the U.S. 
government enjoyed a long string of successes in the courts (Wells 2002)
14.  The court victories 




  Many of the international cartels discovered and prosecuted since 1995 are qualitatively 
different from those operating in the interwar period.  A large number are truly global cartels and 
as such represent the ultimate product of the evolution of the cartel as a form of business 
enterprise.
16  Contemporary international cartels incorporate a refinement of operational 
                                                 
13 Schroter traces the development of international cartels in Europe to the 1880’s depression.  Many cartels, such as 
the Hansa League and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), operated under the protection of 
state sovereignty. Other commodity-stabilization cartels are effectively parastatal organizations. This paper 
discusses only cartels that are not sanctioned by law or protected by government agencies. 
14 This book also contains an excellent historical treatment of the international spread of the antitrust idea. 
15 The U.S. government attempted to prosecute only three global cartels during 1990-1996, but it was unsuccessful 
in court because of the difficulty of securing evidence and witnesses outside the United States (Connor 2001:66-69).  
The DOJ also secured guilty pleas from companies involved in six rather modest regional cartels in 1994 and 1995 
(Appendix Table 3).  The CCB convicted members of two regional cartels in 1990 and 1993.  However, the 1996 
convictions in the lysine cartel mark the beginning of the era of successful U.S. prosecution of global cartels. 
16 To be more precise, the global cartels of the 1990s had as their goal raising prices in at least North America, 
Western Europe, and Japan – a group called “the Triad” in the marketing management literature.  Typically, these   
 
8 
techniques, a global perspective, a multicultural pluralism, a leadership style, a degree of 
longevity, and a scale of operation that the world has never before seen.  Needless to say, global 
cartels are also the most injurious price fixing ventures yet devised, causing massive losses in 
market efficiency, losses in income for customers, and losses in faith in the honesty of 
businessmen
17 and the integrity of market institutions. 
 
     Market Structure
18 
 
The market environments for the lysine, citric acid, vitamins, and other global cartels 
discussed in this paper made possible and indeed fostered collusive price-fixing behavior by the 
leading firms in the industry.  Two industry features tower above all the others in importance 
because they are necessary conditions for cartels to be formed and flourish: high seller market 
sales concentration and product homogeneity.  High barriers to market entry permit cartels to be 
durable; without barriers new sellers will enter the industry and in time make cooperation in 
pricing infeasible.  Commonly, when entry forces industry four-firm concentration to fall below 
about 65%, cartels fail.  Entry is the most common reason for cartel failure (Levenstein and 
Suslow 2002:16).  The remaining structural features of markets shown in Table 1 may be called 
“plus factors.”  The plus factors are not necessary conditions for the formation of cartels, but 
they do facilitate the establishment of price agreements and increase the probability of large, 
durable price effects. 
 
Concentration on the Supply Side 
 
  There is no doubt that industry concentration – the share of sales or production capacity 
controlled by the leading suppliers – was high for every global cartel.  The share of global 
production accounted for by the four largest manufacturers of lysine, citric acid, and vitamins A 
and E was in excess of 80 percent in the early 1990s.
19  Except for citric acid in Asia, sales 
concentrations within the continents were even higher than global concentration (Table 1).
20  
There is evidence that Western Europe, North America, South America, and Asia were viewed 
by the cartels as geographically distinct markets.  Prices were set systematically higher in Europe 
and lower in most parts of Asia, yet never so far apart as to allow non-cartel firms to make 
profits through geographic arbitrage.  
 
  Conceptually separate from the issue of overall industry concentration is the degree of 
supply control by the cartel itself.  In most cases the top four or five producers were all members 
of the cartel, so in practical terms industry concentration and cartel control of supply were nearly 
the same.  Another dimension of concentration is the fewness of company numbers.  In the large 
                                                                                                                                                             
cartels sought price control in all industrialized countries.  Perhaps the interwar cartel that comes closest in scope 
and complexity to contemporary global cartels is the incandescent light bulb cartel (Stocking and Watkins 1946). 
17 I use this gender-laden term purposefully.  Among the hundreds of businesspersons named as conspirators in the 
international global cartels I have studied, only one (the CEO of Sotheby’s auction house) is a woman. 
18 General works on structural conditions facilitating collusion include Scherer and Ross (1990: 235-315), Tirole 
(1988: 239-270), Dick (1998), and Friedman (1977). 
19 In the few cases covered in Connor (2001) where entry caused industry four-firm concentration to dip below 
about 65 percent, cartel activity generally ceased. 
20China was a fast-growing source for citric acid in the early 1990s; it also became a significant source for vitamin C 
and one or two other vitamins in the mid 1990s.   
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majority of cases, the global cartel operated with three to five corporate conspirators.
21  About 20 
vitamin makers admitted colluding on prices, but when one looks at the individual vitamin 




Consistent with cartel theory, the degree of buyer concentration and the size of buyers 
faced by cartels were generally low.  In eight out of ten well documented interwar international 
cartels, buyer concentration was low (Levenstein and Suslow 2002:Table12); in seven out of ten 
cases where buyer conduct was known, larger buyers tried to subvert a supplying cartel by 
backward vertical integration or trying to induce cheating.  Buyers typically build up inventories 
during price wars and use or sell those inventories when a cartel is re-established. Occasionally, 
large buyers may assist the cartel in return for some of the cartel’s profits.  
 
In the case of food products, the buyers were thousands of feed manufacturers, food 
processors, or chemical wholesalers.  In every instance, the top four direct purchasers accounted 
for less than 40 percent of the market, whether calculated at the global or regional level.  Low 
buyer concentration makes it more difficult for purchasers to share credible information about 
transactions prices and prevents buyers from countervailing against the market power of sellers.  
Low buyer concentration may be one factor that accounts for the prevalence of global cartels in 
the food-and-feed-ingredient industries. 
 
In the case of nonfood products, buyer concentration was sometimes at moderate to high 
levels. Some examples are graphite electrodes (sold to steel makers recycling scrap), carbon 
cathode black (aluminum smelters), parcel chemical tankers (chemical manufacturers), and 
holographic printing (credit card consortia). In these relatively few instances of high buyer 
concentration, it appears that the products that were cartelized formed a very small proportion of 
the total value of purchased inputs.  Thus, even these presumably sophisticated buyers may not 
have had an efficient way of developing the expertise in their suppliers’ industries sufficient to 
challenge unjustified price increases.  Moreover, there are strategic reasons for leading 
companies in concentrated industries to overlook suspected cartel behavior by their suppliers 
(Levenstein and Suslow 2002).  Many cartels make provisions for giving their largest customers 
(or any customer that had strong reason to complain) more favorable prices than smaller buyers, 
even in cases where cost savings of managing large accounts do not justify the discounts.  The 
largest buyers then enjoy a cost advantage, however small, over their smaller rivals. 
 
  A substantial number of international cartels sold their products to government buyers 
and rigged the government tenders offers. The BT insecticide cartel sold its products to Canadian 
forestry departments, fuel suppliers to the military procurement agencies of Japan and Korea 
rigged their bids, and wine alcohol buyers allegedly rigged EU auctions. The great majority of 
government bid-rigging cases involved nonfood products: asphalt, bridges, marine heavy-lift 
transport, many public-works construction projects, distinct heating pipe, electric power 
equipment, petroleum fuels, and several cases of drugs and medical devices sold to health 
programs. The frequency and success of such bid-rigging schemes is often attributed to inept, 
uninformed, or compliant government procurement managers. 
                                                 
21 The sorbates cartel and the sodium gluconate cartel each had six members (Connor 2002: Appendix Table A.2).   
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Table 1.  Economic Conditions Facilitating Global Price Fixing: Lysine, Citric Acid, and 
Vitamin A, Early 1990s. 
 
Market Conditions  Lysine  Citric Acid  Synthetic 
Vitamins A & E 
High seller concentration: 
      Global market 
      U.S.  market 
 
Few cartel participants 
 
High cartel supply control 
 





High barriers to market entry: 
       Large plant scales 
       Sunk investment costs 
       Technology secret           
       Building new plants slow 
 
Transparency of market prices to 
buyers 
 
Large, infrequent transactions 
d 
 
Major rivals have long history of 
strategic interaction 
 
Annual market growth 
 
Price collapse triggers formation 
 
Cultural propinquity of cartel 
members 
 
CR4 > 95% 
CR4 > 97% 
 




























CR4 > 80% 
CR4 = 90% 
 




























CR4 > 95% 
































Sources: Chapters 4, 7, and 10 of Connor (2001). 
CR4 = Sum of the market shares of the top four suppliers or buyers. 
a Within well recognized industry grades when prices were at cartel-enhanced levels.  There were no substitutes 
when prices were within a normal range. 
b Control by formal members of the cartel.  Cargill, a major supplier with up to 20 percent of U.S.  capacity, 
provided passive support for the cartel's pricing decisions. 
c The vitamin conspirators were long time rivals from Western Europe, but in most of the other vitamin cartels 
Japanese or Northern American companies had to be recruited to the cartels. 
d   Nearly all of the products were sold under annually negotiated supply contracts. 
   
 
11 
  However, despite these cases of high buyer concentration, the great majority of nonfood 
cartels sold their products to dispersed private buyers, including consumers themselves. Among 
the many examples are cement, concrete, cartonboard, glass containers, auto refinishing paints, 





  Within normally observed price ranges, nearly all the products sold by the cartels 
included in the present study are perfectly homogeneous industrial goods.  Where quality 
differences exist, accepted grades impose within-grade homogeneity.  Chemicals are a good 
example of such goods.  Vitamin A has a unique molecular structure, and no other vitamin can 
provide vitamin A’s metabolic benefits.  Yet, if the price of synthesized vitamin A is pushed up 
too high, then more costly vitamin A extracted from natural sources (e.g., cod livers) becomes 
price-competitive.  If the rates for long distance ocean transport rise high enough, then land or air 
transport becomes an economical substitute. 
 
  There are very few consumer goods or services that have been cartelized, but these 
exceptional cases are instructive.  The French beef and Dutch prawns cases involved graded, 
standardized products.  A Belgian beer case concerned a collusive arrangement among brewers 
selling cans of beer that carried retailers’ private label; the manufacturers were essentially 
bidding for the right to make an industrial product that was standardized by tight product 
specifications imposed by the buyers.  The cell-phone rates cases involved consumer services 
that are not differentiated by perceived quality variation across providers.  The main example of 
a  cartel that involved a highly differentiated manufacturer’s brand is the Italian cigarette case; in 
this instance, a duopoly continued a long historical practice of fixing the prices of Phillip Morris 
brands that had been legal so long as the state tobacco monopoly ETI had remained publicly 
regulated.
22  The antitrust suit applied only to the period after ETI was privatized.  
 




  Data on the identity, economic dimensions, and legal actions of international cartels are 
drawn from many sources. First, most discovered cartels are first revealed to the public when 
fines, a guilty plea, or an indictment is announced in press releases of the DOJ, CCB, EC, or a 
dozen other national antitrust authorities with active anticartel programs. These are followed by 
additional documents, such as sentencing memorandums, plea agreements, “statements of fact” 
(in Canada), and official speeches of antitrust officials. In Europe the most important cartels have 
the full decisions of the EC (some of them running to more than a hundred pages) posted 
publicly about a year after the brief press releases about fines imposed or the closure of a case 
due to insufficient evidence. Lesser cases are described in the Competition Directorate’s 
quarterly newsletter. All these documents are preserved on the web sites of the U.S., Canadian, 
                                                 
22 The U.S. cosmetics case also affected highly differentiated consumer goods, but the issue was agreements for 
exclusive distribution through selected retailers, which raised prices indirectly.   
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and the EU going back to the mid 1980s in most cases. Related U.S., Canadian, and European 
court decisions are fully archived. 
  
  A second source of data occurs when an investigation is announced or leaked to the press 
or when raids on corporate offices are noticed. Then business newspapers, trade magazines, and 
news services begin to publish pieces on the alleged violators and their industries. Older articles 
are often available that describe the size, growth, and market structures of the affected markets. 
List and transaction prices can also be located for some industries. Among the more useful trade 
magazines and newsletters are Chemical Market Reporter, Oil and Gas Journal, and similar 
publications available on major business-and-law search engines (Factiva, LexisNexis). 
 
  Third, a small number of academic and government researchers have been compiling 
similar data sets. Among the most useful are working papers by Levenstein and Suslow (2002) 
and Levinstein, Suslow, and Oswald (2003). Some useful Government/NPO publications are 
OECD (2002) and Development Prospects Group (2003). And of course I have built upon data 
collected in my previous publications (Connor 2000, 2001, 2002), as well as publicly available 
information contained in unpublished consultancy reports involving cartels cited therein. 
 
    In common with nearly all other empirical studies on cartels, this paper considers only 
known cartels
23.  Specifically, the data set comprises only private cartels whose participants were 
aware of the illegality of their actions in at least some of the jurisdictions in which the cartel 
operated.  These cartels were clandestine, and members typically attempted to cover up or 
destroy evidence of their meetings and communications (Spratling 1999)
24.  Suggestions in the 
cartel literature are that only about 10% to 30% of all such conspiracies are discovered and 
punished
25.  Undiscovered cartels are probably more durable and may differ in some other 
economic characteristics, but it is also possible that discovery is tied only to managerial 
personality characteristics (e.g., the tendency to become a whistle-blower) that are distributed 
disproportionately to discovered cartels. If the latter is true, then discovered cartels may be 
representative of the majority of cartels that are hidden. 
 
Numbers, Size, and Industry 
 
  Descriptive statistics for the international cartels analyzed in this paper are shown in 
Table 2 and Appendix Table 1. There are a total of 167 cases. Most of these cartels have been 
fully prosecuted or have had several participants prosecuted or indicted; the greatest amount of 
information is available for these cases. However, 39 cases are cartels under investigation prior 
to indictments, guilty pleas, or the impositions of fines. That is, alleged cartel members have 
been subject to investigative raids or have been served subpoenas in the United States. The 
chances of prosecution are judged to be high. 
  Slightly more than one-fourth of the cartels made products sold to the food, feed, or 
agricultural industries. Of these, more than 80% are organic chemical intermediates. The food-
                                                 
23 There are studies of legal cartels that are presumably free of sample selection bias. (Dick 1996, Symeonidis 2002). 
24 Some of the shipping conferences met openly, but hid the extent of their price coordination. 
25 Some cartels are investigated but not indicted because the evidence of guilt is insufficient, other cases have higher 
priorities, or the statute of limitations intervenes. Presumably, cartelists could reveal their successful, undiscovered 
conspiracies five years after they terminated without legal liability, but they never do.    
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and-feed ingredient cartels typically had four corporate members and affected $2.6 billion of 
commerce during their lifespan. Three-fourths of the cartels in the data set sold nonfood products 
or services; these tended to be larger in terms of average membership and affected sales. 
However, the differences between the food and nonfood cartels nearly vanish when the median is 
the basis of comparison. The composition and sales size of the nonfood cartels is highly skewed 
toward a few cases with huge sales or large memberships. Thus, the median is a better measure 
of typicality, and this measure shows that the nonfood cartels are only slightly larger than the 
food-product cartels. 
 
  Cartel size varies according to geographic scope. The EU-wide cartels have the largest 
memberships and affected sales of any type; this reflects the importance of cartels reinforced by 
EU trade associations, the targeting of shipping conferences, and the durability of EU-based 
cartels. Despite their greater geographic spread, the median sales size of global cartels is 
considerably smaller than the EU-wide price-fixing schemes. Naturally, cartels confined to 
single nations tend to be the smallest type, with those operating only in North America the 
smallest of all. North American cartels affected sales that were on average less than one-tenth the 
sales of EU-wide cartels. 
  
    Further details on the industries occupied by international cartels are shown in Appendix 
Table 8. More than 90% of affected sales occurred in the manufacturing sector, and more than 
95% of those manufacturers are industrial inputs: intermediate materials, components, or capital 
goods. By far the largest group of cartelized manufacturers is chemicals, which accounts for 
virtually half of affected sales in the sector. Another one-fourth of the manufacturing cartels 
made glass, cement, and graphite products, and most of the rest were food, paper, and metal 
products. Less than 5% of the sales of the cartels were consumer products (beef, sugar, beer, 
plastic dinnerware, cigarettes, and certain paper products). Outside the manufacturing sector, 
cartel sales consisted mainly of wholesale-retail distribution (5% of the total), transportation 
(1.5%), communication (1.3%) , other services (0.5%), and construction (0.4%). Industries with 
no cartels include agriculture, mining, textiles, wood, furniture, rubber, transportation equipment, 
and power and water systems.  
   
  During the periods of operation, these international cartels had global or regional sales of 
at least $436 billion (Appendix Table 7). This total is based on a sub-sample of 114 cartels for 
which global sales are known or have been estimated with a fair degree of precision. As the dates 
and regions for cartels currently under investigation become known, this total may well exceed 
$600 billion.
26 One case alone, the EU’s Cement case, accounted for an estimated $32 billion in 
sales because virtually every large cement maker in the EU was part of the cartel for 11 years. 







                                                 
26 Examples of large industries in this category are carbon black, carbon fiber, tar products, plastic modifiers, and 
iron oxide.   
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          Table 2.  Description of Data Set: International Cartels 
Companies per cartel 
b  Total Sales Affected per Cartel 
Cartel Characteristic  Number 
Mean Median  Mean  Median 
       $million 
          
Products:          
  Food-and-feed ingredients  44  4.1  4  2,596  1,080 
  Other products  123  9.5  5  4,447  1,170 
  Total  167  8.2  5  3,830  1,200 
          
Geographic areas affected:           
  Global  51  5.3  5  5,366  1,863 
  EU-wide  33  12.5  6  5,307  3,390 
  NAFTA  32  8.4  4  1,808  281 
  Single European  44  8.8  5  2,063  550 
  Other Nations  6  5.3  5  756  525 
              Source: Appendix Table 7 
 
  In terms of geographic impact, only 10% of the sales of all international cartels confined 
their operations to the NAFTA region; another 35% of affected sales occurred within the EU 
(i.e., the European Economic Area). About half of the sales of markets affected by cartels 
involved what I have termed global cartels. On average, these global cartels derived about one-
quarter of their sales from North America, one-quarter from Europe, and one-third from Asia. 
 
  The large number of cartels in the data set permits an examination of temporal patterns, 
using the date of discovery to categorize the cases. In many cases the first date at which a cartel 
becomes publicly known or suspected is also the date that the first guilty pleas is received or 
fines are announced. In other cases, the date of first notice predates the first prosecution by 
several months or a few years. 
 
Rates of Discovery 
 
  One temporal pattern of interest is the rate of discovery, displayed over time, product 
type, or geographic type of cartel. So long as the probability of discovery does not vary over 
time, discovery should track the number of cartels operating fairly closely; with average lags of 6 
years or so, discovery will also be correlated with rates of formation. 
 
  These rates are shown in Table 3 for three time periods: January 1990 to December 1995 
(six years), January 1996 to December 1999 (four years), and January 2000 to June 2003 (3.5 
years). A break between 1995 and 1996 was chosen to reflect the more aggressive prosecution of 
international cartels that was signaled by the DOJ’s lysine-cartel case; the 1996-2003 period was 
dived approximately in half.  The first time period includes a small number of cases with 
discovery dates prior to 1990 that were prosecuted during 1990-1995. 
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Table 3. Temporal Patterns: Rates of Cartel Discovery 
Dates of Discovery 
a  Type of Cartels 
1990-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003 
  Number per year 
Food-and-agricultural:  0.8 6.0 4.0 
     
   U.S. & Canada  0.5  1.0  0.3 
   EU national  0  0  1.1 
   EU wide  0.2  0.8  1.1 
   Global scope  0.2  4.3  1.4 
     
Other products:  2.7  7.5  18.5 
     
   U.S. & Canada  1.0  2.0  3.1 
   EU national  0  3.8  6.9
b 
   EU wide  1.3  1.0  3.4 
   Global scope  0.3  0.8  6.3 
     
All products:  3.5  13.5  22.6 
     
   U.S. & Canada  1.5  3.0  3.4 
   EU national  0  3.8  6.2
c 
   EU wide  1.5  1.8  4.6 
   Global scope  0.5  5.0  7.7 
     
a)  Slightly exaggerated by a few pre-1990 cases 
b)  8.6 including 7 non-EU nations 
c)  8.0 including non-EU 
Source: Tables A.1 to A.12 
  
  Perhaps the most striking statistic is the number of cartels discovered per year: the rate of 
discovery is seven times higher in 2000-2003 than it was in 1990-1995 (Figure 1). However, the 
rate of increase was faster between 1990-1995 and 1996-1999 than it was between the two most 
recent periods, which confirms that the lysine-cartel discovery in June 1995 (convicted August-
December 1996) was a watershed event. Either cartel formations increased after the early 1980s, 
or prosecution became more efficient. 
 
  Another pattern that leaps out from the table is the more rapid increase in the rates of 
discoveries among the non-food cartels. These cartels are being discovered at the rate of 13 per 
year since 1999, compared to 2.7 annually prior to 1996. Indeed, the rate of cartel discoveries 
among food-and- agricultural cartels has apparently peaked in the late 1990s. Since 1995, the 
proportion of global-scope cartels has remained above one-third, while only two were discovered 
prior to June 1995.
27 
                                                 
27 The Industrial Diamonds case prosecuted by the DOJ in 1995 was allegedly global, but there were no guilty pleas, 
and the government lost at trial, so it is not in the data set.   
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Figure 3: Number of Cartels 
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  In this section, four measures of effectiveness are developed for international cartels: 
number of participants, durability, and average value of commerce affected, and the overcharge 
imposed on direct buyers. Each of these indexes has limitations, but each of them is directly 
related to the economic harm generated by the cartels.  
 
Numbers of Participants 
 
  National variations in technology and the historical evolution of industries, including the 
toughness of competition and government industrial policies, lead to variations in the 
composition of industrial market structures.  Thus, any particular national or supranational 
economy is has an array of industries with small, medium and large numbers of producers.   
 
  Cartel formation is more likely to occur, ceteris paribus, in an industry with small 
numbers of suppliers. Collusive behavior, both tacit and overt, is only possible when the number 
of rivals is small enough to make monitoring of each others’ strategic moves even feasible; even 
smaller numbers of actual and potential rivals in a market may give rise to a structured 
environment that makes the formation of conjectures about rivals potentially economically 
profitable. When mutual dependence among market rivals becomes recognized, oligopolistic 
strategies are likely to emerge, of which cartel formation is one such option. In addition to simple 
numbers of sellers, other factors may influence the decision to form cartels. The presence of a 
trade association and the expectation of weak antitrust enforcement probably facilitate overt 
agreements by larger numbers of suppliers than in regimes with strict antitrust rules that limit the 
use of trade associations for conspiratorial purposes. Put another way, jurisdictions that foster 
Source: Table 4   
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cartels with relative large numbers of participants are likely to have overall greater degrees of 
cartelization. 
 
  Data on the number of corporate participants are available for 163 of the 167 cartels 
(Appendix Table 7).  The mean number of members per cartel is 8.2.  The mean number is 
significantly lower for global cartels (5.3 companies) and significantly higher for the EU-wide 
(12.5) cartels.  Compared with previous studies of prosecuted U.S. horizontal conspiracies, the 
mean is less than half the mean number for domestic cartels convicted between 1890 and 1972, 
but about the same for those convicted from 1963 to 1972 (Levenstein and Suslow 2002: Table 
1).  It is notable that among domestic cartels, the mean number of participants declined over 
time, a pattern that may indicate greater effectiveness of anticartel enforcement and the spread of 
a business culture that discourages price-fixing behavior
28. 
 
  The number of cartelists is positively skewed for the international cartels sampled here 
and for three samples of domestic price-fixing conspiracies (ibid.).  Thus, the median number of 
companies per cartel is lower than the mean number.  The median for the sampled international 
cartels is five; in the case of domestic U.S. cartels, the median varies from six to ten. 
  
  Figure 3 summarizes the number of companies per cartel for the 136 cases with ten or 
fewer members. With two exceptions, cartels with three or seven corporate members, the 
frequency of cartels declines monotonically with the number of corporate participants.
29 The 
modal number of participants is two, with a foursome not far behind. The dip in the frequency of 
triopolies is puzzling and has not been noted previously in the economics literature. 
 
  A striking feature revealed by Figure 3 is the precipitous drop-off in the number of cartels 
with more than six participants. This finding is in accord with a couple of game-theoretic models 
of cartels (Selten 1973, Farris et al., Phlips 1995). Of the cartels depicted in Figure 3, 89% had 
six or fewer corporate participants. 
  
  What is not shown in Figure 3 is the fact that approximately 13% of all discovered 
international cartels were reported to have more than ten participants. Indeed, in ten cases (13%) 
cartels had 16 or more members. There appear to be four explanations for the existence of cartels 
with large numbers of participants. First, the great majority of such cartels were prosecuted by 
the EU or its member states (see Table 2). In these jurisdictions trade associations are more 
likely to have official or quasi-official status.
30 The EC has a policy of encouraging and 
supporting the development of EU federations of national trade associations, many of which 
have affiliated units of corporate trade associations that have been used, unwittingly or 
otherwise, to facilitate private cartels.
31 The role played by such trade associations was 
                                                 
28 One study showed a peak in 1920-1934 , which corresponds to a period of relatively lax antitrust enforcement.  
29 For a small number of cases still under investigation, prosecutions are pending, which makes it likely that 
additional participants may become public in the future. When these figures are finalized, the rate of decline will be 
lower. 
30 See, e.g., FEFANA. These comments may also apply to Japan and some other Asian countries. 
31 A related form of official assistance is in the provision of excessively detailed, publicly available price data 
(Albaek et al. 1997). Analogously, the DOJ has mentioned the role played by the trade magazine Chemical Market 
Reporter in printing prices that were the basis of price fixing methods.  A survey of 16 deep historical studies of   
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documented in the case of the lysine and citric acid cartels by Connor (2000: Chapter 5 and 8). 
Other cartels helped by trade associations appear to include cement (the EU, German, and Italian 
cartels), Dutch prawns, asphalt in Sweden and Finland, diesel fuel distribution in Lombardy, 
Dutch construction, and German industrial property insurance. In many of these cases, the trade 
associations were cited as violators and given fines. (In one U.S. FTC case, the only defendant 
was an international trade association for interpreters, the AIIC). In the United States the special 
status of farmers’ cooperatives also makes possible cartels with large numbers (Medhaven et al. 
1994). 
 
  Second, the EC has prosecuted at least six shipping conferences, four with large numbers 
of members (each had from 13 to 34 members). Liner conferences have bloc exemptions for 
many of their activities under EU competition rules, but are not permitted to fix prices for their 
members. In some cases these liner conferences have persisted in fixing shipping rates even after 
being denied exemptions for that activity. This appears to be a business institution that like trade 
associations can provide a cover for illegal behavior while operating openly for legitimate 
business purposes. 
 
  Third, some cartels with large numbers of participants have combined both horizontal 
and vertical price-fixing activities. In these cases, both manufacturers and distributors have been 
identified as members of a broad cartel in which the manufacturers horizontally fixed prices or 
terms of trade, and then manufacturers offered exclusivity contracts with retailers in return for 
no-sale policies in retail pricing. The U.S. cosmetics and UK toys and games cases fit this 
pattern. 
 
  Fourth, perhaps the most common reason for unexpectedly large numbers of participants 
is a failure to define the market boundaries properly for prosecution purposes. In particular, 
antitrust agencies find it convenient at times to investigate and prosecute multiple geographic or 
product cartels as though they were one conspiracy. The global vitamins case is frequently cited 
as a single violation, whereas the U.S. and EC cases clearly brought single actions against what 
were 15 cartels; although somewhat related by overlapping membership, each of these cartels 
had distinct product lines and time spans, each with from two to six participants that totaled 
about 20 companies. More commonly, cartels have sold products that are bulky and, therefore, 
are sold in local and sub-national geographic areas. Sometimes the cartels consist of one or a few 
firms with multi-market distribution that collude with a number of smaller firms. In such cases, it 
is appropriate to view “the cartel” as a series of overlapping circles or market areas; each area is 
a cartel populated by a unique combination of participants, some large ringleaders and some 
smaller followers, where the large leaders appear in two or more of the local cartels. This 
concept applies to the EU cement (42 companies), German ready-mix cement (69 companies), 
and district heating pipe (10 companies) cartels. Large cement companies like Lafarge (France) 
or Hocim (Switzerland) operated in many distinct geographic cement markets, but many of the 
smallest violators operated in only on or two of them. In the heating pipes case, Asea Brown 
Boveri sold pipes in both Denmark and Germany, but several of the makers confined their sales 
to one country alone. Other cartels that were probably amalgamations of multiple localized 
                                                                                                                                                             
international cartels finds that half of them had more than 12 members during at least some portions of their active 
periods; large numbers in every case can be traced to trade associations (Levenstein and Suslow 2002:16).   
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cartels are: bitumen, asphalt, construction, cartonboard, compressed gases, steel beams, and 




Durability or longevity is the total life span of an effective overt agreement on prices, 
from formation to abandonment (usually because of discovery or failure to prevent entry).  If a 
cartel ceases to affect prices yet maintains a formal management structure, this period should not 
be counted as part of its duration.  Ceteris paribus, the durability of cartels is doubtless an 
unambiguous indicator of the cohesiveness of a collusive group
32. However, cartel discipline is 
likely to be positively related in turn to a number of factors, including the opportunity for 
generating relatively large monopoly profits and to the persistence of entry barriers during the 
collusive period (Marquez 1994, Dick 1996). Cartelists may be able to control the probability of 
defection and may be able to adopt strategies to raise or maintain barriers to entry, but potential 
profitability and some types of entry barriers arise largely out of the structural environment of 
the cartel’s market.  A number of collusive models (e.g., Rotemberg and Soloner 1986) suggest 
that demand shocks will require price agreements to be renegotiated, and some of these 
renegotiations may be unsuccessful.  Besides demand shifts, other structural changes will require 
periodic changes in price or quantity agreements (Slade 1989).  Alexander (2003) emphasizes 
unstable currency exchange rates as a source of international-cartel breakdown.   
 
Levenstein and Suslow survey five empirical studies of cartel duration, three of them 
samples of international cartels (Table 6). High cartel control, low buyer concentration, low 
demand variability, low growth in demand, high profitability, and a history of cooperation 
positively affect longevity.  Dick (1996) also finds that the formation of a common sales agency 
and the age of the cartel aid cartel durability.  Experience, history, and the development of more 
complex management rules and structures go hand in hand to contribute to duration.  Suslow 
(1991) concludes that cartels holding patents and those focused on narrow product lines are more 
durable.  Unexpectedly, industry concentration and the number of participants have no 
significant effect on longevity. 
 
  Trends in discovered international-cartel durability are displayed in Table 4. On average 
these cartels spanned almost six years (i.e., about 69 months). Over the entire 1990-2003 period 
of observation, there is very little variability in durability that can be ascribed to the cartels’ 
industry groups. However, geographic scope of cartel operation appears to be systematically 
related to durability. The NAFTA area cartels were of average durability, but the cartels 
prosecuted by national European authorities operated for 30% shorter periods than the average (4 
years rather than 6). The multinational cartels of Europe and the global cartels lasted 25% longer 
than average (more than seven years). 
 
  The international cartels in this paper’s data set are more durable than most international 
cartels active in the years 1819-1984 (Levenstein and Suslow 2002: Table 2).  Three studies of 
older cartels find that mean durations ranged from 3.7 to 4.6 years; one finds durability averaged 
                                                 
32 Durability should not be equated with cartel stability, which is the infrequency with which collusion breaks down 
(or “reverts to Cournot” in the language of game theory).  Durable cartels may have few or many episodes of  price 




33.  The range in these studies was from a few months to 29 years.  However, a survey 
of 16 deep historical case studies of international cartels that began operating in the 19
th or early 
20
th centuries determined the mean duration to be 17.2 years (median of 8 years) (ibid. Table 9).  
The South African gem diamonds cartel lasted 120 years, in two separate episodes of 20 and 100 
years (Spar 1994).  One cartel (potash) was active for 75 years, but formed and reformed eight 
times.  These historical case studies tend to be selected because of there instability.    
 
 
Table 4. Average Durability of International Cartels, by Type, Over Time. 
Date of Discovery  Types of Cartels 
1990-1995 1996-1999  2000-2003 
  Months 
Product Groups:       
















      
Geographic scope:       
















      
-- = No observations 
Note: Superscript indicate sample size 
Source: Tables A.1- A.12. 
 
 
  One notable trend is a decline in cartel durability (Figure 4).  The average durability of 
international cartels discovered in 2000-2003 was more than 40% shorter than those discovered 
in the early 1990s. The decline in mean durability has affected every industry category and 
geographic location. The mean durability of global cartels is generally higher than those of more 
limited geographic scope, but these too have fallen over time (Figure 5). 
 
  The most rapid increase in rates of discovery occurred among the national antitrust 
agencies of Europe and other countries outside North America and the EU. Rates of cartel 
discovery more than doubled in North America and the EU from the early 1990s to the early 
2000s (Table 3). However, from no activity prior to 1996, the European national agencies began 
investigations of international cartels at a rate of nearly four cases per year in the late 1990s. The 
Netherlands authority NMa, newly empowered with greater investigative powers, brought a case 
against seven distributors of compressed industrial gasses in 1997, all of which were non-Dutch 
firms. Spain began investigation price fixing by the three leading gasoline retailers in 1999, a 
move soon imitated in Italy; in both cases the investigations followed their governments’ 
                                                 
33 If a cartel disbanded and later reformed, each episode is counted as a separate observation.   
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withdrawal from administrative control of petroleum-product prices. In 2000-2002, similar cases 
against retail gasoline companies were launched in Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Chile, and 
the Czech Republic. In the late 1990s Italy, with the newest antitrust law in the EU, brought nine 
cases against international cartels in a wide variety of industries: recorded music, cell phones, 
gas water heaters, glass containers, auditing services, and drugs. During 2000-2003, Italy 
increased the pace of discovery with seven new cases launched or concluded, a record only 
matched by NMa. The other European antitrust authorities with international anti-cartel activity 
during 1997-2003 were Germany (three cases), France (three), the UK (three), Norway (two), 
Sweden (two), and one each in Finland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Korea, Japan, 
Mexico, Australia, and Chile also brought international cartel cases in recent years. 
 
  It should be mentioned that in this analysis of average durability’s of cartels, the mean 
has been employed. However, the range of cartel durability’s is quite large, and the distribution 
is skewed by a few very large observations. The most durable cartel in the data set is the soda ash 
duopoly, which lasted from 1945 to early 1989 (530 months) and was fined by the EC in 
December 1990. The second most durable was the AIIC case, and association that fixed prices 
and contract terms for its members from 1956 to 1996, the year in which it signed a consent 
decree with the U.S. FTC. Most of the liner conference cases also displayed exceptional 
longevity. The briefest cartel in the data set is a Dutch action taken against three petroleum 
stations for three days of price fixing, but this degree of brevity is quite exceptional. As a result 
of a much larger proportion of very long lived cartels than brief ones, the sample is skewed and 
the median durability’s are lower than the means.  A re-examination of durability using medians 
demonstrates that the trends are not much affected by this conversion. 
 
This general trend toward discovery of cartels with increasingly shorter life spans is a 
phenomenon that deserves an explanation. One possibility is that highly experienced cartelists 
have become more adept at keeping their conspiracies clandestine, while at the same time cartels 
formed in more recent periods have not developed such skills. For example, the more recently 
discovered cartels appear to have a higher proportion of Asian companies than earlier cartels.  
Perhaps Asian managers, whose business experience is derived mainly from countries with lax 
antitrust enforcement, are not as concerned about covering up their cartel participation.  Another 
possibility is that the reservoir of discoverable cartels in the early 1990s simply contained a 
higher proportion of long-lived cartels than those discovered in the early 2000s. Ceteris paribus 
one would think that long-lasting cartels are easier to detect by antitrust authorities than newly 
formed cartels, if only because there are more potential corporate and individual whistle-blowers 
available for durable agreements because of the natural turnover in participants. Moreover, as 
will be discussed below, it is doubtless true that the leniency programs adopted by many of the 
world’s leading antitrust agencies have been increasingly effective in leading to cartel 
discoveries. On the whole, this second, more sanguine explanation of declining cartel life spans 
seems the more likely alternative. 
 
  The analysis of changes in cartel durability just presented used discovery dates, which is 
an  ex post or retrospective approach. From the viewpoint of antitrust enforcement, a more 
relevant analysis is one that focuses on the ex ante decision of cartel formation. As discussed in 
more detail below, the overarching objective of anticartel laws is to deter companies from 
collusion in the first place. Therefore, in Table 4A durability is examined prospectively by   
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categorizing the cartels according to the year in which they were first formed; starting dates are 
available for three-fourths of the sample. 
 
  Looking first at the cartels in all industries, it is apparent that mean cartel durability has 
declined considerably over time. Cartels launched before 1981 were about four times as durable 
as the discovered cartels that began in the early 1990s. However, the reader must be cautioned 
that some of the decline in mean longevity is a statistical artifact that results from the 1990 cutoff 
date used to construct the data set. The fact that only those cartels discovered since the beginning 
of 1990 are included implies that even if the average durability of cartels was equal for all 
starting periods, the mean durability would appear to decline because of the sampling date. 
Moreover, the data in the later periods are affected by the fact that mid-2003 is the cutoff, 
placing an absolute ceiling of 42 months on cartels started after January 2000. Observations from 
1996 are biased strongly downward because of this ceiling. Nevertheless, statistical sampling 
artifacts probably do not explain most of the decline in durability of international cartels from 
those formed decades ago to those formed in the early 1990s. 
 
  The mean longevity of cartels in the services industries is significantly higher in all 
formation periods (up to 1995) than cartels in all other industries. On average, service-industry 
cartels formed before 1996 last 20% longer than the average cartel and about one-third longer 
than manufacturing-sector cartels (Table 4A). In terms of geographic spread, cartels operating in 
North America are about 15% shorter in duration than the average cartels, whereas those 
operating in only one European country typically endure about 20% longer and the global-scope 




Table 4A. Average Durability of International Cartels, by Type, by Starting Date 
Starting Date 
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-- = No observations 
Note: Superscript indicate sample size 
Source: Tables A.1- A.12. 
a) The bulk of the vitamin cartels began in this period, 12 of the 15. 
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Table 4B. Average Durability of International Cartels, by Type and Starting Date 
Starting Date 
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-- = No observations 
Note: Superscript indicate sample size 
Source: Tables A.1- A.12. 





  Affected sales are simply the total revenues of the members of a cartel during the life 
span of the cartel.  Data are available on affected sales for about 70% of the sample. If reports of 
the antitrust authorities did not reveal the sales of convicted cartels, then sales were estimated for 
the relevant time span and geographic area for the entire market by using a variety of 
government, trade association, or industry publications. The proportion of known sales is 
somewhat lower (about 60%) for cartels discovered since 1999 than for cartels discovered prior 
to 2000 because this latest time period contains most of the un-prosecuted cases still under 
investigation; without information about the span of the conspiracy, it is usually impossible to 
determine the affected sales. All sales are converted to current U.S. dollars
34. 
 
  The mean sales sizes of international cartels discovered since 1990 are shown in Table 5. 
Total affected sales for all industries, geographic areas of operation, and time periods are more 
than $480 billion, or a mean value of $4.4 billion per cartel.
35 A few interesting patterns may be 
observed. First, the mean size of cartels located in the manufacturing industries tends to be larger 
than cartels involved in transportation, distribution, construction, finance, and other service 
industries. The mean size of the food-and-agricultural cartels (most of them organic chemical 
                                                 
34 Affected sales in current dollars are a lower absolute number than sales corrected for inflation would be.  
However, because most cartels were formed after 1982 when global inflation was modest, the degree of 
understatement is not serious and tends to be compensated by the minority of estimates based on industry-wide sales 
(rather than the normally slightly smaller cartel sales). 
35 Global inflation has been a modest 2 to 3 percent per year since the early 1980s, but some of the cartels had sales 
as far back as the 1940s. Although conversion to 2003 dollars would be desirable, it is a formidable task. In present 
dollars, total sales of this sub-sample is probably $700 to $800 billion.   
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ingredients), together with other organic chemicals, increased from the early 1990s to the early 
2000s. Second, the mean size of other manufacturing cartels, although relatively large, seems to 
have declined; however, this apparent decline is due to a small number of very large EU cartels 
prosecuted in the early 1990s. The two cartels that may distort the trend are the huge ($32 
billion) and durable (139 months) cement cartel and the $13-billion cartonboard cartel. Two 
other exceptionally large cartels ($25 and $29 billion) are the U.S. glass containers cartel and the 
flat glass cartel, which were found guilty at civil trials in 1990 and by settlement in 1997. Third, 
the mean size of global cartels has risen substantially over time; the late-1995 lysine case is the 
only cartel in the early period, but this trend is clear from the late 1990s to the early 2000s as 
well. 
 
  The extreme skewness in sales figures in most of the categories shown in Table 5 
suggests that the median sales size is more informative about the average than the mean (see 
Table 5A). Examining trends in medians reveals that the increase in the food, agricultural, and 
organic chemical cartels is pronounced in the early 2000s; this is a bit surprising because the 
1996-1999 period includes 14 vitamins cartels, many of which were quite large. The median 
sizes of all four industry categories dipped in 1996-1999, but only the services cartels failed to 
bounce back in the early 2000s. 
 
  Trends in geographic categories largely reflect the enforcement priorities of the world’s 
chief antitrust authorities. While the mean size of the NAFTA cartels has decreased (Table 5), 
the median size of these mostly U.S. – prosecuted cartels has increased (Table 5A). The reason 
that the means show a decline is that the two civil cases mentioned above (glass containers, flat 
glass) were huge (78 times larger than the remaining NAFTA cases of the 1990s). The median, 
therefore, is more representative of the more typical criminal cases brought by the U.S. DOJ., 
and these have increased sharply in median sized from the 1990s, to the early 2000s.
36 
 
  The two European categories tell an interesting tale. Beginning in the very late 1990s, a 
new division of responsibility emerged between the EC and the competition-law authorities of 
the Member States with respect to cartel enforcement. The EC and European Court encouraged 
the national European authorities to prosecute cartels that have limited geographic impacts, 
usually one country. Thus, one observed relatively small but significant cartels being 
investigated and prosecuted by European national authorities after the mid-1990s. 
Simultaneously, the size of EU-wide cartels (solely prosecuted by the EC) has sharply declined, 
especially when measured by the median, while the size of global cartels (prosecuted by the U.S. 
or EU or both) has markedly increased (Figure 6).  These patterns are consistent with a policy 
shift that allows the EC to focus on larger, mostly global-scope cartels, while the Member States 
focus on smaller more localized conspiracies. This is, of course, the division of responsibility 





                                                 
36 The early 2000, includes only a year or so fully influenced by the new Bush administration, so it remains to be 
seen whether one will observe a return to Baxter: style enforcement (i.e,. a focus on many very small bid-rigging 
cases). 
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Table 5. Mean Affected Sales of International Cartels, by Product and Geographic Type 
Date of Discovery 
Type 
1990-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003 
  Million dollars per cartel 
Product groups:       





















      
Geographic scope:       




















a)  Organic chemical intermediates not purchased by the food, feeds, or agricultural industries. 
Note: superscripts indicate numbers of observations 
Source: Table A.1 to A.12. 
 
Table 5A. Median Affected Sales of International Cartels, by Product and Geographic Type 
Date of Discovery 
Type 
1990-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003 
  Million dollars per cartel 
Product  groups:     
   Food and agricultural  1,932  600  1,650 
   Organic chemicals 
a 160  5  7,750 
   Other manufacturers  7,000  950  1,663 
   Services  1,800  1,000  361 
   All industries  2,745  715  1,100 
      
Geographic scope:       
   National EU  --  509  525 
   NAFTA nations  200  500  1,400 
   EU-wide  6,250  2,167  375 
   Global  1,932  1,140  7,650 
   All areas  2,745  715  1,100 
     
a)  Organic chemical intermediates not purchased by the food, feed, and agricultural industries. 
Source: Table A.1 to A.12. 
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  The third measure of cartel effectiveness is the average percentage overcharge during the 
affected period.  In general, illegal cartels are unable to achieve the full monopoly price because 
of disagreements among members, fear of entry, the existence of substitutes, or concerns about 
discovery.  An ideal measure of cartel effectiveness would be the average cartel price relative to 
the monopoly price. Overcharge data are difficult to find for cartels, but calculating a monopoly 
price is virtually impossible.  A sample of 70 observations has been developed for this paper
37. 
 
  The mean average overcharge is 28% of affected sales (Table 6). The overcharges are 
surprisingly invariant to the industry of the cartel. For the whole period 1990-2003, most 
industries displayed averages of between 25% and 35%; moreover, geographic scope made little 
difference as to the degree of monopoly power achieved. Of course these are averages; at the 
individual cartel level, the overcharges varied from 4% to 100%. 
 
  Levenstein and Suslow (2002) surveyed studies of the price effects of international 
cartels.  From their own sample of 35 cartels prosecuted since about 1990, the mean for 17 
overcharge observations is 39.4% (Table 15)
38; the median is about 25% (p.20).  Eckbo (1976) 
judged that the Lerner index for 37% of his 51 international cartels that operated in 18 industries 
from 1819 to 1964 exceeded 0.67; depending on the levels of competitive profits in the 
industries, the mean overcharge is somewhere around 55-65%.  Griffin’s (1989) sample of 54 
cartels active in 22 industries 1888-1984 had a mean Lerner index of 0.31, which corresponds to 
                                                 
37 Readers should be aware that 12 of the 70 estimates are vitamin cartels. Several estimates were developed by the 
author using generally conservative assumptions (Connor 2001: 319-336), while others are extracted from 
documents or decisions by prosecuting parties. Thus, there may be a slight overstatement for the latter group. 
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an average overcharge of about 25 to 30%. In sum, the price effects found in the present study 
are about the same as Griffin’s but lower than the other two studies.     
  
  Changes over time were also generally slight. Partly because no global cartels were 
discovered and prosecuted before 1995, the average overcharges rose form the early 1990s to the 
late 1990s. The degree of overcharge has remained particularly steady among the cartels in the 
organic chemicals industry (which includes most of the food-and-agricultural cartels). 
 
  Cartel studies have found it difficult to estimate the determinants of profitability 
(Levenstein and Suslow 2002:8).  Historians are often not interested in quantifying the impacts 
of the cartels that they study.  In their compilation of 16 monograph-length historical studies of 
international cartels, only five provided specific calculations of the price increases caused by the 
cartel, many of which were immediate or short-run price changes (ibid. Table 8). The South 
African cement cartel maintained prices 10% above the word price (Leach 1994); diamond 
prices increased almost 50% after the initial formation (Spar 1994);  the potash cartel increased 
prices 100% above average costs in the year after initial formation (Levenstein 2000, Schroter 
1993); German steel prices were 33% higher than world prices (Baker 1989, Barbezat 1989, 
1990, 1994); and tea prices rose 80% in 1933 when the cartel was re-established (Gupta 1997, 
2001).  The mean price increase of the five cartels is 55% and the median is 50%.  
 
Table 6. Percentage Overcharges of International Cartels, by Type. 
Date of Discovery  Type of Cartel 
1990-1995 1996-2003 1990-2003 
  Percent 
Product Groups:       












      
Geographic Scope:       
    National  27
5 -- 27
5 




    Global  --  28
19 28
19 




      
-- = No observations 
















  In a standard textbook on antitrust policies written in the early 1980s, the author tells the 
story of the international uranium cartel of 1972-1975.  This cartel was comprised of 29 suppliers 
of uranium, 17 of them U.S. firms that were successfully sued for treble damages by the largest 
U.S. buyer of uranium.  The fact that the U.S. DOJ never indicted the cartel 
 
“… demonstrates that the strict [U.S.] policy against price fixing 
largely exempts foreign cartels, even if they have U.S. members ... 
and probably affect prices in the United States.” (Shepherd 1985)
39 
 
How different the attitude is two decades later.  In the United States, the early 1990s 
represent a major watershed in international cartel enforcement policies and effort. From 1945 to 
late 1996, U.S. prosecutions of international price-fixing schemes were rare and almost 
inevitably unsuccessful. Since 1995, the U.S. DOJ has had a large number of legal victories 
against harmful, secretive global cartels.  The Antitrust Division, together with its sister 
competition agencies in many other jurisdictions, has steadily expanded its investigatory 
methods, powers to negotiate guilty pleas, and harshness of penalties for noncooperative 
violators. 
 
The competition directorate of the European Commission (EC) has also experienced a 
rising number of investigations of alleged cartel violations since the 1980s and during the 1990s. 
Most price-fixing cases pursued by the EC are international in the sense used in this paper, i.e., 
the corporate participants hail from two or more nations, and most also involved schemes that 
affected trade between the member states of the EU. However, the great majority of these cases 
have involved companies and geographic areas totally within the jurisdiction of the EC. 
Therefore, the EC has not had as many difficulties prosecuting international cartels as the United 
States and Canada.  
 
For Europe, prosecution of cartels has involved an intensification of effort and greater 
harshness of sanctions after 1995.  The EC’s first decision against a secret cartel was adopted in 
1969 (Monti 2002).  The total amount of cartel fines imposed from 1969 to 1995 was €500 
million in 33 cases (i.e., about 1.4 cases and $23 million per year on average).  Beginning in 
1996, the EC offered discounts on fines for companies that cooperated in cartel investigations, 
and this first leniency policy accelerated the number of cartel investigations.  From 1996 to 2001, 
24 cartel decisions were handed down and €2800 million in fines were imposed on 160 
companies (4.8 decisions and about $560 million per year).  In February 2002, a second leniency 
program was approved; it offered quicker decisions on discounts and the possibility of full 
immunity; in that year alone 9 cases were decided with fines of €1038 million (approximately 
$980 million). Therefore, the EC’s anticartel activity 1995-2001 has comprised 88% of all the 
fines imposed since the EU was formed.  
                                                 
39 Shepherd does not mention U.S. government partly decided not to prosecute because the Canadian government 
was a party to the agreement (Spar 1994).  The participation of foreign governments in cartels greatly complicates 
prosecutions.   
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Three changes in the nature of anticartel activity may be noted in Europe after 1995. 
First, the EC has become deeply involved in investigating and prosecuting global cartels for the 
first time. Of the 28 global cartels fined by the EC, all but two were sanctioned after 1995 
(Appendix Table 3). Second, the EC has for the first time formally and extensively investigated 
international cartels with the direct cooperation of antitrust authorities outside the EU. There are 
at least 13 examples of such joint investigations (Table 7).  U.S. – EC joint efforts are the most 
common, the first being the graphite electrodes cartel in 1997. In 2000, the first global cartel 
investigation involving four jurisdictions was launched.  Third, competition directorate was 
reorganized to create a special unit devoted to anticartel activity; a second unit was established in 
2002 (Monti 2002:1-2). Fourth, the 1996 and 2001 leniency programs (discussed in greater detail 
below) were highly productive. From 1996 to 2001, more than 50% of all conspiring companies 
received leniency for their cooperation.  In early 2002, the EC was receiving two leniency 
applications per month (ibid.). 
 
The final qualitative change in EC anticartel enforcement is the devolution of such 
activity exclusively from the EC to the national authorities of its member states. Similar to the 
federal-state concurrent enforcement in the United States, the EC has fostered the involvement of 
the member states in prosecuting conspiracies that operated within one nation’s boundaries. At 
least 32 international cartels have been fined by the European national antitrust authorities, all 
since 1997 and 80% of them since 1999 (Appendix Table 3). Most of these cartel prosecutions 
have been pursued under the national antitrust laws of the member states, but in one case the 
Netherlands prosecuted an international cartel using Article 81 of the EU Treaty. In another 
interesting innovation in 2002, the Norwegian and German antitrust authorities launched a joint 
investigation of an alleged cartel in calcium carbide (Table 7). 
  
The acceleration in annual rates of discovery of international cartels is quite impressive. 
Recall that “discovery” means the first date that a formal investigation becomes publicly known, 
which in some cases is also the date that sanctions are levied. In the case of global-scope cartels, 
only four more were discovered prior to 1996 (Figure 7). By the late 1990s, the rate of discovery 
of global cartels was more than six times faster than the early 1990s. After 1999, the rate had 
risen to eight per year – ten times faster than a decade earlier. 
 
The rate of discovery is even more rapid among international cartels that operated in only 
one country.
40 In the early 1990s, only 2.2 international cartels were being discovered each year, 
most in Canada or the United States (Figure 8). In the early 2000s, more than 13 of this type 
were being uncovered each year, the vast majority in Europe by the national authorities. Eight 
cartels have been prosecuted by authorities outside North America and the EU (Australia, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Japan, Korea, and Chile), all since 1998. 
                                                 




Table 7. Joint Investigations 
Authority  Date 
a Case 
USDOJ CCB  EC  JFTC Other 
June 1997  Graphite electrodes  √   √    
Oct. 2002  Rubber processing chemicals  √   √    
Oct. 2002  EPDM synthetic rubber  √  √      
Nov. 2002  Carbon block  √   √    
Dec. 2002  Tar pitch  √   √    
Dec. 2002  Creosote  √   √    
Dec. 2002  Naphthalene  √   √    
Feb. 2003  Parcel tankers, chemical  √   √    
Feb. 2003  PVC plastic impact modifiers  √  √  √  √  
Feb. 2003  PVC plastic heat stabilizers  √  √  √  √  
Feb. 2003  MBS  √  √  √  √  
May 2003  Copper concentrate  √  √  √   AUS 
Jan. 2003  Sulfuric acid 
b  √  √      
Dec. 2002  Calcium carbide 
c         DE/NOR 
a)  Date on which raids or joint investigations are first made public by the authorities themselves, by 
companies seeking amnesty, by targets in their financial reports, or by investigative journalism. Not all raids are 
made public. 
b)  First known example of a NAFTA-area case. 
c)  First known example of joint investigation by European national authorities. 




































Figure 8: Rates of Discovery: 


























The prosecutorial success of the U.S. DOJ and the EC’s DG-4 have encouraged other 
national agencies to focus more resources on anticartel enforcement, to adopt new laws 
strengthening investigatory powers or raising sanctions, and to reorganize the antitrust 
authorities.  More vigorous enforcement is noted since the mid 1990s in Australia, South Korea, 
and selected East Asian countries (Round 2002). The UK has made the most sweeping changes; 
in 2003 price fixing was criminalized, fines were raised, and prison sentences of up to five years 
were made possible. 
 
  Antitrust authorities have been goaded into action by the disrespect shown by cartelists to 
competition laws and those who enforce them.  Speech after speech by top antitrust officials 
betrays a visceral antipathy for global price fixers.  The global conspirators are consistently 
described in highly emotive language as brazen, cold-blooded, contemptuous of the law, 
disdainful of their customers, and eager to break their own companies’ rules (Hammond 2002, 
Spratling 1999, Monti 2001).  Particularly surprising to antitrust prosecutors is the involvement 
of the most senior officers of colluding firms in the management of the cartel.  At the same time, 
these global cartelists have shown a fear for the ability of U.S. authorities to detect their illegal 
activities by avoiding meetings on U.S. territory and by trying to hide the existence of the cartel 
from U.S. employees; these practices were particularly evident after the lysine-cartel 
investigation became public in 1995.  Elaborate measures were taken to cover up the cartel’s 
activities wherever the conspiracy took place. 
 
  Once the threat of global conspiracies came to be recognized by the newly appointed 
head of the Antitrust Division in 1992-1993, the agency reordered its priorities fairly quickly.  
Prior to 1995, less than 1 percent of the corporations accused of criminal price fixing were   
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foreign-based firms; after 1997, more than 50 percent were non-U.S. corporations.  Fines 
imposed on global price fixers escalated steeply from 1996 to 1999, with new record amounts 
collected nearly every year.  In 1999 alone, the $900-million-plus collected from international 
price fixers was far more than the entire 108 years of U.S. antitrust enforcement.  Nearly four-
fifths of the DOJ’s fines for criminal price fixing were imposed on non-U.S. firms in the late 
1990s.  The use of personal fines and prison sentences has also escalated; since 1995, the U.S. 
government has sent more than 30 executives to prison for price-fixing, and a high proportion are 
not U.S. citizens.  Perhaps more importantly, the success enjoyed by the U.S. DOJ has been 
increasingly mimicked abroad by the antitrust agencies of Canada, the EU, Mexico, Korea, 
Brazil, and Australia.  In 2001, the EU collected more than €1.8 billion in price fixing fines; 
from 1998 to 2001, the total was €2.5 billion (Arbault 2002). 
 
  This section presents some original data on the prosecutions by the U.S., Canada, and EU 
of international cartels, most of them global in scope.
41  The purpose is to show the pattern of 
anticartel enforcement by government agencies of three jurisdictions that have the most active 
programs to deter price fixing.  These data are necessary to develop a fuller understanding of the 
potential for effective cartel deterrence in the long run. 
 
The U.S. Department of Justice 
 
  The U.S. Sherman Act became law in July 1890.  While the U.S. Congress has 
implemented many clarifying amendments over the years, the section of the Sherman Act that 
prohibits all agreements, contracts, or conspiracies in restraint of trade has remained virtually 
untouched in its original form.  “Naked” cartels, those arranged through direct explicit 
communications between independent firms, are per se violations of U.S. law; no amount of 
evidence concerning circumstances in the industry or effects of the agreement on markets will be 
considered evidentiary in determining guilt.  If the conspiracy is serious enough and the evidence 
of intent strong enough, corporations and individuals may be charged by the DOJ as a criminal 
matter.  In practice, the DOJ files about 95 percent of all price-fixing cases as criminal matters, 
and nearly all other antitrust violations are treated as civil matters, for which the burden of proof 
is merely the preponderance of the evidence.  All other parties that bring suits against price 
fixers, including other federal agencies and state attorneys general, may file only civil 
complaints. 
 
  Although preceded by antitrust laws passed by 13 states of the United States and at least 
two other countries (France and Canada), the Sherman Act became the first truly effective 
anticartel statute.  By 1897 the U.S. DOJ had successfully prosecuted the first of many domestic 
price fixing conspiracies.  The famous American Tobacco case decided by the Supreme Court in 
1911 had some international elements; two of the defendants were UK firms.  However, except 
for the period of five years following the end of World War II, the DOJ prosecuted very few 
international cartels, even though the Sherman Act applies to any conspiracy that affects U.S. 
markets.  It appears that international cartels formed between 1945 and 1990 were few, very well 
                                                 
41 Recall that under the U.S. DOJ’s definition of “foreign” or international at least one target (corporate or 
individual) of an investigation or conviction must have non-U.S. registration, citizenship, or residence.  Global 
cartels are subsets that aimed at affecting prices in three or more continents or consist of members drawn from three 
or more continents, usually Europe, North America, and Asia.   
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hidden, or had no U.S.-corporate membership.  Moreover, in the three or four cases of global 
cartels that were prosecuted between 1950 and 1995, the DOJ lost the cases because the 
witnesses were foreign or key evidence located abroad could not be obtained by prosecutors.
42 
 
  The notable success in prosecuting global cartels after 1995 may be traced to several 
improvements in the law and in investigatory techniques (Connor 2001, Baker 2001).  First, the 
Sherman Act’s penalties were steadily increased by amendments in 1955, 1974, 1987, and 1990 
(Table 8). In 1974, corporate fines were increased twenty-fold, and personal participation was 
made a felony (prison sentences were raised from a maximum of one year to three years).  In 
1987, a federal judicial commission further raised the possible fines on corporations up to a 
maximum of double the cartel’s overcharge, a level that could far exceed the previous statutory 
cap of $1 million; larger personal fines also became feasible.
43  In 1990, the Sherman Act 
received a centennial “birthday present” of yet larger statutory fines from the Congress.  Thus, 
from 1974 to 1990, the maximum corporate liability for U.S. price fixing rose from $50,000 to 
twelve times the cartel’s overcharge.
44 
 
  Cohen and Scheffman (1989) provide a useful survey of increases in U.S. price-fixing 
fines. From 1955 to 1974, the average fines for corporations and individuals amounted to only 
0.4% of the cartel’s affected sales. During 1974-1980, when the maximum corporate fine was 
raised to $1 million, the average price-fixing fines rose to 1.4% of affected commerce. During 
this period the U.S. DOJ issued guidelines that specified 10% of affected sales as the “base fine,” 
with two aggravating factors and two factors permitting downward departures from the base fine. 
Thus, on average, corporations received 86% discounts from the base fine in 1974-1980. 
 
  In 1984, it became possible to fine price fixers “double the harm,” that is, twice the 
overcharges; this power was rarely applied in practice. A 1988 survey reported average corporate 
price-fixing fines of only $160,000 per company. Moreover, instead of 200% as permitted by 
law, Sheer an Ho (1989) found that the average 1988 corporate fine was a mere 0.36% of the 
overcharges. In 1987, the recommendations of the U.S. Sentencing Commission were made law 
(USSC 1997). The guidelines for price-fixing fines were strongly affected by submission of DOJ 
staff and optimal deterrence theory. These sentencing guidelines, still currently in force, propose 
a base fine of 20% of affected sales (which is calculated on double-the-harm for an assumed 10% 
overcharge). 
                                                 
42 In the Industrial Diamonds cartel case, the case was dismissed in large part because a key witness residing in 
Europe refused to testify and many inculpatory documents were in South Africa beyond the reach of U.S. 
subpoenas. 
43 Under the so-called “alternative sentencing provisions” of 18 U.S.C.S 3571 (d), the U.S. DOJ can calculate a 
violator’s base fine using the overcharge of all the cartel’s members, not just a single company’s (Spratling 1997). 
44 Government fines are based on double the overcharges to U. S. buyers, but the DOJ has the discretion to use 
global affected sales in place of U.S. sales; the former are typically at least three times domestic sales.  Treble 
damages for direct buyers may be followed by treble damages for indirect purchases in state courts or parens patriae 
suits. The U.S. Government has not used global sales to calculate the base fine up to now; it only uses large global 
sales to adjust the culpability multipliers (Kovacic 2002). However, it may still have the power to use global sales 




Table 8.  Criminal Penalties for Price Fixing, U.S. Sherman Act, 1890-Present. 
 
a In serious cases, prosecutors can file multiple counts against firms involved in one conspiracy.  Not used much in recent years. 
b Misdemeanor 
c Became a felony for individuals. 
d The base fines are calculated using either double or 5% of the estimated monopoly overcharge.  The base fines are multiplied 
by upper and lower figures that depend on the degree of “culpability” (larger numbers for several exacerbating factors and 
smaller ones for extenuating factors).  In the 1990s, the multipliers have often been between 1.5 and 3.5.  If the overcharge is not 
known, it is presumed to be 10% of affected sales, which yields a base fine of 20% of affected sales, and a typical fine range of 
30% to 90% of cartel sales.  However, if a cartel creates a 25% overcharge, then the base fine is 50% of affected sales and the 
final fine range will be 75% to 225% of sales.  “Sales” is usually U.S. only, but may be global cartel sales.  In rare cases 
individuals can be fined up to $25,000,000 depending on their cartel’s overcharge amount. 
 
 
  The culpability factors (increases for recidivism, high-level-management involvement, 
and big rigging; decreases for cooperation) then allow for a range of corporate fines between 
20% and 80% of affected sales. In theory, corporations are liable for at least 14 times higher 
fines after 1987 than during the late 1970s; in practice, the DOJ typically requests very large 
discounts for minimally cooperative firms. 
  
Second, around 1993 an enforcement policy shift took place in the DOJ that placed a 
higher priority on investigating international antitrust violations and that instructed the FBI to 
employ all the tools of their trade to collect evidence.  Prior to 1993, price-fixing fines had been 
cheerily paid with all the embarrassment associated with a parking ticket.  The FBI had treated 
price fixers with the gentleness accorded a shoplifter.  But after 1992, price-fixing probes had all 
the trappings of a major conspiracy by the worst types of organized criminals.  Armed with 
intimidating new powers to sanction firms and their managers, prosecutors bargained hard to 
obtain confessions and to “flip” conspirators into useful witnesses against their co-conspirators.  
The 1993 revision of the DOJ Corporate Leniency Program described below was a particularly 
important investigative innovation.  Prosecutors became sophisticated in their use of amnesty, 
leniency, or other blandishments to induce cooperation.  By 2001, nearly 70 percent of all 
corporate price-fixing defendants were foreign-based. 
  Third, the DOJ has introduced a number of methods of cooperating with other 
jurisdictions (ICPAC 2000, Pate 2003). Protocols between agencies permit sharing of 
information on cartel investigations or enforcement actions, subject to restrictions set by national 
laws on confidentiality. More formal treaties (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties) can facilitate 
joint investigations, and other bilateral treaties can legalize extradition of cartel managers 
indicted for antitrust crimes. Informal regular meetings of enforcement officials have fostered the 
exchange of effective investigatory techniques, such as the corporate leniency program. The 
Maximum Penalties for Individuals  Year 
Enacted  Maximum Fines for Companies 
Fines  Prison 
(Months) 
1890  $5,000 per count 
a  $5,000 per count  12
b 
1955  $50,000 per count 
a  $50,000 per count  12
b 
1974 $1,000,000  $100,000c  36
c 
1987  Larger of $1,000,000 or double the 
harm with multipliers 
d 
Larger of $100,000 or 5% of the 
harm with multipliers 
d 
36 
1990  Larger of $10,000,000 or double the 
harm with multipliers 
d 
Larger of $350,000 or 5% of the 
harm with multipliers 
d 
36   
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International Competition Network has been joined by dozens of antitrust authorities; top 
officials now meet once a year to exchange views and initiate projects of mutual interest. 
 
  The U.S. DOJ’s criminal price-fixing record is summarized in Table 9.  During 1980-
1999, the Antitrust Division convicted more than 50 price-fixing crimes per year on average.
45  
Until late 1996, nearly all the cases prosecuted were domestic schemes that involved modest 
sales in the affected markets.  Indeed, during the 1980s, more than 80 percent of the price-fixing 
cases involved bid-rigging, mostly construction firms colluding on government projects or 
suppliers to local school districts; fewer than 15 percent were directed against conventional 
corporate cartels. 
     
  After 1990, enforcement patterns returned to the more traditional pattern of prosecuting 
horizontal collusion by corporate perpetrators.  More importantly, starting with the lysine cartel 
in September 1996, the most important U.S. price-fixing convictions have been global 
conspiracies in food-and-feed ingredients.  Ten such cartels were fully or partially prosecuted 
during, 1996-1999.
46  Total corporate fines imposed in the ten food-and-feed cartels were $1,326 
million on 33 multinational corporations (five more companies were granted amnesties).  In 
addition, the U.S. DOJ has convicted members of ten global cartels in other markets.  However, 
the food-and-agricultural cartels accounted for 81 percent of the cartelized sales and 85 percent 
of all the fines on discovered international cartels. 
 
  During 1970-1999, the DOJ has obtained corporate fines from a high share (83 
percent) of the corporations found guilty of criminal price fixing (Table 9). The global cartels 
prosecuted in the late 1990s were clearly all fairly serious cases because all of them resulted in 
fines for the corporate participants.
47  Indeed, all cartel members were fined except for those 
offered amnesty (Nanni 2002).
48   
 
Table 10 summarizes the sanctions imposed by the DOJ on violators involved in 
international price fixing since 1990 – 36 cases in all. A total of 118 corporations have paid fines 
or were liable to pay fines.
49 Of the 118 guilty firms, 23 were not fined; they either received 
amnesty or in a few cases settled with the government through non-monetary means such as 
consent decrees. As not all of these cases are closed, it appears that another 35 or so companies 
will either plead guilty or insist on a trial 1n 2003-2004. Thus, the average international cartel 
case generates about four corporate convictions. 
                                                 
45 The DOJ convicts more than 80% of those indicted for antitrust.  Nearly all convictions are through       
    plea bargains rather than trials. 
46 Data in this paragraph from Connor (2002:  Tables 3, A.1, A.2, and A.3.). 
47 Table 10 includes every global cartel case filed after September 1996 and largely concluded by mid 2003. 
48 Only one corporate cartel participant risked a jury trial, and it lost badly.  Mitsubishi Corp. had very little direct 
involvement in the global graphite-electrodes cartel, yet it was fined $134 million in 2001. 
49 A few firms were fined more than once. These are double counted.   
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-- = not available 
Sources: Posner (2001:45), Connor (2001),  Appendix Tables 2 and 10. 
a Proportion of criminal cases to total DOJ antitrust cases. 
b An unusual case; individual found guilty of racketeering as well as price fixing. 
c Seven persons have been indicted in a fourth, the sorbates case, but are fugitives as of 2003. 
d  Global cartels calendar year, others federal fiscal year Oct 1-Sept. 30. 
e Six persons in three cases are indicted fugitives. 
 
 
DOJ fines on the 36 international cartels prosecuted since 1990 have amounted to $2,250 
million (Appendix Table 2). With 95 companies fined, the average per company is $24 million, 
but the range is quite large and skewed toward smaller fines. Twenty of the companies or 21% 
received fines of $1 million or less, whereas 38 (40%) companies are members of the DOJ’s 
“Ten-Million-Dollar Club.” 
 
The temporal pattern of U.S. fines on the 36 international cartels is shown on in Figure 9. 
Fines imposed on the four cartels first prosecuted in 1992-1994 amounted only to $23 million 
(these are omitted from the figure). Beginning in 1995, the pattern is strongly affected by five big 
cases: lysine ($92.5 million in 1995), citric acid ($105.4, 1996), graphite electrodes ($433.3, 
1998), vitamins ($876, 1999), and the USAID/Egypt construction case ($141.2, 2000)
50. Indeed, 
these five cases account for 75% of the fines imposed during 1992-2003. 
 
                                                 
50 Te USAID-construction case includes restitution, which is treated in this paper as equivalent to a monetary fine. 
Cases in Which Prison  
Sentences Imposed 






Imposed  Total 
Number  < 1 yr.  1-2 yrs.  2+ yrs. 
  Number 
1970-1979 176  156  25  24  0  1
b 
1980-1989 623  513  196  183  10  3 
1990-1999 416  324  61  47  12  2 

























           
  Percent of Total 
1970-1979 42
a 88.6  14.2  96.0  0  4.0
b 
1980-1989 84
a 82.3  31.5  93.4  5.1  1.5 
1990-1999 68
a 77.9  14.7  77.0  19.7  3.3 






















16.7   
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Clearly, 1998-99 was the peak year for U.S. fines from international corporate price 
fixers. After 1999, the total fines imposed trail off significantly. In the first half of 2003, only 
one cartel was fined by the DOJ ($5 million). While this drop off may signal a change in federal 
Anticartel policy, most of the decline seems to be attributable to the size of affected sales. It is 
likely that the number of international-cartel cases to be filed in 2003-2004 will be high; in July 
2003, the DOJ had 120 grand juries enpummeled on price-fixing allegations, of which 50 were 
international cartels (Pate 2003). 
 
Prison sentences can be imposed by U.S. courts, which almost always follow the DOJ’s 
recommendations in these matters..  The threat of prison is still reserved for the most serious 
types of price-fixing, namely, those involving large economic injuries or cases in which the 
cartel managers resisted pleading guilty and cooperating with prosecutors.   
 
Historically, the DOJ sought prison sentences for individuals in a minority of price-fixing 
cases; the rate was 23% all price-fixing cases during 1970-1999 (Table 9). But in the case of 
global cartels, the DOJ obtained prison sentences in 50% of the cases since 1995.  Half of the 
prison sentences are at the felony level of more than 12 months. On average, about three 
executives plead guilty or are indicted per global cartel. As of 2003, about 30% of the indicted 
executives not yet sentenced were residing outside the United States and were fugitives; another 
10% were U.S. citizens awaiting trial (Appendix Table 10). The share of long sentences imposed 
on the cartel ring leaders is particularly striking.  In the one case where the managers resisted 
making deals for pleading guilty, the lysine cartel, the three ADM executives lost at trial and 
were sentenced to a collective 99 months in prison; ADM’s Vice Chairman was the first person 
in antitrust history to receive the maximum 36-month sentence. 
 
Criminal indictments and convictions of food-and-agricultural price fixers display an 
interesting geographic pattern (Table 11).  Since 1990, total of 559 corporations and 99 
individuals have been sanctioned for their roles in about 65 international cartels by U.S. or EU 
authorities. (There is some double counting of corporations sanctioned for the same infraction by 
both jurisdictions). The majority of corporate cartelists come from just four countries: Germany, 
Belgium, the United States, and Japan. The top ten countries account for 80% of all international 
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Table 10.  Fines and Sentences Imposed on International Cartels by U.S. DOJ, 1990-2003. 
No. of Fines  Prison Sentences Imposed 
Case First Filed  Corpor-
ate
a  Persons 






1993 Aluminum phosphide  3
2 0
3 -- 0 0  0 
            
1994 Fax thermal paper rolls  6 1  --  0  0  0 
1994 Plastic dinnerware  3  7  1996  7  80  21 
            
1995 Explosives  4  2
1 1996 1  10 10 
1995 Ferrosilicon  2
2 1  1995  1  4  4 
            
1996 Lysine  5  6
1 1999 3  99 36 
1996 Citric acid  5  4  --  0  0  0 
1966 Tampico fiber  3
1 0  --  0  0  0 
1996 Laminated tubes  0  0  --  0  0  0 
            
1997 Sodium gluconate  3
2 5  --  0  0  0 
            
1998 Anti-anxiety drugs  4  0  --  0  0  0 




5 -- 0 0  0 
1998 Heavy-Lift marine 
transport 
2
1(+2) 2  --  0  0 0 
1998 Graphite electrodes  7
1 3  1999  2  26  17 
1998 Sorbates  5
1(+1) 0
8 Pending  -- -- -- 
1998 Niacin (vitamin B3)  4  2  2000  2  20  12 
            
1999 Vitamins A,E,C,B1,B5  7  6
2 1999 6 22.5 5 
1999 Choline chloride (B4)  2  05  --  0  0  0 
1999 Sodium erythorbate  1
1 0  --  0  0  0 
1999 Maltol  1
1 0  --  0  0  0 
            
2000 Bromines  1
1(+1) 0  --  0  0 0 
2000 Construction, USAID  4
1 2
1 2001 1  36 36 
2000 Bridge, California  1(+1)  1  --  0  0  0 
2000 Bridges, cable-stayed  2  1
1 -- 0 0  0 
2000 Fine art auctions  1
1 1
2 2002 2  18 12 
2000 Tactile tiles  1(+1)  0   --  0  0  0 
2001 MSG and nucleotides  3
1(+4) 0
1 -- 0 0  0 
2001 Isostatic graphite  3
2 2
3 2002 1  3  3 
2001 MCAA  3
1(+2) 0 2002  3  9 3 
            
2002 Organic peroxides  1
1 0  --  0  0  0 
2002 Carbon cathode block  3
1 2
2 Pending  -- -- -- 
2002 Stamp dealers  0(+8)  0
2 Pending  -- -- --   
 
41 
2002 Polyester staple  1(+1)  1
1 -- 1 8  8 
2002 Carbon electrical 
products 
1(+1) 1
4 2002 0  0  0 
2002 Carbon fiber  1(+6)  0  --  0  0  0 
            
2003 Magnetic iron oxide  1
1(+1) 3
1 Pending  -- -- -- 
            
Total 95
23(+35) 65
43  32  341.5  36 
-- = Not applicable 
Source: Appendix tables 2, 3, and 10; Tables A.1-A.12. 
 a Superscripts indicate persons indicted but not convicted (either awaiting trial, awaiting sentencing, or fugitives).  Numbers in 
parentheses are companies known to be under investigation.  Some may be fined or imprisoned later. 
 
One unusual case, the Euro-Zone Banks prosecution in the EU, distorts the distribution 
shown in Table 11. Excluding this case causes Belgium, Portugal, and Austria to drop out of the 
top ten countries to be replaced by Italy, South Korea, and Sweden: the top five countries then 
become the United States (17% of all corporate violators), Germany (15%), Japan (14%), France 
(9%), and the UK (7%). The individuals sanctioned for initiating and leading international cartels 
are overwhelmingly from the United States and Japan (65%). 
 
  Table 12 examines the nationalities of sanctioned cartelists in the case of global 
cartels only. The 150 corporations caught participating in these cartels are headquartered in 19 
countries, but those from Japan, the USA, Germany, France, and South Korea account for 77% 
of the total. Relative to the sizes of their national chemical industries, Japan, South Korea, 




Table 11.  Nationality of Participants of International Cartels, 1996-2003. 
Indicted by DOJ 
a  Sanctioned by EC 
b Total  Corporations 
Country  Companies  Persons Euro-Zone  Other  All  Excluding 
Euro-Zone 
  1. USA  56  41  0  14  70  70 
  2. Germany  16  9  17  47  80  63 
  3. Japan  37  23  0  23  60  60 
  4. France  11  5  0  26  37  37 
  5. UK  7  4  0  21  28  28 
            
  6. Netherlands  5  5  15  17  37  20 
  7. Switzerland  11  5  0  6  17  17 
  8. Italy  2  2  0  13  15  15 
  9. South Korea  5  1  0  9  14  14 
10. Sweden  1  1  0  11  12  12 
            
11. Austria  0  0  8  10  18  10 
12. Norway  3  0  0  6  9  9 
13. Belgium  1  1  66  7  74  8 
13. Spain  0  0  0  8  8  8 
13. Denmark  0  0  0  8  8  8 
            
16. Taiwan  1  0  0  3  4  4 
16. Finland  0  0  7  4  11  4 
18. Mexico  2  0  0  1  3  3 
19. Portugal  0  0  27  1  28  1 
20. Ireland  0  0  9  0  9  0 
            
Others 7  2  0 12  17  17 
            
Total 165  99  149  247  559  408 
a)  Includes guilty corporations granted amnesty and fugitive individuals 
b)  Includes infringing corporations granted amnesty 
c)  Eleven countries with one or two sanctioned parties 
Source: Appendix Table 2 
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Table 12. Nationality of Corporate Participants in Global Cartels, 1995-2003  
Indicted by DOJ  Country 





        
  1. Japan  20  20  18  38 
  2. USA  19  15  10  29 
  3. Germany  9  6  11  20 
  4. France  8  4  7  15 
  5. South Korea  4  1  10  14 
        
  6. Switzerland  5  4  4  9 
  7. Netherlands  3  2  4  7 
  8. United Kingdom  3  5  3  6 
  9. Denmark  0  0  2  2 
  9. Singapore  0  0  2  2 
        
  9. Hong Kong  0  0  2  2 
  9. Taiwan  0  0  2  2 
13. Sweden  0  1  1  1 
13. Malaysia  0  0  1  1 
13. Mexico  0  0  1  1 
        
13. Poland  0  0  1  1 
17. Belgium  0  1  0  0 
18. Italy  0  1  0  0 
        
TOTAL 71  60  79  150 
Source: Appendix Table 2 and 10. 
 
Corporate sanctions need not stop with fines. In a conviction of bid-rigging against the 
U.S. Agency for International Development on building projects in Egypt, a U.S. court required 
two convicted firms to pay for large advertisements in the Wall Street Journal and New York 
Times that detailed their shameful transgressions. The U.S. DOJ intends to seek similar court 
orders in appropriate cases. Corporate governance restructurings, divestitures, or disgorgement 
are possible additional sanctions that courts may require. 
 
The executives who are fined or imprisoned for global price fixing by the U.S. DOJ are 
often at or near the top of their corporate management structures. Yet, in general the fines 
collected from individual criminal conspirators are modest compared with their corporate 
salaries (Table 13). The median fine is $50,000.  Moreover, some non-U.S. companies pay the 
fines for their convicted executives. 
 
However, there are two noteworthy examples of high fines paid by the ringleaders of 
global cartels. The first was a fine of $10 million paid in 1998 by the German Chief Executive 
Officer of SGL Carbon, the instigator of the graphite electrodes cartel. He paid a fine well above 
the statutory cap of $350,000 to avoid a prison sentence. Second, in 2002, the Chairman of   
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Sotheby’s art auction house was convicted at trial for fixing the fees for selling precious works of 
art. His fine of $7.5 million was the first litigated example of the alternative fine statue being 
applied for price fixing. This statute permits personal fines of up to $25 million, depending on 
the size of the overcharge caused by the cartel’s operations. 
 
The conviction and imprisonment of non-U.S. executives for criminal price fixing by 
U.S. authorities is an extraordinary development in recent enforcement history (Table 14).   
During 1995-2002, the U.S. DOJ has arranged guilty-pleas from dozens of top executives who 
were nationals of 12 foreign countries: Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, England, France, 
Switzerland, Italy, Sweden, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and South Korea (Hammond 2002a).  Many 
of these executives worked in the United States, but some traveled from their residences abroad 
to submit to the jurisdiction of the U.S. court, plead guilty, and pay fines.  Although some are 
indicted fugitives, nearly 80 percent of all price fixers of food-and-agricultural cartels are foreign 
nationals.  Moreover, about ten foreign nationals from Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and 
Sweden have served significant prison sentences in the United States.     
 
The majority of all price fixers of U.S. prosecuted international cartels are non-U.S. 
nationals. About 20 executives indicted for global price fixing, the vast majority of them 
Japanese citizens, have chosen to remain fugitives by residing outside the U.S. territories. On the 
other hand, at least 12 foreign nationals from Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden have 
served significant prison sentences in the United States. One reason for foreigners’ willingness to 
serve time in U.S. prisons is that if they reside or even pass through countries that have criminal 
statutes for price fixing, they may be extradited to the United States (Nanni 2002a).  The United 
States has explicit treaties with Canada, Ireland, and Japan that permit extradition for antitrust 
violations, though none of these has yet been invoked.  In 2002, Interpol added U.S. antitrust 
fugitives to its “Red Notice” watch list for the first time.  When foreign executives plead guilty 
for price fixing, they are frequently granted the right of free passage across U.S. borders for their 
cooperation. 
 
In summary, the financial penalties applied by the U.S. DOJ to global price fixers in the 
late 1990s were unprecedented in their harshness.  Despite an increasing number of amnesties, 
average corporate fines for members of global cartels in the late 1990s were many times higher 
than the fines collected in 1990-1996, but declined significantly after 1999.  While individual 
fines remained modest on the whole, managers of global conspiracies were more than twice as 
likely to receive prison sentences as managers of domestic conspiracies, and the length of the 
sentences has remained high since about 1998.  Corporate and individual sanctions have both 
declined since the peak year 1999. The main reasons for the escalation in fines in the late 1990s 
were the extraordinary escalation in legal standards, the expanded size of the markets affected, 
the high overcharge rates, the longevity of many of the conspiracies, and, if truth be told, the 
rising intolerance of the judicial system for thieves dressed in expensive suits.  This rise is 
especially notable in light of the fact that, correcting for inflation, average corporate fines were 
essentially unchanged for the first 90 years of the 20th century.    
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Table 13. Range of U.S. Individual Fines for International Cartel Violations, 1990-2003 
Persons Fine 
  $ thousand 
1. Robert Kohler  10,000 
2. A. Alfred Taubman  7,500 
3. Robert Krass  1,250 
4. Robert Hart  1,000 
5. Michael D. Andreas  350 
   
6. Terrance Wilson  350 
7. Mark Whitacre  350 
8. Andrea Hauri  350 
9. Dianna Brooks  350 
10. Akira Nakao  200 
   
11-15. 5 executives  150 
16.      1 executive  125 
17-22. 6 executives  100 
23.      1 executive  90 
24-29. 6 executives  75 
   
30-36. 7 executives        50 (median) 
37-61. 25 executives  less than 50 
  
Total  24,400 
Average (Mean)  400 
Source: Appendix Table 10.   
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Table 14.  Average U.S. Criminal Penalties for Price Fixing, 1890-1999. 







     Dollars Months 
   1890-1899  0  0  0 
   1900-1919  20,000 0  0 
   1920-1939  77,800 0  0 
   1940-1949  52,000 0  0 
   1950-1959  40,000 NA  0 
   1960-1969  131,000 NA  0.1 
   1970-1979  301,000 5,000
a 2 
   1980-1989  368,000 NA  4E 
   1990-1996  1,000,000 67,000 5E 
   1997
b  7,000,000 125,000  0 
   1998
 b  11,000,000 131,000  0 
   1999
 b  38,000,000 1,871,000  19 
   2000
 b  24,406,000 0  0 
   2001
 b  7,094,000 36,250 11 
   2002
 b  7,007,00 128,050  3 
 
Sources: Posner (2001), Shepherd (1985), Connor (2001), DOJ (2002), Appendix Tables 3 and 10 
NA = Not available, but a small amount. 
a From the Folding Carton case. 
b Global cartels.  The corporate lysine case is placed in 1997, but the individual sentences were delayed to 1999.  
 
 
Canadian Competition Bureau 
 
  The Canadian Competition Bureau (CCB) enforces laws similar to those in the United 
States, and its prosecutions follow those in the United States by a year or so (Connor 2002: Table 
A.3).  Cartel violations are crimes treated in effect as per se illegal acts.  Persons can be fined 
and imprisoned, but this power is used quite sparingly.  The CCB is a small agency that 
cooperates closely with the U.S. DOJ.  Its indictments of global cartels usually followed those 
announced by the DOJ after a lag of six months to one year.  As in the United States, the CCB 
has imposed record antitrust penalties, but at a level proportionately lower than the U.S. fine 
rates, typically representing 10 to 20 percent of Canadian sales during the affected period.  In 
several cases, except for leniency discounts, apparently to save the costs of economic analysis 
and litigation, the CCB has imposed identical percentage-of-sales fines on each of the 
conspirators in global cartels. 
 
  Canadian cartel-enforcement policy shifted in the mid-1990s. Canadian corporate fines 
for global price fixing are shown in Table 15.  Prosecution began in 1998 with the lysine and 
citric acid cartels.  The fines imposed on these two cartels were almost double the amount the 
CCB had collected from all other cases in 1990-1997.  By mid 2003, Canada had collected 
C$120 million in fines from 11 global cartels.  Of the 11 cartels, nine followed U.S. convictions 
and the other two EU sanctions. 
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  Only one person, the CEO of a Canadian vitamin manufacturer, has been incarcerated.  
This sentence of 90 days was the first such punishment in many years.  Three more cartel 
managers, from Germany, Switzerland, and Japan, have paid large fines for their roles in the 
citric acid, vitamins and sorbates cartels.  They paid a fines totaling $750,000, which were the 
third-largest fines in recent antitrust history.  
 
  In addition to global cartels, the CCB fined 20 corporations a total of C$13.4 million for 
regional price fixing (Table 15A).  Each of the six international cartels involved manufactured 
products, some of them imported.  Nearly all of the companies fined were non-Canadian, which 
reflects the very high share of Canada’s manufacturing sector that is foreign owned.  The three 
cartels convicted in 1991-1993 (compressed gasses and forest insecticides) operated solely in 
Canada, but the remaining three cartels (fax paper, choline chloride, and sodium erythorbate) 
were jointly prosecuted with the DOJ in 1994-2001. 
 
  Canada does not automatically prosecute all global cartels that are found guilty in the 
United States.  At least eight such convictions have had no Canadian follow-up.  For example, 
four food-ingredient cartels with relative small affected sales fined by the DOJ in 2001 (e.g., 
maltol, nucleotides) have not yet been prosecuted in Canada. In four other cases (fine arts, 
carbon fiber, magnetic iron oxide, and the 3-tenors CD), the U.S. prosecutions were quite 
lengthy and difficult; the Canadian Ministry of Justice seems to have passed on indicting in order 
to conserve its resources for cases easier to win.  
 
Canadian fines for international price fixing were imposed predominantly on conspiracies 
in food and agricultural markets; since 1990, more than 75 percent of the fines have been 
imposed in these industries.  Moreover, the vitamins cartels were by far the largest cartel cases 
uncovered.  The vitamins fines accounted for 48 percent of all cartel fines imposed in Canada 
since 1990.  Although Canada has a relatively small national market and many of the convicted 
firms sold cartelized products only through exporting (thus, owning few if any assets in Canada 
that could have been seized in the event of nonpayment of fines), it has been able to mount a 
surprisingly effective anticartel campaign using very slim enforcement resources.  Canada is a 
model for many smaller industrialized countries that have tough anticartel laws on their books 
yet have weak enforcement.  Unlike many other areas of law enforcement, the returns to 
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Table 15.  Canadian Global Price-Fixing Convictions and Fines, 1990-2003. 
Year Product:  Company  (Ultimate Parent)  Fine 
     C$ million 
1991-96 Various:  12  Companies  15.0 
      
1998 Lysine:  ADM  9.1 
   Ajinomoto  2.3 
   Sewon  America  0.1
a 
   Kyowa  Hakko  0.0
 a  
      
1998 Citric  acid:  Jungbunzlauer  1.3
 a  
    Haarmann & Reimer (Bayer Corp.)  3.2 
   Hoffmann-La  Roche  2.0 
   ADM  1.3 
   Cerestar  Bioproducts  (Eridania)  0.5 
      
1998 Sodium  gluconate:  ADM  0
 a  
   Jungbunzlauer  0.6 
   Roquette  Frères  0.5 
   Fujisawa  Pharmaceuticals  0.3 
    Glucona (Akzo Nobel)  0.2 
      
1999  Chlorine chloride  Chinook Group  1.5 
   Russell  Cosburn  0 
   DuCoa  Pending 
   Mitsui  Pending 
      
1999 Vitamin  B12  Hoechst/Aventis  0.2 
   Rhone-Poulenc/Aventis  0
 a  
      
1999-2000 Vitamins: 
b Hoffmann-La  Roche  34.1 
      Kuno Sommer  0.1 
      Roland Broenimann  0.2 
      Andres Hauri  0.1 
   BASF  12.7 
   Rhône-Poulenc  9.4 
   Takeda  3.6 
   Daiichi  1.7 
   Eisai  1.3 
   E.  Merck  0.7 
      
1999-2001  Sorbates:  Ueno Fine Chemicals  1.0 
   Daicel  Chem.  Industries  1.6 
      Takayasu Miyasaka  0.2 
   Höechst  (Aventis)  1.6 
   Eastman  Chemical  0.5   
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   Nippon  Gohsei  0.1 
      
2000-2001 Graphite  electrodes: SGL  Carbon  12.50 
   UCAR  Intl.  11.00 
   Tokai  Carbon  0.25 
      
2001 Sodium  erythorbate:  Pfizer  1.50 
   Fujisawa  0.00
 a  
      
2001 Isostatic  graphite:  Carbone of America  0.30 
   Ibiden  Pending 
   Toyo  Tanso  Pending 
   Tokai  Carbon  Pending 
   Nippon  Steel  Pending 
   SGL  Carbon  Pending 
      
2002 Vitamin  B3  Degussa  1.6 
   Lonza  0.7 
   Napera  0.2 
   Reilly  0.02 
      
2003 Methyl  glucamine  Aventis  0.34 
   E.  Merck  0
 a  
      
 TOTAL  48  corporations  120.0 
 
Source: Canada Competition Bureau and Department of Justice: Fines chart dated November 23, 1999, News 
Releases, and Statements of Fact. 
a Discounted because of early cooperation with the Ministry. 
b Investigations continuing as of early 2003.  Two individuals were fined C$250,000 each (not shown). 
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  Like Canada, the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG-4) 
has cooperated with U.S. and other national antitrust agencies, but it is also terribly understaffed 
and even slower to act.
51  The EC’s international-cartel decisions take an average of four years 
                                                 
51 The DG-COMP has about 500 professionals, half the Antitrust Division’s number, but broader legal 
responsibilities (state subsidies, issuing negative clearances, etc.) than the Division. Moreover, the U.S. DOJ has 
dedicated investigators in the FBI, whereas DG-4 does its own probes. 
Year Product  Company  (Parent)  Fine 
     C$ million 
1991  Compressed gasses  Canadian Oxygen  0.5 
   Union  Carbide  1.2 
    Canadian Liquid Air  1.2 
   Liquid  Carbonic  1.2 
   Air  Products  0.3 
     4.4 
      
1993  Insecticides, forest, synthetic  Chemagro (Bayer)  1.3 
   Sumitomo  Chemical  0.8 
     2.1 
      
1993  Insecticides, BT, forest  Abbott Labs  1.4 
   Chemagro  (Bayer)  0.5 
     1.9 
      
1994  Thermal fax paper  Kanzaki Paper Mfg.  0.44 
   Mitsubishi  Paper  0.62 
   Mitsubishi  International  0.68 
    Kangaki Specialty Papers  0.68 
   Rittenhouse  Ribbons  0.07 
     2.49 
      
1999  Choline chloride, No. Am.  branch  Chinook Group  1.5 
   DuCoa  Pending 
   Bio-products  (Mitsui)  Pending 
     1.5 
      
2001 Sodium  erythorbate  Pfizer Corporation  1.0 
   Fujisawa  Pharma.  0 
    Cheil Jedang  0       
     1.0 
      
 TOTAL    13.4 
Source: Tables A.9 and A.12.   
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after U.S. prosecutions are announced (Connor 2002: Table A.3).  The EC’s lysine decision 
came eight years after the U.S. DOJ began investigating.  Unlike the United States, Canada, and 
some of its member states, EU law treats antitrust violations solely as a civil infractions by 
business entities.
52  Individual conspirators are not personally liable for monetary penalties or 
prison sentences (Connor 2001:81-91).  In this sense the powers and procedures of the DG-IV 




  Prior to the strengthening of the Sherman Act’s sanctions during 1974-1990, the EC’s 
formal authority to impose fines for major cartel violations was considered superior to the DOJ’s  
powers.  Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, corporate members of cartels have been 
subject to maximum fines of 10 percent of sales in the year or years prior to an effective price-
fixing agreement.  The EC’s fines can be based on the global sales of an offending firm in all its 
lines of business, but in practice cartel fines are mostly based upon a violator’s EU sales in the 
affected line of business only (Connor 2001:401-407).
54 
 
  The difference between U.S. and EU powers to fine corporations may be easily illustrated 
using a hypothetical but realistic example.  Take ADM’s situation in the citric acid market during 
the mid 1990s: annual global sales of about $10 billion and citric acid sales of about $200 
million per year (distributed equally between North America, Western Europe, and the rest of the 
world) out of $900 million in global citric acid sales.  Then consider three cartel scenarios: (I) a 
short-lived cartel of modest effectiveness (a 10-percent overcharge), (II) a cartel of a three-year 
duration and highly effective (30 percent), and (III) a ten-year, highly harmful cartel. The 
method of calculating antitrust fines was made more exploit in an EC decision of January 1998 
(Wils 1998). 
 
  Table 16 demonstrates ADM’s maximum antitrust liability under current U.S. and EU 
laws.  By assumption, the overcharges on ADM’s buyers in the EU and USA are identical and 
equal to $6.7 million per year.  Looking at cartel scenario I (a short, weak conspiracy), ADM 
would be liable for a top U.S. fine of $13 to $60 million, depending on the company’s degree of 
culpability (i.e., whether it was the cartel’s initiator, chief enforcer, or failed to cooperate with 
the DOJ’s investigation).
55  In the EU, ADM would be liable for simply an amount equal to its 
monopoly profits of $6.7 million, unless the EC took the unusual step of invoking global sales to 
calculate the cartel fine.  In the latter case, the EC could impose a $1,000-million fine on ADM.  
Thus, the sales base employed by DG-IV has a critical effect on whether EU fines can be higher 
or lower than comparable U.S. fines. 
                                                 
52 Besides the USA and Canada, eight other countries provide for criminal sanctions: Austria, Germany, France, 
Norway, Ireland, Slovakia, Japan, and South Korea.  Australia and the UK are considering such laws (Hammond 
2002). 
53 Like the FTC, the EC competition directorate investigates allegations of antitrust violations, holds hearings in 
which defendants can present their side of the case, makes an initial determination of guilt, recommends sanctions, 
has those decisions approved by the full commission, and may have its decisions appealed by the guilty parties to 
two higher courts.  
54 Serious consideration is begin given to imprisonment and personal penalties (Wils 2001). 
55 Under the Sentencing Guidelines approach, the U.S. DOJ arbitrarily adopts 20 % of sales as the base fine, and 
then multiplies this base by the culpability factor, which for global cartels in the late 1990s ranged from 1.5 to 4.0.  
Under the simpler felony approach, ADM is liable for twice the overcharge.   
 
52 
Examining the scenario with the long-lasting, high-overcharge assumptions, the DOJ can 
request greatly enlarged fines of $200 to $600, because the overcharge in scenario III is 30 times 
larger ($200 million) than that for scenario I ($6.7 million).  However, the EC’s ability to fine is 
severely hampered by its 10-percent-of-sales rule.  In particular, under its usual practice, the 
EU’s top fine on ADM would be quite a bit lower than ADM’s monopoly profits from its EU 
operations during the cartel.  That is, based on jurisdictional sales only, the EU’s ability to 
disgorge cartelists’ illegal profits is weak.  It is in such cases that the EC is most likely to 
consider ADM’s global sales as a basis for its antitrust penalties. 
 
Table 16.  Maximum U.S. and EU Fines for a Company with $200 Million in Affected Sales in a 
$900-million Global Cartel. 
United States  European Union














   Million dollars 
I. One year, 10%     
overcharge 
       
A. Jurisdiction sales basis
  b 6.7  20-60  13.3  6.7  333 
B. Global sales basis 
c 20.0  60-180  40  20.0  1,000 
           
II. One year, 30% overcharge           
A. Jurisdiction sales basis 
b 20.0  20-60  40  6.7  333 
B. Global sales basis
c 60.0  60-180  120  20.0  1,000 
           
III. Ten years, 30% overcharge           
A. Jurisdiction sales basis 
b 200.0  200-600  400  6.7  333 
B. Global sales basis 
c 600.0  600-1,800  1,200  20.0  1,000 
 
Source: Connor (2001:87). 
a Assumed that the sales of the cartelized product were $66.7 million in the EU out of $200 million in the world. 
b Assumed that of $900 million in global sales of cartel, $300 million occurred in the U.S. and $300 million in the 
EU.  The company has a 22% share of each geographic market.  The USSG (1997) multipliers are 1.5 to 4.0, 
depending on the seriousness of the offense. 
c Rarely applied by U.S. authorities.  More commonly applied (but in a minority of cases) by the European 
Commission. 
 
  As in all jurisdictions, maximum fines are one thing and actual fines another.  The EU 
has recently adopted guidelines for calculating firm-by-firm discounts from the maximum 
statutory fines.  First, the DG-IV considers the “gravity” of the offense; cartels are always the 
“most serious” (the highest of three levels) type of antitrust infringements, and large overcharges 
that are geographically widespread only add to the gravity.  Second, large companies are fined 
double the amount of “small” ones: in the lysine case the threshold was €3 billion.  Third, fines 
are increased by 10 percent per year for each year the cartel is effective.  Fourth, these three 
factors result in a “base fine” that is adjusted upward by 50 percent for cartel leadership and 
downwards 20 percent for passivity.  Fifth, a 10-percent discount is given for immediate 
cessation of the conspiracy.  Finally, under the Leniency Notice, violators are given discounts for   
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their degrees of cooperation, from 10 percent for minimal cooperation to 50 percent for the most 
cooperative.  In rare cases, amnesty is granted. 
 
  The description just given for fine-setting probably overstates the degree of precision of 
the process.  Moreover, firms can and usually do appeal the EC fines to the European Court of 
First Instance, where they often receive modest downward adjustments.  Nevertheless, the fines 
meted out by the EC for 15 cases of global price fixing have reached an impressive $1,852 
millions (Table 17).  The first large cartel fined was lysine, with a total of nearly $100 million.
56  
In 2001, decisions were reached in four huge cartel cases with total fines of $1,115 million 
(together with other antitrust fines, DG-IV imposed €1.8 billion in fines in 2001).  In 2002, the 
EC announced an historic decision to fine four companies $250 million for global price fixing in 
the market for the amino acid methionine; this is the first time that the EC has prosecuted a 
global cartel prior to a U.S. conviction.  Another 12 or more global cartel cases under 
investigation are likely to result in continuing large fines for the next few years. 
 
Table 17. EC Fines on International Cartels, 1990-2003 
Year 
a Product  Number of 
Companies  Fine 
  Global Scope:    Million dollars 
      
1992  Europe-Central W. Africa shipping  13  15.3 
1992  French-W. Africa shipping  17  15.3 
1998  TACA North Atlantic shipping  15  236.0
b 
2000  FETTSCA Far East shipping  15  7.7 
2000 Lysine  5  97.9 
2001 Citric  acid  5  120.4 
2001 Vitamins  9  756.9 
2001 Sodium  gluconate  6  51.2 
2001 Graphite  electrodes  8  186.9 
2002 Methionine  3  250.4 
2002 Nucleotides  3  21.1 
2002 Isostatic  graphite  6  50.9 
2002 Extruded  graphite  1  8.8 
2002 Fine  art  auctions  1  20.1 
2002 Methyl  glucamine  1  2.8 
2002 MCAA  2  10.0 
      
  Total 16 Global Scope  110 1,851.7 
      
  EU Regional:    
      
1990 Soda  ash  2  65.0 
1994 Steel  beams  14  110.9 
1994 Cartonboard  19  117.6 
                                                 
56 The EC’s lysine investigation was launched one year after the FBI raids were publicized and four years after the 
FBI’s probe began.  The EC’s decision was announced four years after the DOJ’s convictions.   
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1994 PVC  plastic  13  20.3 
1996 Ferries,  channel  5  0.7 
1998  Stainless steel, flat  6  25.4 
1998  District heating pipe  10  77.3 
1998 British  sugar  4  11.0 
1999  Ferries, Adriatic   7  59.6 
2000 Euro-Zone  banks  5  89.7 
2000 Cement,  EU  23  103.3 
2000 Carbonless  paper  10  282.6 
2001  Beer, Belgium, store brand  4  1.6 
2001 Zinc  phosphate  6  12.0 
2001  Danish air route  2  45.1 
2002 Plasterboard  4  479.3 
2002 Compressed  gasses, Netherlands  8  22.9 
2002  Mobile phones, Netherlands  5  92.1 
2003  Beer, Belgium, HORECA  2  79.3 
      
  Total 19 regional  149 1,797.0 
  EC 35 total  259 3,648.7 
Source: Appendix Table 11 and 12. 
a Year in which fines announced. Euros translated into U.S. dollars using that date.  
b Fines nullified by appeal to the European Court in September 2003. 
 
Figure 10: International Cartel Fines 
























































In addition to global cartels, the EC has been busy with cartels organized within its 
jurisdiction. Most of these cartels involved conspiracies across national borders, but five of the 
19 operated within one member state (Table 17). The number and size of the EU regional cartels   
 
55 
is close to that of the global cartels. Total fines imposed ($1,797 million) was only slightly less 
than those imposed on the global cartels. The total of EC fines on all types of international 
cartels is $3,648.7 million, which is 60% more than the DOJ’s total over the same period. 
 
The temporal pattern of the EC’s international cartel fines is shown in Figure 10. The 
years 2000-2002 were clearly banner ones; the years 2000-2002 account for 73% of the 1990-
2003 total. The 2001 peak year for the EC follows that of the DOJ by two years. However, the 
size of the fines in 2003 appears to be slowing relative to 2002. 
 
Four of the five cartels prosecuted by the EC in 2000-2001 operated in the food-and-
agriculture sector.  As in the United States and Canada, these cartels accounted for the lion’s 
share of fines: 85 percent in the EC case.  A recent survey of EC competition-law enforcement 
did not anticipate these cases (Buccirossi et al. 2002).
57 
 
Other National Competition Authorities 
 
  This section examines the recent but accelerating number of international-cartel 
prosecutions of national authorities other than the United States and Canada.
58 These agencies 
have  fined a total of 40 international cartels and as of 2003 were investigating another 11 
international cartels. These 51 cartels comprised 29% of the data set constructed for this paper 
(Appendix Table 3). The first such cartel to be fined was the glass-containers case reported by 
the national antitrust authority of Italy in July 1997. In the late 1990s, Italy was by far the most 
aggressive in prosecuting internationally cartels, with nine of the 15 cartels cases (Table 18). In 
all, Italy has prosecuted 16 international cartels since 1997 and is investigating one more; Italy 
accounts for 35% of the cartels discovered by the “other” national authorities. 
 
  Italy’s rate of discovery has diminished to about two cases per year since 1999, but the 
national antitrust authorities in the Netherlands and France have become newly energized. All of 
the Netherlands’s authority’s cases were launched since mid-2001, shortly after its investigative 
powers were strengthened. Much of its work is consumed by a major scandal involving big 
rigging by scores of construction companies of Dutch government building projects. The new 
found assertiveness of the French national authority is also impressive given that council’s 
subjugation to the Ministry of Finance. Nearly all other national authorities have a large measure 
of independence from government ministries. 
 
  In addition to the 40 cases generated by nine EU members, there are 11 cases associated 
with eight non-EU countries (Hungary and the Czech Republic will soon join the EU). All of the 
European cases have involved cartels that fixed prices inside their national borders.
59 Most of the 
remaining cases are also national-scope conspiracies. The only global-cartel cases prosecuted by 
a national authority outside North America were lysine, vitamins, and graphite electrodes. 
                                                 
57 These authors concluded that the DG-IV’s priorities in the agricultural-inputs industry were tacit collusion.  Overt 
price fixing was mainly a concern in the food processing industries. 
58 Besides all the usual journalistic sources, information on these cases was supplemented by visiting the web sites 
of more than 25 national authorities, many of which have extensive translations into English. Another important 
source were these agencies annual reports to the OECD, which tend to highlight most of the bigger cartel cases. 
59 One possible exception is the calcium carbide case currently being investigated by Norway and Germany.   
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Mexico imposed a negligible fine on a couple of the lysine conspirators in the late 1990s, and 
Brazil is currently probing the vitamins cartel. However, the only antitrust authority to impose 
substantial fines on global cartels was the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC). In 2002, the 
KFTC imposed fines of $8.5 million on six companies guilty of graphite-electrodes price fixing 
and $3.1 million on six vitamins manufacturers. This is a remarkable victory for a new Asian 
authority. 
 
  The fines imposed on international cartels by European and Asian national authorities are 
summarized in Table 19. More than 350 companies have been fined, of which one-third were 
foreign, a total of $1,446 million by mid-2003. 
 
Table 18. International Cartels Discovered by Other National Authorities. 
Date of Discovery 
Fined Cartels  Investigations Only  Country 
1997-1999  2000-2001  2002-2003  2000-2001  2002-2003 
Total 
E U :          
    Netherlands  -- 2 2 -- 3  7 
    Italy  9 5 2 -- 1  17 
    UK  -- -- 1 -- 1  2 
    Germany  1 -- 1 -- 1  3 
    France  1 -- 4 -- --  5 
    Spain  1 -- -- -- --  1 
  Sweden  --  1  1  --  --  2 
  Norway  1  --  --  --  1  2 
    Finland  -- -- -- -- 1  1 
         
N o n - E U :          
    Brazil  -- -- -- -- 1  1 
    Mexico  1 -- -- -- --  1 
    Australia  1 -- 1 -- --  2 
  Korea  --  1  2  --  --  3 
    Chile  -- -- -- -- 1  1 
  Czech Republic  --  --  1  --  --  1 
    Hungary  -- -- -- -- 1  1 
    Japan  1 -- -- -- --  1 
         
Total  16 9 15 0 11  51 
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Table 19. Fines Imposed on International Cartels by Other National Authorities 
Companies Fined  Case Decided  Country 
Domestic Foreign 
Amount 
   Number $million 
Global scope:        
  1998 Lysine  MEX  0  2+  0.1 
  2001 Vitamins  AUS  0  4   
  March 2002 Graphite electrodes  KO  0  6  8.5 
  April 2003 Vitamins  KO  0  6  3.1 
        
National scope:        
  7/97 Glass containers  IT  3  1  21.6 
  10/97 Recorded music  IT  0  5  4.5 
  3/99 Drugs, cholesterol  IT  3  2  0.1 
  3/99 Drugs, respiratory  IT  1  1  0.4 
  5/99 Hydro power equipment  NO  2  0  2.6 
  5/99 Water heater gas  IT  4  3  7.3 
  10/99 Cell phones  IT  1  1  80.7 
  11/99 Concrete  DE  64  4  192.6 
  11/99 Military fuel  JP  10  1  18.1 
  12/99 Drugs, obesity  IT  1  1  1.6 
  2/00 Auditing services  IT  0  6  2.2 
  3/00 Infant formula  IT  3  3  3.0 
  5/00 Elevator repair  IT  1  3  8.4 
  6/00 Retail gasoline  IT  4  4  290.0 
a 
  6/00 Retail gasoline  SW  1  4  84.4 
a 
  7/00 Match distribution  IT  3  1  0 
  11/00 Radiological media  IT  2  3  3.9 
  6/01 Military fuels  KO  3  2  146.3 
  6/01 Retail gasoline  ES  1  2  3.6 
  1/02 Construction  NL  25+  25+  Pending 
  4/02 Generic drugs  UK  3  3  Pending 
  5/02 Power transformers  AU  2  1  12.4 
  6/02 Appliances distribution  FR  1  7  33.6 
  6/02 Retail gasoline  NL  1  1  1.1 
  7/02 Property insurance  DE  12  1  Pending 
  9/02 Ball bearings  FR  5  1  18.8 
  9/02 Retail gasoline  CZ  1  5  10.3 
  10/02 Cement  HU  1  1  0.5 
  11/02 Bicycles  NL  4  1  Pending 
  11/02 Concrete engineering  NL  1  1  Pending 
  11/02 Toys & games  UK  2  1  43.7 
  12/02 Athletic tracks  NL  4  1  Pending 
  12/02 Mobile phones  NL  1  4  92.1 
  12/02 Retail gasoline  CL  1  3  Pending 
  1/03 Prawn fishing  NL  12  4  15.0   
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  2/03 Construction  NO  2  2  Pending 
  3/03 Asphalt  SW  9  2  189.3 
  3/03 Cigarettes  IT  1  1  62.4 
  3/03 Diesel distribution  IT  16  3  0.5 
  4/03 Beef  FR  6  0  18.0 
  4/03 Cement, Lombardy  IT  10  1  Pending 
  4/03 Diabetes test device  IT  1  4  35.2 
  4/03 Compressors  AU  1  2  0.5 
  6/03 Asphalt paving  FI  5  1  Pending 
  6/03 Insurance  NL  ?  1  Pending 
        
TOTAL   236  121  1,446.2 
 
 
The total fines imposed (a few are under appeal) is somewhat less than either the EU or 
United States, but an impressive amount given the restricted size of these national economies and 
the relatively few years of active enforcement. The average fine imposed was $38 million, but 
the median is much lower (about $11 million). 
 
A fairly large share of these cases involved government bid-rigging schemes. Several 
cases dealt with sales of drugs or diagnostic devices to national health programs; asphalt, 
concrete, and other public construction services; and fuels purchased for the military. Seven 
cases focused on retail gasoline prices; many of these followed recent privatizations of national 




  Suits by injured private buyers of cartelized products were authorized by the Sherman 
Act of 1890 (Connor 2001:70-71).  These civil suits are often called treble-damage actions 
because of the upper limit of the recovery allowed under the law.  In theory, these awards 
provide for compensation (the overcharge), for the costs and risks of private investigation and 
legal costs, and for punitive a punitive component (Hovenkamp 1999).  Plaintiffs have the 
burden of proof that the illegal activity occurred, that the economic harm was a direct result of 
the illegal conduct, and of the size of the damages; proof requires the use of reasonable methods 
and the support of the preponderance of the evidence. Most private suits are organized as class 
actions, and most are settled out of court with few details about the evidence publicly revealed.
60  
The large majority of cartel civil suits follow criminal convictions; a small number settle prior to 
convictions; and a few successful private suits have no parallel government cases. 
 
  There is a lively debate in the law-and-economics literature over the desirability of treble 
damages suits. Papers published in the 1970s and 1980s expressed concern that treble damages 
would encourage buyers to delay suing price fixers in order to increase their legal recoveries – a 
                                                 
60 Plaintiffs that remain members of the federal class have their negotiated settlement approved by the supervising 
judge, but these decisions are typically not published or avidly available. Even for some large court-approved 
settlements, press reporting is spotty. Settlements by opt-out plaintiffs are strictly confidential unless recipients are 
obligated to report a recovery to their shareholders.   
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perverse incentive (Besanko and Spulber 1990). Other researchers have suggested “neutral” 
welfare consequences; that is, private suits result in pure income transfers with no social welfare 
impacts. The latest word in this stream of the literature is Besanko and Spulber (1999). Their 
game-theoretic model with apparently reasonable assumptions deduces that treble damages 
generally leads to positive welfare increases if the probability of conviction and the multiple of 
damages recovered is high enough. 
 
  Despite a thorough search of business and legal news sources, satisfactory information 
could be gleaned about only 17 private U.S. federal-court settlements or trials since 1990, where 
the defendants were alleged members of international cartels. Nine were global and eight were 
regional NAFTA area cartels.  Counting the main vitamins case as one observation, information 
is available on 47% of U.S.-prosecuted global cartels and 36% of the NAFTA regional cartels.  
Of the remainder, some have private suits pending resolution, some have been settled but were 
not newsworthy, and a small number had no private suits filed (e.g., in the USAID-construction 
case the federal government was the only injured party). 
 
  Private parties recovered about $3.4 billion in the nine global cases (from $1 million in 
sodium gluconate to $1630 million in vitamins).  Defendants in the eight regional cartels paid 
about $550 million to plaintiffs, the largest being cosmetics ($199 million) and choline chloride 
($147 million).  Even though both types are based on only U.S. affected commerce, the average 
global settlement was eight times as large as the average regional settlement.  
 
  Are these recoveries big or small?  There are three ways of measuring the relative size of 
these private rewards: the ratio of the recovery to affected sales, the ratio of settlement to the 
overcharge, and by comparison to the government’s fine (Table 20). 
 
Table 20. The Size of Private Awards 
__________________________________________________________________ 
      Measure                                                                   Global               Regional 
______________________________________________________________________  
 
Median settlement/affected commerce ratio                      18%                 1.3%                
 
Median settlement/overcharge ratio                                   76%                 29% 
 
Median settlement/median fine ratio                                    1.75                2.06 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source:  Appendix Table 6; Tables A.2, A.6, A.8, and A.12     
 
  To summarize, the median settlement rate for the 17 private cases was 12% of affected 
sales, with the global types 1.5 times as high.  The median settlement rate as a proportion of the 
overcharge was 29%, and the global cartel median was 1.6 times as high..  The median dollar 
settlement was about $92 million, but the median global-cartel suit settled for 1.75 times as 
much.  Global cartels by every measure typically yielded settlements that were 50% to 75% 
higher than regional cartels. Although these settlements recovered higher proportions of affected   
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sales than typical domestic price-fixing cases a decade or two ago, the typical international-cartel 
settlement is tiny compared to the 300% of damages envisioned by the framers of the Sherman 
Act 
 
  There is little to be said about private cartel suits outside the United States. These types 
of suits are permitted in Canada, Mexico, Australia, and most EU member states, but are rare in 
practice (Connor 2001: 89, 529-530).  These jurisdictions typically permit only single damages, 
have high burdens of proof, and have low chances of success for plaintiffs. Up to 2003, only one 
private international-cartel suit has been concluded  outside the United States in plaintiffs’ favor.  
Buyers of citric acid in Canada were awarded C$8 million, which is 2% of the amount received 
by buyers in the United States.  Suits are proceeding for iron oxide, lysine and vitamins buyers in 
Canada and vitamins buyers in Australia.  No other private anticartel suits have been reported by 
the world’s press.   
 
  The absence of private suits outside of three countries has a negative effect on deterrence 
of global cartels, because only about one-fourth of the injuries caused by such cartels occurs in 
the United States, Canada, and Australia. Buyers in other parts of the world have no recourse for 
private compensation in their local court systems, but one possible remedy is to allow foreign 
buyers standing to sue for treble damages in U.S. courts (Adams and Bell 1999). Foreign buyers 
who purchase exports in the United States already have standing, but what of foreign buyers 
whose purchases take place completely off shore? 
 
  The Sherman Act refers only to business transactions that “affect” U.S. commerce. In the 
case of global cartels, unless the cartel is able to keep prices high in Europe or Asia, geographic 
arbitrage will inhibit the ability of the cartel to maintain high U.S. prices. Thus, the injuries to 
buyers in Europe and Asia are a necessary adjunct to the affects on U.S. buyers, which suggest 
that such non-U.S. buyers should have the right to seek redress in U.S. courts. 
 
  Concerns about foreign buyers overwhelming U.S. judicial resources led to the passage 
of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) in 1982 (Davis 2003). The FTAIA 
excludes Sherman Act suits on “wholly foreign” sales unless a “foreign cartel” has a direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable anticompetitive effect on U.S. consumers or producers. 
U.S. court decisions have resulted in a check-list of factors that make a cartel “foreign”. In this 
paper, the term “global cartel” fits these factors. At least two U.S. court decisions in 2002 and 
2003 decided that wholly foreign purchases of vitamins and fine art in auctions had the right to 
sue in the U.S. courts, so long as at least one domestic buyer had standing to file a Sherman Act 
claim. 
 
  Although the U.S. DOJ has taken the position that deterrence will be impaired because 
fewer parties will apply for leniency, it is equally clear that expanding the sales territories over 
which suits can be launched will increase deterrence. In short, the net effect of such suits is an 
empirical question that must weigh the balance of the two effects. Deterrence issues are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
 





  Global cartelists face investigations and possible fines in as many as ten national and 
supranational jurisdictions.  Mexico, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and a 
few other countries have active anticartel agencies.  However, the three jurisdictions with 
heretofore the most consistent legal responses to global cartels are the United States, Canada, and 
the EU. 
 
  The fines imposed by the United States, Canada, and the EU are roughly proportional to 
the sizes of the affected markets’ sales in the respective jurisdictions.  In the 11 overlapping 
cases of global cartels available, government anticartel fines were highest in the United States, 
28% lower in the EU, and about 6% of U.S. levels in Canada (Table 21).  Even more impressive 
is the high degree to which fines were correlated in size between jurisdictions.  The simple 
correlation between the U.S. and EC fines was +0.96, between the U.S. and Canada +0.96, and 
between the EC and Canada +0.99.  Thus, corporate members of global cartels can use their fines 
imposed by the U.S. DOJ, usually the first to act, to predict with a high degree of certainty what 
their fines will be a year or two later in the EU and Canada. 
 
Table 21.  Five Global Cartels with Corporate Fines Imposed by U.S., EC, and Canada, 1996-
2003. 
Cartel U.S.  EC  Canada 
  Million U.S. dollars 
Lysine         92.5  97.9  11.5 
Citric Acid       110.4  120.4  7.9 
Vitamins       906.5  756.9  64.0 
Sodium gluconate         32.5  51.2  1.6 





























Total    1,816.9  1,308.3  108.8 
 
Sources: Tables A.1-A.12. 
+ = more fines likely pending 
-- = as of 2003, zero fines by this jurisdiction 
Note: These are the only global cases for which two or more jurisdictions had imposed fines by mid-2003.   
 
Given the near absence of private antitrust litigation in Europe, the total liabilities of 
cartelists operating in Europe are overall quite a bit lower in practice than an otherwise identical 
violation punished under U.S. or Canadian laws. 
 





  The corporate fines and personal sanctions handed out to global price fixers since 1995 
were beyond and above the worst nightmares of corporate defense lawyers might have had in the 
early 1990s.  Corporate cartelists, when they are unmasked by antitrust investigators, are now 
routinely paying fines that exceed their monopoly profits earned in North America and in 
Western Europe.  Indeed, in North America, when the private treble-damages suits by buyers or 
the state attorneys general are factored in, prosecuted price fixers are nowadays normally 
disgorging close to double their illegal “earnings” (Connor 2001:469-476).  Nevertheless, serious 
doubts remain that even the heightened fine structures observed since 1995 are sufficient to 
prevent recidivism (repeat offenses of the same crime). 
 
  In this section, a theory of optimal deterrence will be developed for the case of global 
cartels.  A formula is presented that takes into account the special characteristics of cartels that 
operate across jurisdictions with varying types of sanctions.  The empirical data collected for this 




  A rational policy with respect to the design of legal sanctions would admit to two 
principal objectives: deterrence and compensation of victims.
61  The EC’s cartel decisions are 
explicit in mentioning deterrence as the main objective of its determination of fine levels; to the 
extent that these fines are used to defray the EU budget, European consumers are at least 
indirectly compensated.
62  In the United States, treble damages (i.e., settlements equal to three 
times the victims’ economic losses) were explicitly instituted in the 1890 Sherman Act to 
compensate buyers from cartels as well as to deter firms from forming cartels ex ante.  However, 
the advent in the 1990s of the double-the-harm standard for setting government fines has led 
some legal writers to criticize cartel sanctions as having reached supradeterrent levels 




  These criticisms confuse the ex post liabilities faced by discovered cartel members with 
the ex ante decision making process that deterrence-fines are supposed to affect.  True, the 
theoretical maximum fines and private settlements faced by prosecuted cartelists have reached 
surprisingly high multiples of cartel overcharges in the U.S. legal system.  A domestic cartel 
successfully prosecuted in the United States is liable to pay up to double the cartel’s overcharge 
to the federal government and triple the overcharge to direct buyers who file civil suits.  In 
addition, the cartel can be sued by the state attorneys general for another set of treble damages 
                                                 
61 A third motivation is sometimes mentioned, viz., funding the costs of detection and prosecution.  In U.S. law, 
these costs are borne by both the government and by plaintiffs’ lawyers.  To the extent that these costs are incurred 
by plaintiffs, they may be regarded as compensatory. 
62 In 2001, EU antitrust fines amounted to 2 percent of its annual budget. 
63 Supradeterrence is frequently alleged in the context of treble damages. However, some legal commentators have 
specifically cited the increased global cartel fines and penalties as excessive. Some also argue that the first U.S. 
sentencing guidelines caused a serious overdeterrence problem.  For an economics-and-law model suggesting 
supradeterrence of government cartel fines, see Kobayashi (2001).   
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incurred by indirect buyers.
64  Thus, domestic cartels are obligated to pay as much as eight times 
their illegal monopoly profits if they are found guilty.  Moreover, suppose the cartel is a global 
one with a typical one-third of its sales in the United States.  Then, the U.S. DOJ has the option 
of calculating its fine on the basis of global overcharges (which are likely to be three times the 
domestic overcharges).  In this case the federal fine could rise to six times a cartel’s U.S. 
overcharges.  It is the possibility of fines and settlements totaling eight to twelve times a cartel’s 
U.S. monopoly profits that leads critics to make claims of overdeterrence.   
 
  However, deterrence effects of anticartel policies must be evaluated ex ante, that is, from 
the perspective of a company considering forming or joining a global price-fixing conspiracy.  
Such a company must evaluate the probable additional profits from the cartel relative to the 
probable costs associated with being discovered and prosecuted.  The theory of optimal 
deterrence in public law enforcement is reviewed by Polinsky and Shavell (2000)
65.  In the 
version of the deterrence model presented below, I assume that only corporate costs and benefits 
drive cartel decisions.  This assumption seems reasonable because the involvement of top 
officers in these cartels suggests no principal-agent problem.  Moreover, in recent decades many 
companies linked managerial rewards closely to corporate financial performance.  Many cartels 
had weak boards of directors, as their restructurings after price-fixing episodes demonstrate.   
Personal fines are very low in the United States, and practically nonexistent elsewhere.  Prison 
sentences are difficult to monetize.
66     
 
  The evidence is that potential conspirators are adept at calculating the annual profits from 
an effective cartel, though they might have uncertainty about the scheme’s longevity.
67  As to the 
probability that a cartel will be discovered, most evidence seems to suggest a 10- to 20-percent 
chance (Bryant and Eckart 1991, Feinberg 1985, Connor 2001, Cohen and Scheffman 2000, 
Adams 2002, Werden and Simon 1987).
68  Levenstein and Suslow note that government 
anticartel actions accounted for only 10% of some of the best documented cartels operating in 
the interwar period (p.16).  Moreover, even if cartelists are indicted by the U.S. DOJ, the chances 
of being convicted are less than 100 percent.  The DOJ likes to boast that more than 80 percent 
                                                 
64 These are called parens patriae actions.  Indirect buyers include both corporate and consumer purchasers.  In 
2000, 45 states joined together to sue the six largest companies in the vitamins cartels.  Indirect buyers may also sue 
in about 16 state courts.  Pass-on by direct buyers is no defense for these actions. 
65 Polinsky and Shavell (2000) survey more than 200 academic papers.  Most of their examples are drawn from 
individual criminal acts.  The model presented immediately below has two features not mentioned in the survey: the 
probability of conviction after apprehension and consideration of violations that inherently involve multiple 
geographic jurisdictions with varying sanctions and multiple geographic harms caused.  
66 Focusing solely on corporate benefits and costs runs counter to repeated public statements of DOJ officials, who 
assert the primacy of prison sentences in deterrence of cartels (e.g., Pate 2003). If individual sentences are 
important, then the fines on companies for optimal deterrence will be lower. Ignoring individual fines and prison 
sentences is controversial. The standard optimal-deterrence approach recommends only personal fines (Shawell 
2003). However, Werden and Simon (1997) offer strong views on the necessity of imprisonment for price fixers. 
They argue that imprisonment is even justified by the Beckerian theory of deterrence because the optimal fines for 
price fixing, using 1975-1980 data in 1981 dollars, are about $1 billion. When individuals are too poor to pay fines, 
Becker seems to favor imprisonment. They also argue that optimal deterrence theory is inappropriate for price 
fixing. 
67 Historically the average global cartel lasted about eight years, with a range of two to 18 years. 
68 The highest rate is suggested to be 0.33 by Cohen and Scheffman (2000). Polinsky and Shavell (2000) note that 
for some of the most common felonious property crimes (burglary, auto theft, and arson), U.S. arrest rates vary from 
0.138 to 0.165, well within the range adopted here.   
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of its indictments end in guilty pleas, which is true because the per se evidence is so damning in 
most cases that defendants usually negotiate a guilty plea.  On the other hand, when accused 
price fixers choose to litigate a criminal price-fixing case, the government wins their cases less 
than half the time.  Thus, cartelists adept at covering up their clandestine meetings or able to 




  The decision facing a firm trying to decide whether to form a cartel or join an existing 
cartel may be explained using a benefit-cost framework.  Let E(B) be the expected financial 
benefits, that is, the net present value of the expected monopoly profits accruing to the firm from 
an effective cartel.  Let E(C) be the expected monetary costs of forming or joining the cartel, 
where the managerial costs are assumed to be negligible.  Then the firm will opt to enter a cartel 
agreement if 
 
[1]    E(C) < E(B) , 
 
but will opt to stay out if the inequality sign in [1] is reversed.  If  E(C) = E(B), then the costs are 
deemed privately optimal.  
 
In the simplest version of this decision model, one used by Richard Posner (2001), 
 
 
[2]    E(C) = p ⋅  F, 
 
where p = the probability of antitrust-authority discovery and conviction and F is the fine 
imposed for the violation.
70  An optimal fine is F = E(C)/p.    
 
   A more complete version of this model is  
 
[3]    E(C) = p⋅ c⋅ E(F), 
 
 
where p is the probability of detection and c is the probability of conviction or settlement.  E(F) 
depends on the culpability factors and the size of the affected sales or overcharge (a range known 
with near certainty from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines) and the firm’s timing in applying for 
leniency.  E(F) could be zero if the firm is granted amnesty, but even then the expected private 
settlement costs, E(S), are not zero.  Moreover, the firm may incur significant legal defense costs 
and related managerial time losses as well as post-indictment reputational costs, E(R).  Thus, in 
the case of a domestic conspiracy, 
 
[4]    E(C) = pg⋅ cg⋅ E(F) + pp⋅ cp⋅ E(S) + E(R), 
 
                                                 
69 Connor (2001: 60-61, 68-69). 
70 Posner (2001: 47). This formulation assumes that the justice system is costless and errorless, that offenders and 
victims are risk-neutral, and that the conspiracy was condoned by the company’s top managers.   
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where subscripts g and p refer to government and private legal actions.  In the usual follow-on 
suit, pp = 1 and cp will be very high (close to 1), but in some cases where the government does 
not indict, pp and cp are low positive numbers, much closer to zero than to 1. 
 




[5]    E(C) = pgu⋅ cgu⋅ E(Fu) + ppu⋅ cpu⋅ E(Su) + pge⋅ cge⋅ E(Fe) + pga⋅ cga⋅ E(Fa) +E(R), 
 
 
where u = U.S. and Canada, e = EU and a = Asia.
71  Because of the absence of effective private 
damages suits outside of North America, it is not necessary to include E(Se) or E(Sa) (First 
1995). 
 
  Several simplifications can be made to Equation [5].   Because most companies are listed 
on at most one stock exchange, E(R) refers to stock-price effects in the firm’s home country.  
Unlisted cartel members suffer little E(R), and in my view the reputational effects for public 
companies, if any, are very small and seem to dissipate within five years or less (Alexander 
1999).
72  Thus, from a long-run perspective, E(R) = 0, and because of weak enforcement in Asia, 
E(Fa) = 0 and [5] becomes 
 
[6]  E(C) = pgu⋅ cgu⋅ E(Fu) + ppu⋅ cpu⋅ E(Su) + pge·cge·E(Fe). 
 
An important step in this analysis is to convert the right side terms into functions of B. 
When that is done, the algebraic expression can be solved for E(C). It is true that most DOJ fines 
are based on “20% of sales” base fine together with culpability multipliers, but as Tables 13.1 to 
13.3 of Connor (2001) show, the difference in dollar fines are small between that method and the 
double-harm approach.  Therefore, the maximum U.S. corporate fine is double the cartel’s U.S. 
overcharges.   
 
  Given the standards that have evolved for corporate sanctions for global cartels, E(C) can 
be converted to a function of the private financial “benefit” of price fixing, where B is the global 
overcharge paid by direct buyers during the conspiracy period. For simplicity, the overcharge 
rate is assumed to be equal in all regions of the world. For a convicted cartelist, the actual 
maximum ex post costs C of global collusion will be  
 
[7]    C = E(Fu) + E(Su) + E(Fe). 
 
                                                 
71 Equation [5] ignores the possibility of government antitrust fines in Mexico, South America, Africa, and Europe 
outside the EU. These areas could be added if anticartel sanctions become more severe. 
72 Reputational effects may be nonlinearly related to the size of a fine, especially if the fine represented a new record 
amount.  ADM’s $100-million fine assessed in October 1996 certainly fits this description.  It was only beginning in 
2000 or 2001 that financial profiles of ADM or its top executives failed to include references to ADM’s 1996 price-
fixing convictions.  Alexander’s empirical study finds, for five publicized price-fixing convictions between 1984 
and 1990, no reputational effects for the corporate defendants.   
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Now with the facts in this paper on the actual fines and settlements applied to global 
cartels since the late 1990s, one can calculate the three expected costs in [7] in terms of B, where 
the firm assumes the most pessimistic legal outcomes. Because this analysis is ex post, p = c = 1. 
The U.S. DOJ imposes the maximum double-the-overcharge (2B) fine on domestic sales with no 
leniency discounts, but the DOJ bases the fine on only the 25% of the typical cartel’s U.S. 
affected sales.  Then the CCB adds its 6% to the U.S. fines.  Thus, E(Fu) = (1.06)(.25)(2B) = 
0.53B.  Similarly, EC fines are 72% of the U.S. (recall Table 16).  Therefore, (Fe) = 
(0.72)(0.53B) = 0.38B.  If direct buyers in the U.S. and Canada won full treble damages and 
legal costs of 25%, then E(Su) =  (0.25)(1.25)(3B) = 0.94B.  
 
  Substituting these conversions into equation [7], one obtains 
 
[8]   C = 0.53B + 0.38B + 0.94B = 1.85B. 
 
On the basis of equation [8], a firm might expect to pay as much as 1.85 times its global 
monopoly profits in fines and settlements.
73 Because C>B, one might expect that cartels will be 
deterred. 
 
  In the case of a more appropriate ex ante analysis, F(C) will be considerably lower than 
1.85B because p and c are less than unity.  In this analysis it is appropriate to use a range of 
likely parameters rather than point estimates.  As discussed above, a consensus estimate for pgu is 
a value between 0.10 and 0.33, with the higher value due to the recent success of the leniency 
programs adopted by most antitrust agencies. Given the improved degree of international 
cooperation in anticartel enforcement, it is reasonable to assume pgu = pge = pga.  For conviction, 
the DOJ’s conviction record suggests that 0.5 < cgu < 0.9 is a reasonable range, and because most 
U.S. treble-damages suits are follow-on actions, cpu = 1 is not unreasonable.  Actual fines paid in 
the United States and EU can be used to derive expected fines, and these can be converted to an 
overcharge basis (B).
74  DOJ practice suggests that for the average cartel participant Fu = 0.18B 
to 0.64B; in the EU, Fe = 0.2B to 0.7B.  Ringleaders of cartels have paid relatively high U.S. 
fines per dollar of overcharge (.6B to .7B), and small followers low fines (.2B to .3B).  In North 
America, private suits against global cartels have yielded settlements of from 1.0 to 2.0 
overcharges.  These parameters, when substituted into Equation [7], imply that ex ante: 
   
[9]    E(C) = 0.17B to 0.25B. 
 
  The range of expected antitrust costs using realistic, historical enforcement practices 
results in a range that is far below the theoretical maximum costs calculated in Equation [8].  
Thus, highly cooperative follower-participants in global cartels can reasonably expect to incur 
fines and settlements far below their expected cartel profits.  Even under the most optimistic 
assumptions about discovery, lenience, and prosecution rates, the average conspirator can 
                                                 
73 In certain cases, the U.S. DOJ can calculate its base fines on a world-wide sales basis; as the typical global cartel 
makes one-fourth of its revenues in North America, assuming that overcharge rates are equal in all regions, E(Fu) = 
(1.06)(2B), then E(C) = 2.12B+ (1.06)(1.25)(3B) + 1.44B = 7.5B.  In fact, the DOJ has never exercised this 
authority, though global sales have been used to adjust culpability factors (Kovacic 2002). 
74 U.S fine practices can be found in Tables 13.1 to 13.3 of Connor (2001), and for the EU Table 14.1 (ibid.) 
suggests that Fu = 0.35B to 0.74B.  For the U.S., Fu was 0.33B for lysine, 0.30B to 0.64B for citric acid, and 0.18B 
to 0.44B for vitamins.   
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reasonably expect to make a profit on the typical global price-fixing scheme.  Only ringleaders of 
cartels that resist cooperating with prosecutors risk financial costs in excess of their expected 
profits.  One example is ADM’s participation in the lysine cartel.
75 
 
  Given the rational expectations about the certainty of punishment just mentioned, what is 
an appropriate level of financial sanctions to deter price fixing before it starts?  At a minimum, to 
ensure absolute deterrence of a global cartel, total financial sanctions should be four times the 
expected global cartel profits (the overcharge); this level of sanctions would deter the “leaders” 
that initiate and provide most of the discipline for cartels. In the case of followers, deterrence 
would require penalties in all geographic regions to be equal to eight times overcharges.
76 These 
extraordinary multiples demonstrate that, from a purely benefit/cost approach, even the 
theoretical maximum U.S. legal sanctions of eight times U.S. overcharges is insufficient to deter 
recidivism in global cartels
77. 
 
  This study is hardly the first to conclude that current fine structures are suboptimal.   
Cohen (1989) studied corporate fines handed down in U.S. federal courts in the late 1980s. He 
concluded that the fines alone equaled only 33% of the harm caused by the companies
78. 
 
Sanctions in the United States 
 
  Recidivism in global price fixing is depressingly common (Appendix table 5).  In part, 
this may be caused by the highly diverse businesses found in most large multinational firms.  
Price fixing in the 1990s bears all the marks of contagion, between and within enterprises.  For 
example, soon after Hoffman-La Roche and BASF implement price fixing in vitamins A & E, 
the positive financial results prompted them to form at least five more highly complex cartels in 
eight other vitamins industries a year later.  Furthermore, Roche’s success in vitamins instigated 
one top Roche executive to write a memorandum to the head of the company’s citric acid 
marketing department encouraging him to form a citric acid cartel.  Soon after ADM and Roche 
began fixing the price of citric acid in 1991, the ADM vice president in charge of citric acid 
taught ADM’s head of the lysine department how to form and run the lysine cartel (Connor2001: 
199). At least a dozen firms convicted of global price fixing in the 1990s have become repeat 
offenders. 
 
  Although the theoretical financial costs of price fixing may strike some as high, the actual 
amounts of the fines and private settlements are much lower than what is legally possible in 
cases settled before 1990. A wide gap between the maximum penalties prescribed by the law and 
the actual penalties imposed has persisted after 1995 in fines imposed on global price fixers.   
 
  In the three best documented prosecutions of global cartels, U.S. government corporate 
fines of $1,106 million were precedent-shattering.  Yet they represented merely 10 to 79 percent 
                                                 
75 See Connor (2001: Table 19.4).  ADM probably profited from its role in the citric acid cartel. 
76 These estimates assume that a global cartel’s U.S. profit comprise one-third of its total monopoly profits 
worldwide.  Strictly national cartels would require seven- to 20-times penalties.  These estimates ignore the legal 
fees paid by defendants.  If legal fees are substantial, the required multiple to deter would be somewhat lower. 
77 It also shows that the full force of U.S. law is quite capable of deterring purely domestic cartels.  
78 His analysis predates the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG 1997) and ignores nonmonetary penalties, 
restitution, civil penalties, and tort suits.   
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of the maximum possible fines that could have been levied (Table 22).  To place them further in 
perspective, these fines represented only 2.8 percent of global sales during the three conspiracy 
periods and only 12.6 percent of the cartel’s illegal profits.
79 Individual fines and prison 
sentences were also far more lenient than the law permits. These fines and sentences averaged 3 
to 7 percent of the maximum levels allowed.  Moreover, less than one-fourth of the individual 
conspirators were sanctioned at all.   
               
 Table 22.  Potential and Actual U.S. Government Sanctions Applied in Three Global Cartels. 
Corporate Fines
a  Individual Sanctions 
Number
b Prison  Fines
c  Cartel  Maximum Actual 
Max.  Actual Max. Actual Max. Actual 
  $ million  Number  Months  $ million 
Lysine 225-559  92.5  40  7  1440 99 14.0 0.9 
Citric acid  189-721  105.4  12  4    432  0    4.2  0.8 
Vitamins 994-9850  908.5
d  52  13 1872  22.5  18.2 0.9 
             
Total 1408-11,130  1,106.4  104  24 3744  121.5  36.4 2.6 
 
Sources: Connor (2001:Tables 13.1, 13.2, and 13.3). 
a Based on either the usual 20-percent of U.S. affected sales with a culpability score of 9 and multipliers of 1.8 to 3.6 or twice the 
U.S. overcharge.  In general, had global sales been the basis of the fines, the maximum amounts shown in this table would be 
trebled. 
b Named conspirators in the DOJ’s proffers to the courts. 
c Based on the $350,000 statutory cap, not on the much higher amounts allowed by the alternative sentencing statute. 
d A few small companies have yet to plead guilty. 
 
   The major reason for the relatively low government fines is the ancient practice of 
prosecutors everywhere of offering rewards for a defendant’s cooperation.  Such cooperation 
may be needed to induce price fixers to testify against other, more recalcitrant co-conspirators; it 
may be given to low-ranking employees in order to prosecute high-ranking executives with 
greater deterrence value; or it may be justified as a method to conserve constrained prosecutorial 
resources.  What is new is the promulgation of formal leniency programs in the 1990s by the 
U.S. DOJ and the EC’s DG-IV for price fixing. 
 
  Here is how the U.S. Leniency Program works.
80  If a cartel member is not a ringleader or 
enforcer in the conspiracy and if the DOJ is not aware of the illegal activity, then the first firm to 
confess is granted automatic amnesty. Amnestied firms receive a 100-percent discount on its fine 
specified by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and its officers receive immunity from prosecution.  
In the view of the DOJ, amnesty is valuable because it sets up a “race” to be first to confess and 
leads to tension and mistrust among cartel members (Spratling 2001). In game-theory terms, 
prosecutors are exploiting the “Prisoners’ Dilemma”.  
 
  An extension of this program called “Amnesty Plus” offers amnesty to suspected price 
fixers if they are the first provide evidence of cartel activity in an unrelated market about which 
the DOJ was ignorant.  The many vitamins cartels were unmasked by this type of amnesty 
                                                 
79 As a proportion of U.S. sales and estimated overcharges, the respective percentages are 14.0 of sales and 60 to 74 
of overcharges. See Connor (2001: Table 19.5). 
80 Perhaps the most detailed description of the program is to be found in Spratling (2001).   
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granted to BASF.  Indeed, as of 2001, more than half of the 30 grand juries established to 
investigate alleged cartel activity were set up as a result of the Amnesty-Plus Program. 
 
  The Leniency Program also extends concessions to later arrivals on the doorstep of the 
Justice Department.  The second member of a cartel to offer its cooperation to prosecutors is 
entitled to a 50- to 80-percent fine reduction.  The third and fourth conspirators to arrive may 
expect less generous discounts, but in effect all cooperators save the last firm to hold out are 
rewarded with substantial discounts.  If anything, these leniency discounts, which were approved 
by a court, are larger than the official policy suggests.  While the first and second firms to plea 
follow the Leniency Program standards, those that plea later receive discounts that exceed the 
program’s stated guidelines.  Similar incentives to cooperate are offered to individual 
conspirators: reduced fines, short prison sentences, or the freedom to cross the U.S. border.
81 
 
  An example of how a company will fare if it is the last to be sentenced and does not 
cooperate is provided by the Mitsubishi conviction at trial in February 2001.  For its indirect role 
of aiding and abetting price fixing in the graphite-electrodes cartel, it received a fine of $134 
million.  What is impressive is that the fine was 76 percent of affected U.S. sales, probably a 
record percentage, and very nearly at the top of the Sentencing Guidelines range; it was also 7.6 
times the assumed overcharge. 
 
  The U.S. Leniency Program for price fixing has been widely imitated by antitrust 
authorities in other jurisdictions.  The most important adoption was by the European Union in 
February 2002.
82  Its new program makes the process for applying for full immunity far more 
transparent and predictable.  Amnesty is automatic for the first company to reveal a cartel if (1) 
the EC was unaware of the cartel already, (2) cooperation is fully satisfactory, (3) the company 
immediately ceases price fixing, and (4) the company never coerced other companies to join to 
cartel.  Thus, the new EC policy sets up strong incentives in the “races to be first” (to confess) to 
Brussels.  Moreover, this race complements the race to be first to Washington, DC, Toronto, 
London, Paris, Brasilia, and at least three other national capitals where a company can earn 
multiple prizes.  The global convergence of antitrust leniency policies has now become the major 
single source of information of formerly clandestine illegal activities that were nearly impossible 
to detect.
83 To a large extent, the potentially huge and automatic financial rewards for informing 
antitrust authorities have made the disease of global price fixing self-medicating. 
 
  Finally, to get a complete picture of the actual U.S. financial sanctions for collusion, one 
must consider the treble-damages suits filed by injured parties.  In the three best-documented 
global cartel cases, private plaintiffs garnered record-making settlements totaling between $1,745 
and $2,445 million (Table 23).  However, compared to fairly reliable estimates of what U.S. 
                                                 
81 As a general rule, convicted felons may not be issued passports or obtain visas to enter U.S. territories.  However, 
by arrangement with the U.S. State Department, the Antitrust Division may obtain an exemption for some convicted 
price fixers.  This concession has proven to be a valuable incentive to induce cooperation by middle-aged non-U.S. 
residents. 
82 The 2002 EC Notice replaced a 1996 leniency program that was not working very well because it retained too 
much discretion for EC officials and did not guarantee amnesty for the first applicants.  Indeed, the EC did not grant 
any company amnesty until November 2001 when the vitamins cartels were fined. Hammond supra note 9. 
83 Grinberg (2003) considers the Brazilian leniency program a failure because the approval of rival enforcement 
programs is needed, and it is not automatic.   
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treble overcharges were, these settlements are well below what the Sherman Act promises to 
direct buyers.  Lysine buyers received 35 percent of treble damages, citric acid buyers 32 to 40 
percent, and vitamins buyers 32 to 54 percent.  That is, injured parties got single damages (or 
slightly higher), not treble damages.
84  There is some evidence that the largest direct buyers that 
opted out of the federal classes obtained settlements that were twice as rich. 
 
Table 23.  Potential and Actual U.S. Private Settlements Paid by Three Global Cartels. 
Corporate Settlement Amounts  Cartel 
Treble U.S. Damages  Actual Settlements 
a 
  Million dollars 
Lysine 240  85 
Citric acid  600-750  239 
Vitamins 3,660-4,515  1,421-2,121
b 
     
Total 4,500-5,505  1,745-2,445 
 
Sources: Connor (2001:Table 16.A.1). 
a These amounts include federal suits by direct purchasers (both class actions and firms that opted out of the classes), a parens 
patriae settlement in vitamins, and estimates of indirect-purchaser suits in state courts.  The latter amounts may be generous. 
b Several cases still in negotiation or litigation. 
 
  To summarize, government and private antitrust penalties on the lysine, citric acid, and 
vitamins cartels amounted to between $2,850 million and $3,550 million.  Although by historical 
standards these amounts were great accomplishments for public prosecutors and private 
plaintiffs, they fall far short of what the Sherman Act intended.  These price-fixing penalties 
amounted to about 47 percent of affected U.S. sales, or somewhere between 179 percent and 194 
percent of the cartels’ illegal profits.  Although these sanctions have or will deter some cartels 
(relative deterrence), less than double overcharges will not deter absolutely. 
 
Sanctions in Canada and the EU 
 
  The enhanced fines on global conspirators imposed by the governments of Canada and 
the EU help deter, but their incremental influence is still not sufficient to prevent the formation 
of new cartels. 
 
  In 1998-2000, the Canadian Competition Bureau (CCB) obtained court orders requiring 
the lysine, citric acid, and vitamins cartelists to pay a total of C$145.7 million.  In addition, class-
action suits were filed by direct and indirect buyers; two of these private damages actions were 
moderately successful.  Taken together, the members of the three cartels have paid about U.S. 
$100 million in fines and settlements to parties in Canada. 
 
  In 2000-2001, the same three cartels were fined U.S. $975 million by the European 
Commission.  Although legal in the courts of some of the member states of the EU, no 
significant private antitrust settlements are expected.  The Australian, Mexican, and Brazilian 
                                                 
84 As a percentage of U.S. sales (equals U.S. purchase values), lysine buyers obtained 18.5 percent, citric acid buyers 
16.4 percent, and vitamins buyers 23.7 to 42.4 percent.  The average was 32.6 percent.  (Compare footnote 26 
above).   
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antitrust agencies have launched investigations of the three cartels, but except for small fines for 
vitamins in Australia, none has yet resulted in significant fines. 
 
  The ability of direct buyers who purchase cartelized products outside the United States to 
obtain compensation is quite limited.  Canada, Australia, and several European countries have 
laws that permit private suits for injuries due to price-fixing overcharges, but mostly these 
national courts do not award sufficiently large to make such suits worthwhile.  Moreover, the 
possibility of class actions to recover damages is low.  However, class actions against the lysine 
and citric acid cartels have been moderately successful in Canada under a 1992 law.  Moreover, a 
March 2002 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2
nd Circuit (Kruman v. Christie’s 
International) has extended the rights of foreign buyers to sue for damages under the U.S. 
Sherman Act.  Oddly, instead of U.S. legal standards spreading to other nations, the U.S. court 
system itself is becoming a globalized legal institution. 
 
  The additional $1.1 billion in non-U.S. fines for price fixing in the markets for lysine, 
citric acid, and vitamins certainly moves global anticartel policies in the right direction.   
Nevertheless, the global penalties imposed on the three cartels ($3,950 to $4,650 million) still 
represent modest amounts when compared to either worldwide affected sales (9.9 to 11.7 
percent) or to worldwide overcharges by the cartels (51 to 60 percent).   
 
  The relationship of global public and private penalties to the cartels’ illegal gains is 
illustrated in Figure 11.  Estimated worldwide profits made from collusion are compared to U.S. 
and non-U.S. penalties for the three cartels.  In each case, U.S. penalties are about double the 
non-U.S. (mainly EU and Canada) penalties.  These penalties slightly exceed the cartel’s 
monopoly profits only in the case of lysine, by about $40 million.  However, in the other two 
cases, cartel crime did pay.  The corporate members of the citric acid cartel made a net return of 
about $370 million; that is, they retained about 53 percent of their illegal profits after paying 
their fines and private settlements.  The members of the vitamins cartels kept more than $4 
billion of their illegal profits, or almost 60 percent of their customers’ overcharges.
85  For ADM, 
probably the most heavily fined conspirator relative to its size, the antitrust costs of its lysine and 







                                                 
85 Recall that this is an ex post analysis.  Viewed from the dates of cartel formation (1988-1992), the expected profit-















































Figure 11: The Bottom Line: Does 




Effectiveness of Anticartel Sanctions 
 
  The data collected on international cartels for this paper suggest four indicators of 
enforcement effectiveness by antitrust authorities. First, the speed with which the agencies 
investigate, negotiate, and impose sanctions may be analyzed. Generally, long delays in the 
administration of justice are regarded as bad public policy.  One can imagine an investigation 
that is too short for an adequate judgment about probable cause, but the main complaint of 
defendants is about excessive length and the consequent period of uncertainty of prosecution or 
the size of sanctions, especially if the investigation becomes public, as many do. Plaintiffs 
especially have an interest in quick conclusions to suits, which defendants habitually delay as far 
as possible (Adams and Metlin 2002).  A peculiar feature of international cartels is that when a 
probe, fine, or guilty plea is made in one jurisdiction, it may well trigger follow-on investigations 
in other jurisdictions. Although court trials are rare for either criminal or civil prosecutions, they 
can add several years to a final determination of guilt; in the EC, appeals about the sizes of the 
EC cartel fines are common, but as these are by choice of the fined companies, this aspect of 
speed will not be studied. 
 
  A second indicator is the pattern of cartel formation over time. The simple notion 
underlying this measure of enforcement effectiveness is that as information becomes available to 
business persons about increases in maximum legal price-fixing penalties, in the probability of 
detection, or in harshness of actual sanctions corporate decision makers will raise their 
expectations concerning the costs of illegal behavior. This information is likely to arise from 
several sources: legal advisors, business and trade publications, and the informal exchange of 
Source: Tables 3 and A.3, Connor (2001)   
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information between business persons. The lags in learning and in forming convictions may be 
considerable. Therefore, conclusions about the relationships between milestones in anticartel 
laws or enforcement actions and decreases in cartel formations will require long periods of 
analysis. 
 
  A third measure of effectiveness is the size of a company’s fine relative to its sales during 
the cartel period; alternatively, the fines on all members of a cartel can be compared to total 
market affected sales. Although these ratios have no direct relationship to economic deterrence, 
they are the most frequently cited measure of a successful prosecution in legal discussions. 
Judicial opinions on the fairness of proposed class-action settlements inevitably focus on the 
recovery/sales ratio proposed relative to the same rations from other settlements. Class counsel 
likewise highlights this ratio when defending a settlement from criticisms about a particular deal. 
Recoveries above 10% or even 5% of sales are cited as successful results for plaintiffs. Some 
students of cartels opine that fines as high as 150% of affected sales are necessary for absolute 
deterrence (Wils 2001). Despite the absence of a firm economic defense for the fine/sales ratio 
(fines relative to profits or liquid assets might be more defensible), this index reveals something 
about the rigorousness of anticartel enforcement over time or across jurisdictions. 
 
  The fourth measure of enforcement effectiveness is the ratio of monetary sanctions to the 
cartels overcharge. This index bears directly on the question of economic deterrence. 
Unfortunately, it is the most difficult to compute and the most likely to contain measurement 
errors. 
 
Rates of Cartel Formation 
 
  At this time only an informal analysis of cartel formation is possible, based on the 
patterns shown in Figures 12 to 15. In every geographic region, the annual rates of cartel 
formation (the year the cartel began fixing prices) peaks in the early 1990s. The increase in 
formation rates from the 1980s to the 1990s is particularly striking and informative. The 
acceleration in new cartels is apparent for all types of international cartels, global, European, and 
North America. 
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Source: Table 4A. Dates are years of initial operation; planning and initial
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The NAFA-area cartels began at a slightly earlier time than the other two types (cf., 
Figure 15 and Figures 13 and 14). During the 1981-1988 Regan administration, the resources of 
the U.S. DOJ were directed primarily at small scale bid-rigging conspiracies (Connor 2001: 67). 
Attention to international cartel enforcement rose slightly during the Bush pere administration, 
but really became a major priority of the DOJ only after 1992. U.S. legal sanctions increased in 
1987 when price fixing was made a felony and in 1990 when the statutory corporate fine was   
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raised to $10 million; however, the DOJ seems not to have implemented these new powers until 
the 1993-1994 period (Spratling 1999, 2001). The fall-off on new cartel formations in North 
America is consistent with the threat of the DOJ’s enhanced prosecutorial powers and, after the 
DOJ’s singular victories in the lysine and citric acid cases in 1995-1996, with the demonstrated 
ability to win in court. The notable decline in new cartel formations after 1992 is suggestive of a 
deterrence effect, but only a longer time period will allow for a more definitive conclusion.
86 
 
Europe began successful prosecution of international cartels in 1969, but significantly 
increased the priority to investigate such cases only from the mid 1990s.
87 Figure 14 
demonstrates a peak in cartel formation in 1993-1995 and a notable decline after 1995. Again, 
although time will tell if the post-1995 decline is not just a statistical illusion, the pattern is 
consistent with increased cartel deterrence after 1995. 
 
Finally, global-cartel initiations also peaked in 1989-1992; those formed prior to 1989 are 
mostly shipping conferences, which operated in a grey area of the law. Though too early to tell, 
the successful prosecutions of several high-profile global cartels in the late 1990s may well have 
had a chilling effect on would-be global cartelists. 
 
Speed of Sanctions 
 
  Table 24 summarizes the information available on time lags in enforcement actions with 
respect to international cartels prosecuted from 1990 to 2003. The first panel in the table 
calculates the percentage of cases for which there were no lags between the first public notice 
and the announcement of the sanction by the antitrust authority (guilty plea, indictment, fine, or 
consent decree). In other words, these percentages are indicators of how well investigations are 
kept secret. In the United States, grand jury proceedings are secret, but their existence may 
become known if someone asked to testify voluntarily reveals it. 
 
  Data on lags are available on 106 cartel cases. On average, half of the cases were kept 
secret until the day sanctions were announced, but secrecy was far more pronounced in North 
America than in Europe. The U.S. grand jury system is clearly effective in most cases, whereas 
the use of “dawn raids” in Europe makes most investigations public at an early stage of 
investigation. Over time it appears that the secrecy of EC cartel investigations is increasing. In 
fact in 2000-2003, secrecy levels of the EC were at levels comparable to U.S. and Canadian 
practice. European national agencies are even more transparent than the EC. 
 
  Looking only at cases with positive lags (about 58 observations), the average time 
between “first notice” (generally news accounts of raids) and the first cartelist to be sanctioned is 
18 months. However, the raid-to-sanction lag is far shorter in the United States than for EC 
cases: 7 months versus 35 on average. The DOJ dispatches more localized cartels with amazing 
alacrity (three months) compared with more complex and challenging global-cartel cases (16 
months, four times as long). Rather surprising is the relative speed of the European national 
                                                 
86 As discussed above in the context of Table 4A, the fact that no data are collected after 2003 puts a ceiling on 
formations, which tend to lead discoveries by about six years. 
87 Competition Commissioner van Miert reorganized DG-4 at that time; Commissioner Monti dates the resurgence 
in anticartel enforcement from 1998. The member states began separate enforcement about 1997.   
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antitrust authorities (eight months), which may be related to the smaller size of the cartels 
prosecuted, greater prosecutorial resources, or the familiarity of agencies’ staffs with local 
markets. Time series data are fairly thin, but there is some evidence that the EC is moving its 
cases through more rapidly in the 2000s than in the 1990s. Note that these figures include only 
the most active phase of cartel investigations. Prior to obtaining search warrants, an antitrust 
authority may spend two or three years determining probable cause (as in lysine and vitamins), 
though a few months is probably more typical. 
 
  The final analysis of speed concerns lags between jurisdictions in the case of overlapping 
prosecutions. In the lysine case, the DOJ began its undercover investigation in November 1992, 
raided corporate headquarters in June 1995, and negotiated the first guilty pleas in September 
1996, EC fines came more than five years later. Are such long leader-follower lags typical? 
 
  Table 24 shows that the lysine case was atypically long. On average, the lag from the date 
an investigation or guilty plea is publicly known in the United States to the date a cartel fine is 
imposed by the EC is 34 months. This is a minimum figure, because under cooperative 
arrangements in force since the 1990s, the EC is informed in advance about U.S. programs in 
investigations on many cases; the average length of advance notification is unknown. Canada, on 
the other hand, responds far more quickly to the news of U.S. guilty pleas or indictments. The 
CCB has had longer and more complete working arrangements with the U.S. DOJ, has had a 
corporate leniency program in place long before the EC, and unlike the EC does its work without 
protracted multi-stage administrative hearings. 
 
Finally, Table 24 shows that the U.S. DOJ is typically the first mover in global cartel 
cases. In 15 instances, U.S. action predated EC action; in 14 cases, Canadian prosecution 
predated EC fines. In only two cases has the EC completed its work in advance of one of the 
North American authorities. 
 
Monetary Sanctions Relative to Sales 
 
  The ratio of fines for international price fixing to cartels’ affected sales is computed for a 
large sub-sample of prosecuted cartels (Table 25). In some cases, affected sales are known only 
for one or two jurisdictions but are unavailable for other parts of the world; these observations 
are reported under the appropriate jurisdiction. However, if a reasonably accurate sales figure 
cannot be found for a region in which a global cartel was known to operate, the “global total” 
cannot be computed; likewise in a few cases global sales are known but not regional affected 
sales. Affected sales are sometimes only available as a range. The total number of observations is 








   
 
78 
Table 24. Time Lags, International Anticartel Enforcement, 1990-2003. 
No Lags 
a  From First Notice 
to First Sanction 
b 
Sanctions From Jurisdiction 
to Jurisdiction 
Cartel Types 
US Can. EC  Other 
Europe  Total US Can.  EC Other 












  Percent  Months  Months  No. of Cases 
                    





7 --  29
8 --  23
15 7.3
16 34.0
15 14  2 
NAFTA area  76
25 67
3 --  --  75
28 3
14 15
1 --  --  4
15 11.0
3 -- --  -- 
EU Regional  -- --  33
21 -- 33
21 --  --  39
1
4  -- 39
14 --  -- --  -- 
European 
nations  -- -- --  8
12 8
12 --  -- -- 8
14 8














15 14  2 















11 10  2 
Other products 













3 2  0 
                     
Date of First 
Notice:                     
   1990-1995  57
7 67
3 0




9 --  34
13        
   1996-1999  79
19 100
2 8
10 --  57
31 16
6 --  31
1
1  -- 26
17        








18        
a)  A measure of secrecy maintained by the antitrust agencies and the targets of their investigations. Superscripts are number of cases. 
b)    Measures the time between a raid  that is reported publicly and the date the first corporate participant is fined. Cases of no lags are not calculated in 
these columns. 
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  On average, the U.S. DOJ and CCB have imposed corporate fines equal to 14% to 17% 
of cartelized sales. This represents a significant increase since the late 1970s, when the average 
U.S. fine was 1.4% of sales (Cohen and Scheffmann 1989). The EC and other national agencies 
(overwhelmingly located within the EC) assess fines of 9% to 10% of affected sales.
88 In North 
America, private treble-damage suits (and, where known, other private antitrust suits) have won 
settlements that average 9% of affected commerce. Thus, in the United States (and two or three 
cases in Canada), public fines and private recovery have amounted to 23% to 26% of sales – 
more than double the European rates. Global cartels that were sanctioned in both North America 
and Europe have on average paid 34% to 37% of their cartels’ sales in fines and settlements. 
 
 However,  the  mean percentages shown in Table 25 probably distort what is typical 
because the sanction/sales ratios are highly skewed. The calculated means are the compound 
result of a small number of very high ratios and large number ratios close to zero. In such cases, 
the median sanction is a better indicator of central tendency.
89 
 
  Median fines are lower than mean fines in every jurisdiction. In North America, median 
government cartel fines are 9% to 10% of affected commerce. The EC’s fines are not quite as 
skewed, so the median fine is just two percentage points lower than the mean (8% versus 10%). 
The other fines of the  other national antitrust authorities are highly skewed, the median (3%) 
being one-third of the mean. The most extraordinary finding is that the median private settlement 
is zero, an outcome predicated by the fact that victims of cartels located outside North America 
have no recourse to civil damage suits. Where permitted, civil suits are settled for 6% to 12% of 
sales. Therefore, as a percentage of total sales (in all areas affected by the cartel), the typical 
corporate sanctions amount to a mere 4% of the cartel’s revenues.  
 
  There is some variation in sanction rates by product and geographic types. Median 
sanction rates are significantly higher for the regional food-and-agricultural cartels (most of them 
organic-chemical intermediates) than for other products; the ratio is roughly three to one. 
However, this food/nonfood difference does not apply to global-scope cartels. Global cartels 
prosecuted by the U.S. DOJ suffered fines that averaged 18% to 23% of affected sales (with 
nonfood the higher figure); in Canada and Europe, global cartelists can expect fines to average 
8% to 16% of revenues (with food the higher ratio). Because global cartels always fixed prices in 
both Europe and North America, the typical government fines to be expected will amount to 32% 
to 35% of sales, depending on product type. Regional cartels are on average treated far more 
leniently by antitrust agencies: EU-wide cartels typically are fined by the EC around 2% to 3% 
of sales; single-country cartels are normally fined from 3% to 4% of their regional sales.
90 
 
  To summarize, multi-continental cartels have experienced markedly higher sanctions 
relative to affected sales than more localized international cartels. Government authorities 
imposed historically median fines of 32% to 35% of affected commerce on global cartels; many 
of them also had civil settlements averaging 6% to 12%, depending on products sold. However, 
                                                 
88 This figure is within the range of 2% to 15% suggested as the typical EC practice in the 1990s (Wils 2001). 
89 In addition, while data on government fines is always public, smaller private settlements are often unreported 
(because they are deemed not newsworthy), or news of them is delayed. 
90 Canada’s CCB seems to be much higher, 8% to 19%, but this result is driven by a few bid-rigging cases where the 
government was the victim. This issue is discussed below.   
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international cartels operating in only one country or within the EU faced distinctly more lenient 
treatment: government fines of 1% to 4% of sales, and no additional civil liability for cartels 
outside North America. 
 
The data on private settlements for regional NAFTA cartels are sparse but suggest settlement 
rates average 1% to 6% of sales. 
 
Sanctions Relative to Injury 
 
  Injury is measured by the average monopoly overcharge achieved by a cartel during the 
entire conspiracy period.
91 These figures fall in a range of degree of precision and are in many 
cases expressed as fairly wide ranges. About 70 estimates are available (Table 25); for some 
global cartels separate estimates are available for two or more of the continents on which they 
fixed prices. One or more geographic estimates are available for 54 distinct cartel cases. As 
before, median measures of the sanction/overcharge are preferred to the mean because of evident 
skewness in these ratios. 
 
The median total sanction (government and private) on all types of international cartels is 
25% of the estimated overcharge (Table 25). For all product types, there is practically no 
variation in the severity of government fines across jurisdictions; moreover, in North America 
the private settlements appear to gravitate near the 25% level, but the size of the sub-sample is 
perilously small to be confident about this result. 
 
Once again, these data point to significantly higher sanction/injury ratios for global 
cartels than more geographically localized cartels. However, before examining the severity of 
sanctions across types of cartels, an issue must be addressed. It is clear that governments treat 
bid-rigging against themselves with greater than average severity. Therefore, Table 26 separates 
these cases from those cartels that sold principally to private buyers. Although there are only 8 
such observations, sanctions averaged more that five times the overcharges imposed by bid-
rigging against government agencies. 
 
Cartels directed at private buyers still evidenced fairly high mean ratios. Government 
fines averaged from 43% to 66% of overcharges; in North America, cartelists settled for about 
72% of calculated damages. 
                                                 
91 The dead-weight or “social” loss due to price fixing would lower these ratios by at least 10% on average.   
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= Not available, probably not zero. 
Source: Tables A.1 to A.12. 
Note: superscripts count the number of observations. 
a)  The average of the ratios of the percentage sanction divided by the percentage overcharge, in those cases where both are available and both are non-zero. 
If either is a range, the midpoint of the range is used. The “private” column shows treble-damage suits. 
b)  Prosecutions by other national competition authorities include Italy (4.5%, average of 12 cases), the Netherlands (4.3%, 2 cases), Sweden (39%, 2 
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Table 26. The Severity of Sanctions Relative to the Degree of Injury, International Cartels, 1990-2003 
Government Bid-Rigging  Private Purchases 
Type of Cartel 
US Canada EC  Other 
Gov’t.  World  US Canada EC  Other 
Gov’t.  Private Total 
  Average Percent Sanctions ÷  Percent Overcharges 
a 
Product  and  region:                 
   Global food & ag.  --  --  --  --  --  66
4 53
3 58
2 --  72
5 52
4 
   EU-wide food & ag.  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  8
1 --  0 8
1 
   Other food & ag.  --  4,176
1 --  --  4,176
1 6
2 36
1 --  -- 130
2 122
2 
               







   EU-wide non-food  --  --  141
1 --  100
1 --  --  71
7 --  0 61
7 
   Other non-food  142









               












               











Prosecuted since 1999  142









               
  Percent 
Less than 10%  0  0  0  40
2 25
2 21 11 43 27  8  30 
10-49% 0  0  0  20
1 13
1 36 56 21 27  31 30 





4 21 11 21 36  23 22 
200% or more  0  100
1 0  0  13
1 0 11 7  0  8 11 
Source: Appendix Table 6 
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Thus, a typical international cartel that fixed prices only in Europe paid in fines roughly 53% 
to 66% of its monopoly profits – less than single damages. However, from the bottom of Table 
22, it appears that about one-fourth of these European-only cartels did forego 100% or more of 
their monopoly profits; the great majority experienced fines that were less than half their illegal 
earnings. 
 
  The case of cartels prosecuted in North America is more complicated. The geographically 
localized cartels could expect mean fines of about 30% of their U.S. overcharges or about 60% 
of their Canadian overcharges; most were subsequently sued for private damages and settled for 
an additional 50% to 60% of their overcharges. Thus, total sanctions for localized North 
American cartels is somewhere around 80% to 120% of overcharges – significantly higher than 
comparable European cartels but well below the twelve-fold damages possible under U.S. 
antitrust law. 
 
  In the case of global cartels, one might expect more severe sanctions than those imposed 
on regional cartels. Typically, global cartels are fined in these jurisdictions and are sued for 
treble damages in the U.S. courts. On average, global cartels were meted out fines that were 
roughly 40%, 43%, and 35% of their U.S., Canadian, and EU overcharges, respectively. 
Weighted by the value of these overcharges, the sum paid in fines was roughly 38%. Private 
settlements extracted on average an additional 70% of U.S. overcharges. Thus, for a typical 
global cartel discovered since 1990, fines and settlements extracted roughly 110% of North 
American monopoly profits and 35% of its European profits. With affected sales roughly equal 
in these two continents, the weighted sanctions average less than single damages. Profits made 
elsewhere in the world are virtually free of potential sanctions. 
 
Summary of Cartel Injuries 
 
  It is possible to project the amount of injuries sustained by direct buyers from the 167 
international cartels in this paper’s data set. Affected sales are known for the majority of these 
cartels, and overcharges for a large minority. Mean levels of each can be calculated by type of 
cartel and projected by the total number of cartels in each category (see Appendix Table 7 for 
details). 
 
  Direct buyers purchased about $620 billion of products and services from international 
cartels that were discovered from 1990 to 2003 (Table 27). This figure understates the total 
because the majority of such cartels are undiscovered and because no allowance is made for 
inflation. Nearly half of affected sales were generated by global cartels. One-sixth was sales to 
food and agricultural customers. 
 
In light of these huge projected injuries, it is useful to summarize the aggregate costs to 
cartelists in the form of antitrust sanctions. Private and government penalties of $10.5 billion 
have been imposed on participants in about 120 different cartels (Table 28, eliminating double 
counting). In addition, 32 corporate executives have received prison sentences averaging 10 
months. It is clear that the penalties melted out to international cartelists are a small share of the 
projected overcharges. 
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Table 27. Total Projected Injuries of International Cartels, 1900-2003 
Type of Cartel  Affected Commerce  Direct Overcharges 
  Million U.S. dollars 
Global food & agriculture  80,912  20,228 
EU-wide food & agriculture  19,811  5,844 
NAFTA food & agriculture  3,024  1,421 
European food & agriculture  6,055  1,744 
    
Global non-food  197,299  59,782 
EU-wide non-food  124,455  24,891 
NAFTA non-food  48,987  12,737 
European non-food  53,757  9,838 
Other national non-food  5,022  904 
    
Total 539,322  137,388 
Source: Appendix Table 7 
a)  Australia (two), Korea, Japan, and Chile. 
b)  Known amounts for each type plus the median amounts for the unknown observations. 
 
Table 28. Summary of Sanctions Imposed on International Cartels, 1990-2003. 
Jurisdiction 
a  No. of Cartels  No. of Participants  Fines and Civil 
Settlements 
c 
   Million U.S. Dollars 
United States:  37  200  5,299 
   Corporate  36  95  1,875 
   Individual  --  105 
b 24 
   Private suits  17  --  3,400 
    
European Union  35  259  3,649 
Canada 17  68  133 
Member State of EU 
d 40  400  1,246 
Other nations  11  48  210 




-- = Not applicable 
a Only in the United States are significant numbers of individuals fined; all others are corporate fines. 
b Includes 43 indicted fugitives in U.S. individual line. U.S. imprisonment for 32 persons totaled 342 months. 
c There are missing data for many U.S. civil suits and especially for state indirect-purchaser suits. 
d Includes Norway, which for antitrust purposes is part of the European Economic Area. 
e Includes double counting of about 19 cartels prosecuted in more than one jurisdiction. See Table 21. 
 
  Overcharges are projected to have been about $137 billion for all the cartel types, of 
which 58% was generated by global cartels, 22% by EU-wide cartels, and 10% by NAFTA area 
cartels. 
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Final Thoughts  
 
  After spending a possibly inordinate amount of time on the subject of global cartels, I still 
perceive a number of unanswered questions raised by the eruption of global cartels in the 1990s.  
Two seem paramount.  What were the economic, financial, and political forces the facilitated the 
establishment of dozens of effective international cartels in the late 1980s and early 1990s?   
What remedies can be implemented to discourage and possibly deter the formation and reduce 




  The temptation for a company in an appropriately structured market to launch or join a 
cartel is well understood: it is a golden opportunity to increase profits to levels higher than those 
being earned, at present or in the foreseeable future.  Were it not for the possibility of 
punishment under antitrust laws, cartels would run rampant, monopolizing vast stretches of 
national economies or international trade.  We know this to be true because of numerous reliable 
economic studies of cartel activity during eras prior to the adoption of effective anticartel 
legislation. This was the state of affairs in the United States before the 1890 Sherman Act 
(Connor and Schiek 1997:37-42), in Germany before 1945 (Voight 1962), in the United 
Kingdom before 1956 (Symeonidis 2002), and in international trade before the U.S. prosecutions 
of the late 1940s (Stocking and Watkins 1946).  In the UK in the early 1950s, hundreds of 
formal, open, and legal cartels operated in nearly half of the manufacturing sector, some of them 
of 70-years duration (Symeonidis 2002:21).  Hundreds of international cartels operated in the 
interwar period, affecting nearly half of international merchandise trade (Stocking and Walkins 
1946). 
 
  The temptation facing company managers to form or joining a cartel are more varied and 
complex.  Loyalty to their employer and a desire to contribute to its financial performance often 
seem to play a role. At a more personal level, the desire for advancement and monetary rewards 
cannot be discounted. In the case of some managers in the lysine cartel, other personal 
motivations included the sheer thrill of controlling markets (akin to the mariner’s dream of 
sailing against the wind) and the nervous pleasure derived from the cloak-and-dagger aspects of 
outwitting the authorities (Connor 2001:199-229). 
 
  International cartels were relatively few during 1950-1990, especially compared to the 
interwar period (Caves 1996). Among the economic conditions accounting for the paucity of 
cartels after 1950 were the emergence of more aggressive behaviors by the largest U.S. 
manufacturers (through foreign investment and acquisitions that broadened their product lines), 
the focus of most European firms on rebuilding their domestic market positions, and a shift away 
from homogenous products toward differentiated consumer of high-tech goods. Most of the 
global cartels discovered after 1995 were formed during a narrow period, 1998-1992. There are 
tantalizing hints that slowing profitability in the late 1980s may have stimulated many of the 
cartelists to consider more risky alternative strategies.  In the organic chemicals industry, a 
pronounced cyclic slowdown was apparent in the late 1980s; several pharmaceutical companies 
had “blockbuster” products coming off patents at the time; and in starch manufacturing, the 
period of rapid growth in high fructose corn syrup ended abruptly in 1986-1987 (Connor 2001).    
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In Japan, the first troubling signs of the end of the “bubble economy” began to emerge in the late 
1980s.  By the early 1990s, massive corporate and government debt and falling asset prices had 
led to chronic recession, a weaker yen, and falling profits. 
 
  Changes in corporate management philosophies, especially evident in U.S. firms but also 
spreading to European companies, may have contributed to the acceptability of price-fixing.   
Criticism of top management of U.S. companies became intense during the decade of slow U.S. 
growth that began in 1973.  A widespread solution during the 1980s was the implementation of 
new managerial reward structures that tied leaders’ pay more closely to financial performance, 
often short run profits and stock price.  Boards of directors approved generous stock-option plans 
and other compensation policies that made stockholders’ interests the only stakeholders of 
importance.  Restructuring corporate management to remove putatively unnecessary layers of 
management and other changes meant to enhance flexibility and speed of decision making came 
at the cost of cross-checks and accountability.  Increasingly, corporate leaders were being trained 
in MBA programs with increasingly uniform curricular that emphasized applied management 
tools and had little room for courses on business ethics.  Many critics of modern business 
principles decry what they perceive to be a decline in corporate ethics, extending to the 
consulting and accounting professions as well (Krugman 2002). 
 
  The third area that may have fostered cartel formations is that of politics and policy.  The 
successful prosecution of scores of global cartels in the late 1940s is cited by Caves (1996) as 
one factor explaining the decline in cartel activity for 30 years or more thereafter.  Perhaps these 
lessons were lost as successive generations of corporate leaders assumed the helms of their 
companies, or perhaps the lessons were not institutionalized through antitrust management-
training programs or the monitoring efforts of corporate counsel.  The enforcement of antitrust 
became more lax during the Reagan-Bush administrations (1981-1992) as the antitrust agencies’ 
budgets were cut nearly in half.  Price-fixing enforcement shifted toward bid-rigging violations 
affecting small markets (Connor 2001:66-68).  U.S. antitrust authorities failed to investigate 
ADM’s attempt to monopolize the lysine industry when it prevented Degussa’s entry in 1989 and 
ADM’s acquisition of Pfizer’s citric-acid assets in 1990, both key events in the formation of two 
important global cartels.
92  The European Union’s allocation of anticartel resources may also be 
criticized as inadequate up until at least the late 1990s.  Another policy of the European 
Commission that inadvertently contributed to cartel effectiveness was the sponsorship of 
industry trade associations that became ideal covers for illegal price-fixing discussions for global 
cartelists.  These organizations were also used to threaten trade reprisals against suppliers that 




  The major objective of anticartel policies should be to lower the benefits (profits) or raise 
the costs (penalties) of price fixing.  Other than vigilance in merger control, public policies can 
do little to change the structural features of markets that make cartels profitable: inelastic 
demand, large numbers of buyers, economies of scale, homogeneity, and so forth.  Policies can 
sometimes have effects on trading conditions, such as the publication of transaction prices in 
                                                 
92 The EU may also have missed a potential monopolization infraction when Ajinomoto took steps in the early 
1970s that prevented Rhône-Poulenc’s entry into lysine manufacturing.   
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markets characterized by lack of transparency.  However, the principal role for antitrust is to 
develop rules, laws, and investigative procedures that make punishment surer and harsher than at 
present.  Reforms should be implemented soon because the present favorable public and 
legislative support may not last. 
 
  It is clear from the geographic location of cartel meetings that, as a general rule, United 
States territory was avoided because of its well-deserved reputation for tough anticartel 
enforcement.  Instead, conspirators met in Switzerland, Mexico, Japan, Hong Kong, and several 
EU cities that were regarded as less risky.  This behavioral pattern is perhaps the best indicator 
that U.S. anticartel policies are the ones other jurisdictions should emulate. 
 
  One investigative technique that has proven especially useful in discovering cartels is the 
DOJ’s 1993 Leniency Program.  Similar programs were subsequently adopted in Canada, the 
UK, Germany, Brazil, and the EU (Hammond 2001a:3).  A novel variation is the “Amnesty 
Plus” program that rewards indicted companies if they inform the DOJ about collusive activity in 
a market not yet being investigated.  In 2001, more than half of the DOJ’s 30 global-cartel 
investigations were the result of Amnesty Plus leads (ibid.:6).  More than three applications per 
month were received in early 2003 (Pate 2003).  An example, admittedly the most productive 
one so far, is shown in Figure 16.  Starting with 1992 information from one cooperating witness 
in 1992, the DOJ was able to leverage five global-cartel investigations into convictions of 10 
companies, 11 executives, and $225 million in fines. A similar trail of connected cartel 
prosecutions occurred in the graphite-related and carbon related cartels (Pate 2003). Kovacic 
(2001) has suggested extending this program to give bounties to individuals.   
 
  An important issue facing the U.S. courts is the status of wholly foreign purchasers from 
global cartels under the Sherman Act. In particular, should a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) entity that 
buys cartelized products at artificially high prices outside the United States be permitted to seek 
treble damages in U.S. courts? Such purchases are usually necessary in order to maintain the 
high U.S. prices; that is foreign injuries are a sine qua non for domestic injuries. Therefore, the 
plain language of the Sherman Act would appear to permit standing by wholly foreign buyers, 
were it is not for contrary limiting language in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 
(Davis 2003). 
 
  Permitting wholly foreign buyers to use U.S. courts would by itself increase the expected 
financial losses from global cartels and, thus, increase deterrence. On the other hand, such suits 
might strain U.S. judicial resources and would have a negative impact on the number of DOJ 
leniency applications by international cartelists. Judicial resources could be expanded by 
charging foreign buyers who pay no U.S. taxes a users’ fee, which could fund the employment of 
court-appointed special masters to deal with such cases. Special masters are quite capable of 
holding hearings exclusively for foreign buyers because such buyers only have standing if 
domestic plaintiffs have already filed against the same defendants. Leniency applications would 
decline because the DOJ has no authority to intervene in private suits, and permitting wholly 
foreign plaintiffs to sue for treble damages would increase potential applicants’ liability. The net 
effects on deterrence of these opposing forces is a matter worthy of study, but I would hazard the 
hypothesis that standing for wholly foreign buyers in U.S. courts will tend to increase global-




  Other U.S. policies worthy of globalization include: fines based on multiples of 
overcharges rather than arbitrary percentages, increased penalties for recidivists, encouragement 
of private antitrust suits, and the criminalization of antitrust violations.  This last initiative is 
especially important because it reduces the number of safe havens for fugitives from U.S. 
antitrust laws.  These policy reforms are especially needed in Japan (which has an arbitrary fine 
of 6 percent of sales for price fixing by manufacturers) and other industrialized Asian countries 
(Chemtob 2000, Hammond 2001a). 
 
Figure 16.  Amnesty Plus and DOJ Cartel Convictions. 
June 1992 . . .  Lysine cartel formed 
  
 
Nov. 1992 . . .  ADM V.P.* confesses to FBI 
  
 
1993-1995 . . .  Secret taping reveals citric 
acid cartel 
   
 
Sept. 1996 . . .  ADM executive* cooperates 
with FBI on citric acid 
   
 
Oct. 1996 . . .  ADM* reveals sodium-
gluconate cartel 
        1997 
 
        1998 . . .  
Fujisawa* pleads guilty to 
sodium gluconate, informs 
FBI about sodium-
erythorbate cartel 
   
 
        1999 . . . 
Pfizer* admits guilt in 
sodium erythorbate, informs 
FBI about maltol cartel 
 
*Parties received reduced sentences or amnesty 
  
 
U.S. anticartel policies themselves are hardly above criticism.  Periods of weak 
enforcement seem to be associated with clusters of cartel-formation, such as occurred in the 
1930s and 1980s.  While it is treacherous to second-guess the decisions of DOJ prosecutors, 
there seems to be a pattern of overly generous fine discounts being given routinely to late-
arriving cartel members; actual discounts are often bigger than the stated discount policy.  Given 
Lysine cartel 
convicted 







convicted   
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the relatively low levels of fines and private settlements outside the United States, consideration 
should be given to calculating fines routinely on the basis of global sales of the cartelized 
product, rather than as the rare exception it is today.  Then DOJ threats of imposing fines “as 
high as 80 percent” of the value of affected commerce might really approach full deterrence 
levels.
93 
  Many legal writers believe that personal penalties may have more deterrence value than 
corporate fines.  The present U.S. Sherman Act cap of $350,000 has little punishment value for 
most multi-millionaire executives convicted for criminal price fixing in recent years.  An 
alternative fine statute, first applied in 2002 litigation, should be made the new standard; at least 
Congress needs to clarify to the judiciary when it should be applied (see Connor 2001:434-436).  
As to prison sentences, three years may be too low a limit.  Other countries have five-year 
maximum sentences for the same offense.  The DOJ has been criticized for overuse, of at least 
unjustified use, of grants of immunity for top executives; closer supervision of these concessions 
by the courts is warranted.  On the other hand, a small somewhat clearer policy is needed on 
granting immunity to “whistle-blowers” or cooperating witnesses, akin to automatic amnesty 
available for corporations. 
 
  Finally, nongovernmental solutions to price-fixing behavior should be explored (Connor 
2001:542-547).  Companies should implement internal antitrust compliance programs: training 
in legal standards of behavior, formal involvement in monitoring of contacts with rivals by 
corporate counsel, confidential whistle-blower communication methods, guidelines for dismissal 
of guilty employees, and surprise audits of participation of employees in trade-association 
meetings (Kolasky 2002).
94  Governance structures are critical if companies are to avoid future 
price-fixing allegations.  In particular, boards of directors must be composed of a majority of 
members independent from management and outsiders should be the majorities on the all-












                                                 
93 Hammond (2001a) mentions this figure.  It assumes the usual 10-percent overcharge level, which is automatically 
doubled and then multiplied by a culpability index as high as 4.5.  However, among the better documented global 
cartels in Tables 7 and A.2, the average overcharge was close to 25 percent of affected sales.  Therefore, fines as 
high as 225 percent of U.S. sales during the conspiracy are in fact credible, or even 800 percent if the DOJ were to 
base its fine on global affected sales. 
94 Federal legislation passed by Congress in July 2002 mandates the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
establish standards of professional conduct for lawyers who practice before the SEC.  Lawyers will be required to 
report evidence of fraud or other misconduct by corporate managers to the firm’s CEO or, if no action is taken, to 
the board of directors (Schmit 2002).  This rule originated from a letter from 40 law-school professors that cited 
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Appendix Table 1 List of International Cartels, by Type. 
 
Product Affected  Areas 
Name  Organ. 
Chem. 
Food/ 
Agric.  Other  North 
America  EU Asia  Other 
    1. Adhesive label stock*      X  US       
    2. AIIC translators’ assn.      X  US       
    3. Aluminum phosphide  X  X    X       
    4. Anti-anxiety drugs      X  US       
    5. Asphalt, Sweden*      X    SW     
              
    6. Asphalt paving, Finland      X    X     
    7. Auditing services, IT      X    X     
    8. Auto refinishes*      X  X  X     
    9. Ball bearings, France      X    X     
  10. Beef, France    X      FR     
              
  11. Beer, France*    X      FR     
  12. Beer, Belgium, HORECA    X      BL     
  13. Beer, Belgium, Pvt. Label    X      BL     
  14. Beer, Italy *    X      IT     
  15. Beer, Portugal *    X      PT     
              
  16. Beer, Netherlands *    X      NL     
  17. Beta carotene     X  X    X  X  X  X 
  18. Bicycles, NL      X    NL     
  19. Biotin (vitamin H)  X  X    X  X  X  X 
  20. Bitumen*  X        X     
              
  21. Bridge, California      X  US       
  22. Bridges, cable-stayed      X  US       
  23. British sugar, UK    X      UK     
  24. Bromines  X      X  ?  ?   
  25. Calcium carbide*  X        X     
              
  26. Carbon black*  X      X  X     
  27. Carbon cathode block      X  X  X  X   
  28. Carbon electrical products      X  X  ?     
  29. Carbon fiber*  X      X    X   
  30. Carbonless paper, EU      X    X     
              
  31. Carotenoids  X  X    X  X  X  X 
  32. Cartonboard      X    X     
  33. Cement, EU      X    X     
  34. Cement, IT*      X    IT     
  35. Cement, DE, 1993-2003      X    DE       
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  36. Cement, Hungary      X    HU     
  37. Cigarettes, IT    X      IT     
  38. Citric acid  X  X    X  X  X  X 
  39. Compressed gas, Canada      X  CN       
  40. Compressed gas, NL      X    NL     
              
  41. Compressors, Australia      X        X 
  42. Concrete, Germany      X    X     
  43. Concrete engineering, NL      X    X     
  44. Construction, marine      X  X  X  X  X 
  45. Construction, sports tracks,  NL      X    X     
              
  46. Construction, NOR*      X    NOR     
  47. Construction, NL*      X    NL     
  48. Construction, USAID      X  X      X 
  49. Copper concentrates*      X  X  X  X  X 
  50  Copper tubes      X    X     
              
  51. Creosote*   X      US  X     
  52. Cosmetics, US      X         
  53. Danish air route      X    X     
  54. Diabetes testing devices, Italy      X    X     
  55. Diesel fuel, Italy      X    X     
              
  56. Distribution, elec. goods, FR      X    X     
  57. District heating pipe      X    X     
  58. DRAMs*      X  X  X  X  X 
  59. Drugs, OTC, commissions*      X  US       
  60. Elevator repair services, Italy      X    X     
              
  61. EPDM synthetic rubber*  X      X  X  X   
  62. Euro zone banks      X    X     
  63. Explosives, commercial      X  US       
  64. Extruded graphite  X        X     
  65. Ferries, Adriatic      X    X     
              
  66. Ferries, channel      X    X     
  67. Ferrosilicon  X      X      X 
  68. Fine art auctions      X  X  X     
  69. Flat glass, U.S.      X  X       
  70. Folic acid  X  X    X  X  X  X 
              
  71. Fuels, military, Japan      X      X   
  72. Fuels, military, Korea      X      X   
  73. Gasoline, Spain      X    ES       
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  74. Gasoline, Italy      X    IT     
  75. Gasoline, Sweden      X    SW     
  76. Gasoline, Netherlands      X    NL     
  77. Gasoline, Czech Republic      X    CZ     
  78. Gasoline, France      X    FR     
  79. Gasoline, Chile*      X    CL     
  80. Generic drugs, UK*      X    UK     
              
  81. Glass containers, Italy      X    X     
  82. Glass containers, US      X  X       
  83. Graphite electrodes      X  X  X  X   
  84. Glyphosate insecticide*  X  X    X  X  X  X 
  85. Holographic printing, U.S.      X  X       
              
  86. Hydrogen peroxide*  X        X     
  87. Inland chemical barges*      X    X     
  88. Insecticide, BT, Canada  X  X    CN       
  89. Insecticides, synthetic, Canada  X  X    CN       
  90. Insurance, Netherlands      X    X     
              
  91. Insurance, industrial, DE*      X    DE     
  92. Iron oxide      X  CN       
  93. Isostatic graphite  X      X  X  X   
  94. Label stock, US      X  US       
  95. LdPE Plastic  X        X     
              
  96. Lysine  X  X    X  X  X  X 
  97. Magnetic iron oxide      X  X    X   
  98. Matches, Italy      X    X     
  99. Maltol, synthetic  X  X    X       
100. MBS*  X      X  X  X   
              
101. MCAA  X  X    X  ?     
102. Methionine  X  X    X  X     
103. Methylglucamine  X      X  X  X  X 
104. MMA*  X        X     
105. Mobile phones, Italy      X    X     
              
106. Mobile phones, NL      X    NL     
107. Mobile phones, UK*      X    UK     
108. Mobile phone fees, UK &      
        Germany 
   X   UK/DE    
109. MSG  X  X    X  X  X   
110. Naphthalene*  X        X     
              
111. Nucleotides  X  X    X  X       
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112. Organic peroxides  X  X    X  X     
113. Oxo-alcohols*  X        X     
114. Paper, office, Canada      X  X       
115. Paper, thermal fax      X  X       
              
116. Parcel tankers, chemical*      X  X  X  X  X 
117. Pharmaceuticals, cholesterol, IT      X    X     
118. Pharmaceuticals, obesity, IT      X    X     
119. Pharmaceuticals, respiratory, IT      X    X     
120. Plasterboard      X    X     
              
121. Plastic dinnerware      X  X       
122. Polyester staple*  X      US       
123. Power equipment, Norway      X    X     
124. Prawns, Netherlands    X      NL     
125. PVC heat stabilizers*  X      X  X  X   
              
126. PVC impact modifiers*  X      X  X  X   
127. PVC plastic  X        X     
128. Radiological media, Italy      X    X     
129. Recorded music, Italy      X    X     
130. Rubber processing   
        chemicals* 
X   X X    
              
131. Seamless steel tubes      X    X     
132. Shipping, FETTSCA (Far East)      X    X  X   
133. Shipping conference, FEFC      X    X     
134. Shipping (French – AF.)      X    X    X 
135. Shipping, TACA (No. Atlantic)      X  X  X     
              
136. Shipping (W. Cent. Afr.)      X    X    X 
137. Soda ash      X    X     
138. Sodium erythorbate  X  X    X       
139. Sodium gluconate  X  X    X  X     
140. Sorbates  X  X    X  X  X   
              
141. Stamp auctions*      X  X  X     
142. Steel beams      X    X     
143. Steel, flat stainless       X    X     
144. Sulfuric acid*      X  US       
145. Tactile tile, U.S.      X  X       
              
146. Tampico fiber    X    X       
147. Tar pitch*  X        X     
148. 3 Tenors CD      X  X  X     
149. Toys & games, UK      X    UK       
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150. Transformers, power, Australia       X      AU   
              
151. Transport, marine      X  X  X  X  X 
152. Tubes, laminated      X  US       
153. Vitamins A & E  X  X    X  X  X  X 
154. Vitamin B1  X  X    X  X  X  X 
155. Vitamin B2  X  X    X  X  X  X 
              
156. Vitamin B3  X  X    X       
157. Vitamin B4 (Europe)  X  X      X     
158. Vitamin B4 (NAFTA)  X  X    X       
159. Vitamin B5  X  X    X  X  X  X 
160. Vitamin B6  X  X    X  X  X  X 
              
161. Vitamin B12  X  X    X  X     
162. Vitamin C  X  X    X  X  X  X 
163. Vitamin D3  X  X    X  X  X  X 
164. Vitamin premixes  X  X    X  ?     
165. Water heaters, gas, Italy      X    X     
              
166. Wine alcohol auctions, EU*  X  X    X  X     
167. Zinc phosphate      X    X     
 
* Investigation underway, 2003, no prosecutions announced. 
? = Not known, but suspected 
X = Prices fixed in 2 or more countries; in North America, U.S. and Canada. 
US = Prices fixed in US only 
CN = Prices fixed in Canada only 
FR = Prices fixed in France only 
BL = Prices fixed in Belgium only 
NL = Prices fixed in Netherlands only 
PT = Prices fixed in Portugal only 
IT = Prices fixed in Italy only 
CZ = Prices fixed in Czechoslovakia only 
AU = Prices fixed in Australia only 
DE = Prices fixed in Demark only 
SW = Prices fixed in Sweden only 
HU = Prices fixed in Hungary only 
NOR = Prices fixed in Norway only 












a Product  Company/Parent  (HQ  country)  Fine 
     $ millions 
      
Detia-Degesch (DE)  0.290  1993  Aluminum 
phosphide Detia  Freyburg  (DE)  0 
    Inventa Corp./ United Phosphorus, Ltd. (India)  0
c 
    Pestcon Systems (US)  0.200 
    Casa Bernado, Ltd. (Brazil)  0.005 
     0.495 
      
Kanzaki Paper Manufacturing (JP)  4.30  1994  Thermal fax paper, 
jumbo rolls  Kanzaki Specialty Papers (JP)  4.50 
    Mitsubishi Paper Mills / Mitsubishi Corp. (JP)  1.80 
    Mitsubishi International / Mitsubishi Corp. (JP)  1.26 
    Oji Paper Company (JP)  0.20 
    Honshu Paper (JP)  0.23 
    Appleton Papers (US)  0
c 
    Nippon Paper Industry (JP)  0
c 
     12.46 
      
Comet Plastics (US)  4.20  1994  Plastic dinnerware, 
disposable foodservice  Plastics Inc. / Newell Company (US)  4.16 
    Polar Plastics Ltd. (CN)  0.46 
   Dispoz-O-Plastics  (US)  -- 
    Amcel Corp. (US)  -- 
     9.14 
      
Elkem Metals (NOR)  1.00  1995 Ferrosilicon 
American Alloys (US)  0.10 
    SKW Metals & Alloys (US)  0.15 
    Globe Metallurgical (US)  0
d 
   Applied  Industrial Materials (US)  0
d 
     1.28 
      
Dyno Nobel / Norsk Hydro (NOR)  15.00
g  1995 Explosives,  commercial 
ICI Explosives / Imperial Chemical Industries (UK)  10.00 
   Mine Equipment & Mill Supply / Dyno Nobel 
(NOR)  1.90 
    Austin Powder (US)  7.00 
   ETI  Explosives  (US)  0.95 
    Dynablast EMSCO (US)  0 
    Du Pont (US)  0 
     34.85 
Appendix Table 2. International Cartels Prosecuted by the U.S. DOJ, Corporate Fines, by       
                               Year, 1990-2003. 




a Product  Company/Parent 
(HQ country)  Fine 
      
ADM Company (US)  70.00
g  1996 Lysine  (G) 
Heartland Lysine / Ajinomoto (JP)  10.00 
    Biokyowa / Kyowa Hakko (JP)  10.00 
    Sewon America / Sewon (KO)  1.25 
    Cheil Jedang (KO)  1.25 
     92.50 
      
ADM Company (US)  30.0  1996  Citric acid (G) 
Haarmann & Reimer / Bayer (DE)  50.0 
   Hoffmann-La  Roche  (CH)  14.0 
   Jungbunzlauer  International  (CH)  11.0 
    Cerestar / Eridania (FR)  0.40 
     105.40 
      
A & L Mayer Associates (US)  0.70  1996 Tampico  fiber 
Ixtlera de Santa Caterina (MEX)  0.75 
    MFC Corporation (US)  0.75 
    Fibros Saltillo (MEX)  0 
     2.20 
      
American National Can (US)  0
e  1996 Laminated  tubes 
KMK Maschinen (CH)  0
e 
     0 
      
PMP Fermentation Products / Fujisawa    
      Pharmaceuticals (JP)  20.00 
1997  Sodium gluconate (G) 
Jungbungzlauer AG (CH)  0
b 
    Glucona / Avebe AB (NL)  5.00 
    Glucona / Akzo Nobel Chemical (NL)  5.00 
    Roquette Freres SA (FR)  2.50 
   ADM  Company  (US)  0
b 
     32.50 
      
HerreMac / Heerma (CH)  49.00  1998  Construction services, 
heavy-lift marine (G)  J. Ray McDermott Company (US)  0
b 
   Saipem/  ENI  (IT)  Pending 
   Bouygues  (FR)  ? 
   ETPM  (FR)  ? 
    Offshore Pipelines, Inc. (US)  ? 
   Hyundai  (KO)  ? 
    NPCC (Abu Dhabi)  ? 




a Product  Company/Parent 
(HQ country)  Fine 
      
Dockwise NV (BL)  15.00  1998  Transport services, 
heavy-lift marine (G)  Dockwise USA (US)  1.00 
    J. Ray McDermott Company (US)  0
b 
   Heerma  (CH)  Pending 
    Saipem / ENI (IT)  Pending 
     16.00 
      
Mylan Laboratories (US)  100.00
g  1998  Anti-anxiety drugs, 
generic   Cambrex (US)  0 
    Profarmaco / Cambrex (IT)  0 
   Gyma  Laboratories  (US)  0 
     100.00 
      
Hochest / Aventis (DE)  36.00  1998  Sorbates (sorbic acid, 
salts of sorbic acid) (G)  Daicel Chemical Industries (JP)  53.00 
    Nippon Gohsei (JP)  21.00 
   Ueno  (JP)  11.00 
    Eastman Chemical (US)  11.00 
   Chisso  (JP)  Pending 
   Monsanto  (US)  ? 
     131.00 
      
UCAR International (US)  110.00
g  1998 Graphite  electrodes  (G) 
SGL Carbon AG (DE)  135.00 
    Showa Denko Carbon (JP)  32.50 
   SEC  Corporation  13.30 
    Nippon Carbon (JP)  2.50 
    Tokai Carbon (JP)  6.00 
    Carbon / Graphite (US)  0
b 
    Mitsubishi Corporation (JP)  134.00 
    Union Carbide (US)  Pending 
     433.30 
      
Lonza / Alusuisse (CH)  10.50  1998  Niacin & Niacinamide 
(Vitamin B3) (G)  Degussa – Huels (DE)  13.00 
   Napera  (US)  4.00 
   Reilly  Industries  (US)  2.00 
     29.50 
      
      
      
      




a Product  Company/Parent 
(HQ country)  Fine 
      
Hoffmann – La Roche (CH)  500.00
g 
BASF (DE)  225.00  1999 
Bulk vitamins A, E, C, 
B1, B5, carotenoids, and 
premixes [six cartels] (G)  Rhone-Poulenc / Aventis (FR)  0
b 
   Takeda  Chemical Industries (JP)  72.00 
   Daiichi  Pharmaceuticals  (JP)  25.00 
    Eisai Company (JP)  40.00 
    E. Merck (DE)  14.00 
     876.00 
      
Chinook Group Ltd. (CN)  5.00 
DuCoa LP / DCV (US)  0.50 
Bioproducts / Mitsui (JP)  Pending  1999 
Choline chloride 
(Vitamin B4), NAFTA 
branch  
DCV Holdings Inc. (US)  0 
   ConAgra  Inc.  0 
   DuPont  0 
     5.50 
      
BASF AG (DE)  ? 
1999  Choline Chloride, EU 
Branch  Akzo Nobel NV (NL)  ? 
   UCB  (BL)  ? 
      
Pfizer Corporation (US)  10.00  1999 Sodium  erythorbate 
Fujisawa Pharmaceutical (JP)  0
b 
    Cheil Jedang (SO)  ? 
     10.00 
      
Pfizer Corporation (US)  10.00  1999 Maltol 
F & S Alloy & Minerals (US)  0
b 
    Otsuka Chemical (JP)  ? 
     10.00 
      
Great Lakes Chemical (US)  0
b  2000 Bromines 
Dead Sea Bromine (IS)  7.00 
   Albermarle  (US)  ? 
     7.00 
      
Philipp Holzmann AG (DE)  30.00  2000  Construction, USAID, 
Egypt wastewater plants   American International Contractors (US)  4.20 
    ABB Asea Brown Boveri (SW/CH)  53.00 
    Bilhar International Establishments (Leicht.)  54.00 
    Bill Harbert International Construction (US)   0 




a Product  Company/Parent 
(HQ country)  Fine 
      
Avar Construction Systems (US)  Pending  2000  Bridge, california post-
tensioning  Diwidag-Systems International USA (US)  0.757 
     0.757 
      
Freyssinet International (FR)  0.720  2000  Bridges, cable-stayed 
(4 States)  Diwidag-Systems International USA (US)  0.571 
     1.291 
      
Sotheby’s  (US)  45.00  2000  Fine art auctions (G) 
Christie’s / Artemis (FR)  0
b 
     45.00 
2000 Tactile  tiles  ADA Fabricators/AMS Tactile Systems (US) 
Ontario Limited (CA) 
0.08 
Pending 
      
Ajinomoto Company (JP)  6.00 
2001 
MSG and other 
nucleotides (IMP,GMP) 
(G)   Takeda Chemical Industries (JP)  Pending 
    Sewon / Daesang Corporation (SO)  0.01 
    Cheil Jedang (SO)  3.00 
   ADM  Company  (US)  0
b 
   Kyowa  Hakko  (JP)  0 
   Deko  International  (JP)  0 
    Tung Hai Fermentation (TW)  0 
     9.01 
      




(G)  Akzo Nobel Chemical (NL)  12.00 
    Clariant AG (DE)
g 0
b 
    Hoechst / Aventis (DE)
h 12.00 
     29.00 
      
Elf Atochem/ElfAtoFina (FR)  3.50  2001  Organic peroxides (seven 
chemicals) (G)  Akzo Nobel Chemicals (NL)  Pending 
    Aztec Peroxides LLC (?)  Pending 
   Crompton  (US)  0
b 
   Degussa-Huels  (DE)  ? 
    Laporte PLC ( ?)  ? 
   Hercules  (US)  ? 
     3.50 
      
      




a Product  Company/Parent 
(HQ country)  Fine 
      
Toyo Tanso (JP)  4.50  2001 Isostatic  graphite  (G) 
Ibiden Company (JP)  3.60 
    Carbone America / Carbone-Lorraine (FR)  7.15 
   SGL  Carbon  (DE)  0 
    GrafTech (UCAR) (US)  0
b 
     15.25 
      
Anchor Industrial Products (US)  0.60  2002  Carbon cathode block 
(G)  Nippon Electrode (JP)  0.45 
    VAW Carbon (DE)  0.99 
    Hepworth Refractories (UK) ?  0
b 
     2.04 
      
Stephen Osborn Ltd. (UK)  Pending  2002  Stamp auctions (G) 
Anthony Feldman (UK)  Pending 
    Earl P.L. Apfelbaum (US)  Pending 
    Davitt Felder Inc. (US)  Pending 
    Mark Marrow Stamps (US)  Pending 
  
Dana Okey (US) 
Etienne de Cherisey (FR) 




   Others  Pending 
     0 
      
Morganite Inc. / Morgan Crucible (UK)  11.00  2002  Carbon electrical 
products (G)  Others Pending 
     11.00 
      
Arteva Specialties (Luxem.)  28.50  2002 Polyester  staple 
Nanya Plastics Corporation (TW)  Pending 
     28.50 
2002  Carbon fiber (G) 
Toho Tenax (JP) 
Toray industries (JP) 




Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha (JP)  5.00  2003  Magnetic iron oxide (G) 
Ibiden Company (JP)  ?  0
b 
     5.00 
      
   
40 Cartels, 35 Cases, July 2003 Grand Total  2,250.23 
   
   




Carbon Black  Methionine Amino Acid 
2003-2005 
(forth-coming) 
Carbon Fiber  Wine Alcohol Auctions 
 Methylglucamine  Glyphosate  Insecticide 
  Parcel Tankers, Chemical  Vitamin B1 
  PVC Plastic Additives  Vitamin B2 
  EPDM Synthetic Rubber  Vitamin B12 
  DRAMs, Semiconductors  Folic Acid (B) 
 Creosote  Vitamin  D3 
  Tar Pitch  Biotin (Vitamin H) 
  Naphthalene  Vitamin B4, EU Branch 
  Auto Refinishes  Extruded Graphite 
 Sulfuric  Acid   
G= Global-scope cartel 
? = Possible future indictment; apparent target of investigation or defendant in private suit. 
-- = Not available 
a The year of the date of the first guilty plea or conviction at trial; some convictions may have 
occurred at a later date. 
b Convicted but granted U.S. government amnesty. 
c Indicted but found not guilty at trial or hung jury. 
d Un-indicted co-conspirator. 
e No fine; settled by consent decree. 
f  Exposed by Canadian Bureau of Competition in 1999 but not prosecuted; may be under investigation   
   by the EU.
   
g  A record U.S. fine at the time. 
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Appendix Table 3. Time Lag in Anti-cartel Enforcement, 1990-2003. 
Dates of First Discovery or Sanctions 
a  Lags in Months 
Type: 
Cartel Name  First 
Date 
U.S. 











Global Food:             
Lysine  6/95 US  8/96  5/98  6/00 EC, 
1998 MX  14 21  46 
Citric Acid  10/96 US  10/96  5/98  12/01   0  19  50 
Sodium Gluconate  9/97 US 9/97  10/98  10/01  0  11 51 
Sorbates 9/98  US  9/98  10/99  --  0  13  -- 
Vitamins A & E  5/99 US  5/99  9/99  11/01  0  4  30 
              
Vitamin B1  5/99 EU  --  --  11/01  30  --  30 
Vitamin B2  5/99 US  5/99  9/99  11/01  0  4  30 
Vitamin B5  5/99 US  5/99  9/99  11/01  0  4  30 
Vitamin B6  5/99 EU  --  9/99  11/01  30  4  26 
Vitamin C  5/99 US  5/99  9/99  11/01  0  4  30 
              
Folic acid  5/99 EU  --  --  11/01  30  --  0 
Vitamin D3  5/99 EU  --  --  11/01  30  --  0 
Biotin (Vitamin H)  5/99 EU  --  --  11/01  30  --  0 
Carotenoids 5/99  US  5/99  9/99  11/01  0  4  30 
Beta Carotene  5/99 US  5/99  9/99  11/01  0  4  30 
              
Vitamin B3  5/99 US  5/99  5/99  --  0  4  -- 
Vitamin premixes  5/99 US  5/99  9/99  11/01  0  4  30 
Vitamin B12  10/99 CN  --  10/99    0  --  -- 
Methionine 11/99  EU  --  --  7/02  32  --  0 
Organic peroxides (seven) 3/01  US  3/01  --  --  0 --  -- 
              
MCAA 6/01  US  6/01  --  6/02  0  --  12 
MSG 8/01  US  8/01  --  12/02  0  --  16 
Nucleotides 8/01  US  8/01  --  12/02  0  --  16 
Wine alcohol auctions 4/02  US  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
              
Subtotal 24  16  15  19  196  100  471 
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Dates of First Discovery or Sanctions  Lags in Months 
Type: 
Cartel Name  First 
Date 
U.S. 











Regional EU Food:              
British sugar  6/93 EU  --  --  10/98  64  --  -- 
Vitamin B4, EU  9/99 CN  --  9/99  4/03  0  --  42 
Belgian beer,                             
HORECA  10/99 EU  --  --  12/01  22  --  0 
Belgian beer, store label  10/99 EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Portugal beer  1/03 EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
              
French beer  1/03 EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Dutch beer  1/03 EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Italian beer  1/03 EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
              
Subtotal 8  0  1  3  86  0  42 
              
Other Regional Food:             
Insecticides, chemical  6/93 CN  --  6/93  --  0  --  -- 
BT insecticide  6/93 CN  --  6/93  --  0  --  -- 
Aluminum phosphide  10/93 US  7/94  --  --  9  --  -- 
Tampico fiber  5/96 US  5/96  --  --  0  --  -- 
Vitamin B4, NAFTA  2/99 US  3/99  9/99  --  1  6  -- 
              
Maltol 7/99  US  7/99  --  --  0  --  -- 
Sodium erythorbate  7/99 US  7/99  10/01  --  0  27  -- 
Infant formula, IT  3/00 IT  --  --  3/03 IT  0  --  -- 
Cigarettes, Italy  6/01 IT  --  --  3/03 IT  21  --  -- 
Beef, France  1/02 FR  --  --  4/03 FR  15  --  -- 
              
Prawns, Netherlands  1/03 NL  --  --  1/03 NL  0  --  -- 
Glyphosate, US  3/03 US  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
              
Subtotal 12  5  4  4  46  33  -- 
              
Global Nonfood:             
Shipping, France –W.Africa  1/92 EU  --  --  1/92  0  0  0 
Shipping, Europe/W. Cent 
Africa  4/92 EU  --  --  4/92  0  --  0 
TACA shipping conference  10/94 EU  --  --  9/98  47  --  0 
Graphite electrodes
b  6/97 US  2/98  3/99  7/01 EC, 
3/02 KO  8 11  29 
Fine art auctions  6/97 US  10/00  --  4/02  40  --  18 
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Dates of First Discovery or Sanctions  Lag in Months 
Type: 
Cartel Name  First 
Date 
U.S. 











FETTSCA Far East shipping 
Conference  5/00 EU  --  --  5/00  0  --  0 
Carbon fiber  7/00 US  5/02  --  --  22  --  -- 
Isostatic graphite  2/01 US  2/01  3/01  12/02  0  1  22 
Auto refinishes  6/01 US  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Magnetic iron oxide  7/01 US  1/03  --  --  18  --  -- 
              
“3 Tenors” CDs  7/01 US  6/02  --  --  9  --  -- 
Stamp auctions  1/02 US 4/02 --  --  3  --  -- 
Carbon cathode block  3/02 US  3/02  --  --  0  --  -- 
DRAMs 6/02  US  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Extruded graphite  9/02 EU  --  --  12/02  3  --  0 
              
EPDM synthetic rubber  10/02 US/CN  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Rubber processing chemicals 10/02  US+EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Methylglucamine 11/02  EU  --  2/03  11/02  0  4  0 
Electric carbon products  11/02 US  11/02  --  --  0  --  -- 
Carbon black  11/02 US+EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
              
Tar pitch  12/02 US+EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Creosote 12/02  US+EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 





-- --  --  --  -- -- 
PVC plastic impact 
modifiers 
2/03 US+ 
EU+JP+CN  -- --  --  --  -- -- 
              
PVC plastic heat stabilizers  2/03 US+ 
EU+JP+CN  -- --  --  --  -- -- 





-- --  --  --  -- -- 
              
Subtotal 28  9  3  9  150  16  69 
              
Regional EU Nonfood:             
PVC plastic  1/87 EU  --  --  12/88  23  --  0 
LdPE plastic  1/87 EU  --  --  12/88  11  --  0 
Soda ash  4/89 EU  --  --  12/90  20  --  0   
 
118 
Dates of First Discovery or Sanctions  Lags in Months 
Type: 
Cartel Name  First 
Date 
U.S. 











Cement, Europe  1/92 EU  --  --  11/94  34  --  0 
Steel beams  5/92 EU  --  --  2/94  21  --  0 
              
Ferries, English Channel  11/92 EU  --  --  12/99  85  --  -- 
Carton board  7/94 EU  --  --  7/94  0  --  0 
Ferries, Adriatic  7/94 EU  --  --  12/99  65  --  -- 
Seamless steel tubes  12/94 EU  --  --  12/99  60  --  0 
District heating pipe  3/96 EU  --  --  10/98  31  --  0 
              
Stainless steel, flat  1/98 EU  --  --  1/98  0  --  0 
Plasterboard 11/98  EU  --  --  11/02  48  --  0 
Euro-Zone banks  10/99 EU  --  --  7/00  9  --  0 
Carbonless paper  8/00 EU  --  --  8/00  0  --  0 
Copper tubes  5/01 EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
              
Danish air route  7/01 EU  --  --  7/01  0  --  0 
Mobile phones, UK & DE  7/01 EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Zinc phosphate  12/01 EU  --  --  12/01  0  --  0 
Bitumen 10/02  EU  --  --  --  --  --  0 
Calcium carbide  12/02 
DE+NOR  -- --  --  --  -- -- 
              
Inland chemical barges  2/03 EU  --  --  --  --  --  0 
Oxo-alcohols 3/03  EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
FEFC liner conference  3/03 EU  --  --  03/03  0  --  -- 
MMA 4/03  EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Hydrogen peroxide  4/03 EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Subtotal 25  --  --  17  407  --  0 
              
Other Regional Non-Food:             
Glass containers, U.S.  6/83 US  --  --  --  156
c -- -- 
Compressed gases, Canada  6/90 CN  --  9/91  --  15  --  -- 
AAIC, US  ?/94 US  --  --  7/96 US  24 ?  --  -- 
Ferrosilicon, US  1/94 US  9/95  --  --  21  --  -- 
              
Plastic dinnerware, US  6/94 US  6/94  --  --  0  --  -- 
Thermal fax paper, US  7/94 US  7/94  7/94  --  0  0  -- 
Cosmetics, U.S.  4/95 US  --  --  --  62
c --  -- 
Explosives, US  8/95 US 8/95 --  --  0  --  -- 
Tubes, laminated, US  6/96 US  6/96  --  --  0  --  -- 
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Dates of First Discovery or Sanctions  Lags in Months 
Type: 
Cartel Name  First 
Date 
U.S. 











Flat glass, US  6/97 US  --  --  6/00 US  36
c --  -- 
Glass containers, Italy  7/97 IT  --  --  7/97 IT  0  --  -- 
Iron oxides, Canada  8/97 CN  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Recorded music, Italy  10/97 IT  --  --  10/97 IT  0  --   
Construction, heavy-lift 
marine, US  12/97 US  12/97  --  --  0  --  -- 
              
Transport, heavy-lift marine, 
US  12/97US 12/97 --  --  0  --  -- 
Power -equipment, hydro, 
NOR  6/98 NOR  --  --  5/99 NOR  9  --  -- 
Anti-anxiety drugs, US  12/98 US  --  --  --  0  --  -- 
Auditing services, Italy  12/98 IT  --  --  2/00 IT  15     
Cell phones, Italy  1/99 IT  --  --  10/99 IT  9  --  -- 
              
Drugs, respiratory, Italy  3/99 IT  --  --  3/99 IT  0  --  -- 
Drugs, cholesterol, Italy  3/99 IT  --  --  3/99 IT  0  --  -- 
Compressors, Australia  4/99 AU  --  --  6/99 AUS  2  --  -- 
Gasoline, Spain  5/99 ES  --  --  6/01 ES  13  --  -- 
Water heaters, Italy  5/99 IT  --  --  5/99 IT  0  --  -- 
              
Concrete, Germany  8/99 DE  --  --  11/99 DE  3  --  -- 
Gasoline, Italy  10/99 IT  --  --  6/00 IT  9  --  -- 
Fuels, military, Japan  10/99 JP  --  --  11/99 JP  1  --  -- 
Drugs, obesity, Italy  12/99 IT  --  --  12/99 IT  0  --  -- 
Bridge, California, US  1/00 US  1/00  --  --  0  --  -- 
              
Gasoline, Sweden  2/00 SW  --  --  6/00 SW  4  --  -- 
Elevator repair, Italy  5/00 IT  --  --  5/00 IT  0  --  -- 
Bromines, US  7/00 US  7/00  --  --  0  --  -- 
Fuels, military, Korea  7/00 KO  --  --  3/02 KO  20
b --  -- 
Match distribution, Italy  7/00 IT  --  --  7/00 IT  0  --  -- 
              
Construction, USAID  8/00 US  8/00  --  --  0  --  -- 
Bridges, cable-stayed, US  8/00 US  8/00  --  --  0  --  -- 
Tactile tiles, U.S.  8/00 US  8/00  --  --  0  --  -- 
Radiological media, Italy  11/00  IT  --  --  11/00 IT  0  --  -- 
Transformers, Australia  4/01 AU  --  --  5/02 AUS  13  --  -- 
Mobile phones, UK  7/01 EU  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Mobile phones, NL  9/01 NL  --  --  12/02 NL  15  --  -- 
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Dates of First Discovery or Sanctions  Lags in Months 
Type: 
Cartel Name  First 
Date 
U.S. 











Gasoline, Netherlands  12/01 NL  --  --  6/02 NL  7  --  -- 
Construction, Netherlands  1/02 NL  --  --  -- NL  ?  --  -- 
Asphalt, Sweden  1/02 SW  --  --  3/03 SW  14  --  -- 
              
Generic drugs, UK  4/02 UK  --  --  -- UK  --  --  -- 
Distribution, appliances, FR  6/02 FR  --  --  6/02 FR  0  --  -- 
Industrial gases, NL  7/02 EU  --  --  7/02 EU  0  --  -- 
Insurance, Germany  7/02 DE  --  --  -- DE  --  --  -- 
Gasoline, Czech Republic  7/02 CZ  --  --  9/02 CZ  2  --  -- 
              
Cement, Germany  7/02 DE  --  --  4/03 DE  15  --  -- 
Gasoline, France  8/02 FR  --  --  4/03 FR  8  --  -- 
Polyester staple, US  9/02 US  9/02  --  --  0  --  -- 
Ball bearings, France  9/02 FR  --  --  9/02 FR  0  --  -- 
Cement, Hungary  10/02 HU  --  --  -- HU  --  --  -- 
              
Toys, UK  11/02 UK  --  --  2/03 UK  5  --  -- 
Bicycles, Netherlands  11/02 NL  --  --  11/02 NL  0  --  -- 
Concrete engineering, NL  11/02 NL  --  --  -- NL  --  --  -- 
Gasoline, Chile  12/02 CL  --  --  -- CL  --  --  -- 
Construction, sports, NL  12/02 NL  --  --  12/02 NL  0  --  -- 
              
Sulfuric acid, US  1/03 US/CN  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
OTC drugs, US  2/03 US  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Construction, Norway  2/03 NOR  --  --  -- NOR  --  --  -- 
Diesel distribution, Italy  3/03 IT  --  --  3/03 IT  0  --  -- 
Cement, Italy  4/03 IT  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
              
Label stock, US  4/03 US  4/03  --  --  0  --  -- 
Paper, office, Canada  4/03 CA  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Diabetes devices, Italy  4/03 IT  --  --  4/03 IT  0  --  -- 
Asphalt, Finland  6/03 FI  --  --  -- FI  --  --  -- 
Insurance, Netherlands  6/03 NL  --  --  -- NL  --  --  -- 
              
Printing, holographic, U.S.  7/03 US  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
              
Subtotal 70  14  1  36  531  0  -- 
              
Grand total    167  45  24  88  1,416  149  582 
 
-- = Not applicable   
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a    First date to appear in newspapers or wire reports of a raid or investigation. Sanction dates are press releases by 
the antitrust authorities of guilty pleas, indictments, or fines imposed on at least on party. 
Sources: Tables A.1 to A.12 
b Prosecuted by Korea’s FTC in 3/02 
c Date that a civil case was resolved. 
 
 
Appendix Table 4. Severity of EU Cartel Fines, Nine Largest Cases
a 
Fine as a Proportion of 





Global Sales of 
Company (fiscal 
year ending)
c  Sales  Total 
Assets 
  Million U.S. dollars Percent 
VITAMINS (11/21/2001):         
   Hoffman-LaRoche/Roche Holdings AG  405.3  17,798  (2000)  2.28  0.93 
   BASF AG  259.8  33,879  (2000)  0.77  0.67 
   Rhone-Poulenc/Aventis SA  4.4  12,687  (2000)  0.035  0.011 
   Lonza AG  0  --  0 0 
   Solvay SA  8.0  8,725  (2000)  0.092  -- 
   Merck KgaA  8.3  7,528  (2000)  0.11  0.10 
   Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.  20.5  2,918  (2000)  0.70  0.43 
   Kongo Chemical  0  --  0 0 
   Sumitomo Chemical  0  --  0 0 
   Sumika Fine Chemicals Co. Ltd.  0  --  0 0 
   Takeda Chemical Industries  32.5  8,964  (2000)  0.36  -- 
   Tanabe Seiyaku Co. Ltd.  0  --  0 0 
   Eisai Co.  11.6  2,937  (2000)  0.39  0.26 
TOTAL  750.3              95,436  0.79  0.40 
     (0.38) (0.45) 
PLASTERBOARD (11/27/2002):        
   Lafarge SA  250.6  12,209  (2001)  2.05  0.94 
   BPB PLC  138.6  2,248  (2001)  6.17  5.26 
   Begrueder Knauf  85.8  Private  --  -- 
   Gyproc Benelux NV  4.3                 82.5  (2003)  5.21  -- 
TOTAL  478.3             14,540  2.70  3.10 
     (5.21) (3.10) 
       
CARBONLESS PAPER (8/8/00):        
   Arjo Wiggins Appleton PLC  166.0  5,205 (1999)  3.19  3.81 
   Papierfabrik A. Koehler Gmbh  29.8  Private  --  -- 
   Zanders Feinpapiere AG  26.8  625 (1999)  4.29  5.59 
   Bollore’ GROUPE SA  20.4  5,173 (2002)  0.39  -- 
   Mitsubishi Hi Tech Paper/Mitsubishi Corp.  19.1  113,844  (1999)  0.017  0.0257 
   Torraspapel SA  12.8  926  (2001)  1.38  -- 
   Papeteries Mougeot SA  3.3  167  (2002)  1.98  -- 
   Distribudora Viscaina de Papeles  1.6  --  -- -- 
   Carrs Paper Ltd.  1.4  26  (2002)  5.38  -- 
   Pellera Zicuñaga SA  1.4  128  (2000)  1.09  -- 
TOTAL  282.6            126,094  0.20  1.92 
     (1.68) (3.81) 
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TACA Liner Conference (9/16/1998):        
   Moller-Maersk A/S  23.7  77
f  (1999)  30.78 (?)  3.18 
   Sea-Land Service, Inc.  23.7  --  -- -- 
   P & O Nedlloyd  35.7  7,552  (2002)  0.47  -- 
   OOCL/Orient Overseas Container Line  17.8  630  (1999)  2.83  6.33 
   NYK Line (Europe) Ltd.  17.8  43
f  (2000)  41.49 (?)  56.78 (?) 
   Hanjin Shipping Co. Ltd.  17.8  3,540  (1999)  0.50  0.40 
   Hapag-Lloyd AG  17.8  7,839  (1999)  0.23  0.82 
   Hyundai Merchant Marine Ltd.  16.0  4,498  (1999)  0.36  0.36 
   MSC/Mediterranean Shipping Co.  11.9  Private  --  -- 
   DSR/Senator Lines Gmbh  11.9  1,614  (2001)  0.74  -- 
   NOL/Neptune Orient Lines  11.9  3,926  (1998)  0.30  0.16 
   Cho Yang Shipping Co.  11.9  Private  --   --   
   TMM/Tecomar SA  5.9  990  (2000)  0.60    --   
   ACL/Atlantic Container Line AB  5.9  308  (1997)  1.92  --   
   POL/Polish Ocean Lines  2.9  Private  --  --   
TOTAL  235.9              31,017  0.59    1.65(7)    
     (0.50) (0.40)   
         
         
GRAPHITE ELECTRODES (7/18/2001):          
   UCAR International, Inc.  43.1  586  (2000)  7.35  4.75   
   SGL Carbon AG  68.5  1,190  (2000)  5.76  4.99   
   Showa Denko Carbon  14.1  6,536  (2000)  0.22  0.15 
   SEC Corp.  10.4  156  (2000)  6.67  3.51 
   Nippon Carbon Co. Ltd.  10.4  180  (2000)  5.78  2.74 
   Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd.  20.9  568  (2000)  3.68  2.26 
   Carbon/Graphite  8.8  Private  --  -- 
   Mitsubishi Corp.  0  --  0 0 
   VAW AG  9.9  Private  --  -- 
TOTAL  187.2               9,198  2.04  3.06 
     (5.76) (2.74) 
       
CITRIC ACID (12/5/2001):        
   Archer Daniels Midland Co.  35.3  12,867  (2000)  0.27  0.24 
   Bayer AG  12.7  26,048  (2000)  0.049  0.037 
   Hoffmann-LaRoche/Roche Holdings AG  56.5  17,798  (2000)  0.32  0.13 
   Jungbungzlauer AG  15.7  207  (2001)  7.58  -- 
   Eridania Beghin-Say SA  0.2  9,073  (1999)  0.0022  0.0022 
TOTAL  120.4              65,993  0.18  0.10 
     (0.27) (0.84) 
       
METHIONINE (7/2/2003):        
   Degussa-Huels AG  116.3  12,741  (1999)  0.91  1.19 
   Nippon Soda Co. Ltd.  8.9  1,170  (2001)  0.76  0.59 
   Rhone-Poulenc/Aventis SA  0  0  -- 0 
TOTAL  125.2              13,911  0.90  0.89 
     (0.90) (0.89) 
       
CARTONBOARD (7/13/1994):        
   Buchmann Gmbh  2.0  Private  --  --   
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   Cascades SA  14.4  242  (1997)  5.95  6.55 
   Enso-Gutzeit Oy  2.9  Private  --  -- 
   Europa Carton  2.1  484  (1996)  0.43  0.75 
   Finnboard Association  17.8  --  -- -- 
   Fyskerby AB  0.9  --  -- -- 
   Gruber & Webber Gmbh  0.9  80  (2002)  1.13  -- 
   BPB PLC  1.6  2,125  (1999)  0.075  0.061 
   KNP BT Nederland  2.7  --  -- -- 
   Laakmann Gmbh  2.0  Private  --  -- 
   Mays-Meinhof  18.7  --  -- -- 
   MoDo/Mo Och Domsjo AB  20.2  --  -- -- 
   Papeteries de Lancy  1.3  --  -- -- 
   Rena/ Kartonfabrik AS  0.2  39.5  (1993)  0.51  1.01 
   Sario AS  13.8  Private  --  -- 
   SCA  2.0  --  -- -- 
   Stora Billerud  10.0  842  (1993)  1.19  1.00 
   Enso Oy  1.6  15.2  (1993)  10.53  7.48 
   Moritz J. Weig Gmbh  2.7  220  (2001)  1.23  -- 
TOTAL  117.6                4,045  1.34  2.80 
     (1.16) (1.01) 
       
LYSINE (6/2000):        
   Archer Daniels Midland Co.  42.1  14,283  (1999)  0.30  0.29 
   Ajinomoto Co. Ltd.  25.1  6,780  (1999)  0.37  0.36 
   Kyowa Hakko Co. Ltd.  11.8  1,900  (1999)  0.62  0.29 
   Sewon/Daesang  7.9  849  (2000)  1.50  -- 
   Cheil Jedong/ Cheil Industries, Inc.  10.9  1,003  (1999)  1.09  0.86 
TOTAL  97.9              24,815  0.39  0.45 
     (0.62) (0.29) 
       
--  = Not available or not applicable 
Sources: Press releases of the European Commission and Worldscope, Disclosure Inc., or similar renderings of the 
income statements of the companies. 
 
a)  These 9 cases are the largest in terms of euro fines among all international cartels, as of July 2003, where 
the fines are the totals imposed on all companies by the EC or later by the European Court of First Instance, 
in euros or ECUs. Some recent cases are still under appeal in 2003. 
b)  Translated from euros to U.S. dollars at the average exchange rate prevailing during the three months 
following the date of imposition. 
c)  Fines are limited to 10% of worldwide sales in the year prior to the date of imposition; if not available, 
closest year available is shown. 
d)  Total for each case is weighted average for sales and simple average for assets. In parentheses is the median 
percentage. 
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Appendix Table 5. Repeat Offenders in International Cartels Discovered 1990-2003 
 
Membership in Cartels 
Company  (Country) 
Sanctioned





BASF  (DE)  9 vitamins, PVC plastic, LdPE 
plastic 
Auto refinishes, oxo-alcohols, 
sulfuric acid, MMA 
15 
Hoffmann-LaRoche (CH)  12 vitamins, citric acid    13 
Total Fina Elf  (FR)    MCAA, PVC plastic, LdPE 
plastic 
Organic peroxides, PVC 
additives, oxo-alcohols, MMA, 
sulfuric acid, bitumen, gasoline, 
(IT,ES,FR) 
12 
Aventis  (FR)  4 vitamins, sorbates, MCAA, 
methionine, PVC plastic, LdPE 
plastic, methlglucamine 
 10 
Akgo Nobel  (NL)  Sodium gluconates, MCAA, 
choline chloride, soda ash, 
explosives 
Auto refinishes, organic 
peroxides, PVC additives, 
rubber processing chemicals, 
MBS 
10 
Degussa-Huels  (DE)  Methionine, PVC plastic, vitamin 
B12 
Organic peroxides, carbon 
black, oxo-alcohols, sulfuric 
acid, MMA, calcium carbide 
9 
Mitsubishi  (JP)  Graphite electrodes, fax paper, 
carbonless paper, Isostatic 
graphite 
Carbon fiber, carbon black, 
MBS, PVC additives 
8 
ADM  (US)  Lysine, citric acid, MSG, sodium  Wine alcohol, fructose, glucose, 
dextrose 
8 
Shell  (NL)  PVC plastic  Bitumen, retail gasoline 
(IT,SW, CZ,FR, Chile) 
7 
Bayer  (DE)  Citric acid, LdPE plastic, BT 
insecticide 
Iron oxide, EPDM, rubber 
processing chemicals 
6 
Takeda Chem.  (JP)  4 vitamins, MSG    5 
Du Pont  (US)  Explosives, choline chloride  EPDM, auto refinishes, sulfuric 
acid 
5 
Solvay  (BL)  Vitamin D, PVC plastic  Oxo-alcohols, sulfuric acid, 
MMA 
5 
Mitsui  (JP)  Choline chloride, methionine, 
FETTSCA 
EPDM 4 
ICI  (UK)  Explosives, soda ash, PVC 
plastic, LdPE plastic 
 4 
Sumitomo Chemical  (JP)  BT insecticide, vitamin H  EPDM  3 
Lafarge  (FR)  Cement, lysine  Cement (IT+DE)  4 
Exxon Mobil  (US)    Bitumen, retail gasoline (IT,FR, 
Chile) 
4 
UCAR Intl.  (US)  Graphite electrodes, extruded 
graphite, isostatic graphite 
 3 
SGL Carbon (DE)  Graphite electrodes, extruded 
graphite, isostatic graphite 
 3 
Crompton Chem.  (US)  PVC plastic additives  EPDM, rubber processing 
chemicals 




ABB  (CH)  District heating pipe, USAID 
construction 
Transformers 3 
REPSOL  (ES)    Bitumen, retail gasoline 
(ES+Chile) 
3 
BP Amoco  (UK)    Bitumen, retail gasoline 
(ES+FR) 
3 
Holcim  (CH)  Cement  Cement (IT,DU,HU)  4 
Cheil Jedang  (SK)  Lysine, MSG, sodium erythorbate    3 
E. Merck  (DE)  2 vitamins, methylglucamine    3 
Monsanto  (US)  EdPE plastic  Sorbates, glyphosphate  3 
Montedison  (IT)  PVC plastic, EdPE plastic, citric 
acid 
 3 
Ajinomoto  (JP)  Lysine, MSG    2 
Kyowa Hakko  (JP)  Lysine, MSG    2 
Sewon/Daesang  (KO)  Lysine, MSG    2 
DSM  (NL)  2 plastics    2 
Enichem  (IT)  2 plastics    2 
Jungbunzlauer  (CH)  Citric, sodium gluconate    2 
Fujisawa  (JP)  Sodium gluconate, erythorbate    2 
Lonza  (CH)  2 vitamins    2 
Interbrew  (NL)  2 beer    2 
Pfizer  (US)  Maltol, sodium erythorbate    2 
VAW  (DE)  Carbonless paper  Carbon black  2 
Ibiden  (JP)  Isostatic graphite, magnetic iron 
oxide 
 2 
Tokai Carbon  (JP)  Graphite electrodes, isostatic 
graphite 
 2 
Nanja  (TW)    Polyester, DRAMs  2 
Maersk, Moller  (DK)  TACA, Danish air routes    2 
Nippon Steel  (JP)  Steel tubes, isostatic graphite    2 
Krupp Thyssen  (DE)  Stainless, steel beams    2 
USINOR  (FR)  Stainless, steel beams    2 
Heerema  (NL)  2 marine services    2 
Saipem  (IT)  2 marine services    2 
J. Ray McDermott  (US)  2 marine services    2 
AGIP  (IT)    Retail gasoline (IT+CZ)  2 
CEPSA  (ES)    Bitumen, gasoline  (ES)  2 
Q8  (KW)    Gasoline  (IT+SW)  2 
Leminkainen  (FI)    Asphalt  (FI+SW)  2 
Vodaphone  (UK)    Phone fees  (NL+UK)  2 
France Telecom  (FR)    Phone fees  (NL+UK)  2 
Skanska  (SW)    Construction  (SW+NOR)  2 
      
a)  Guilty pleas, fines, or private settlements. 





   
 
126 
Appendix Table 6A. The Degree of Harm and Severity of Sanctions Relative to Affected 
Commerce, International Cartels, 1990-2003. 
 
Average Overcharges  Fines, Settlements, or Verdicts 
b 
Cartelized Market 
U.S. Can.  EU or 
EEA 
Other 
Areas  World  U.S. 
DOJ 
Can. 
CCB  EC  Other 
Govt.   Total 
   Percentage of Affected Commerce  Percentage of Affected Commerce 
Global Food & Agric:                           
   Citric acid  16-20
a 19-32 45-50  --  30-35  9  11  10  0  18  10 
   Lysine  18  22  17  8
E 14 21  15  16 --  20  15 
   MCAA  --  --  --  --  --  20  --  Pend.  --  7+  -- 
   MSG  --  --  --  --  --  0.2  --  0.7  --  --  -- 
   Methionine  13  --  --  --  --  Pend.  0  4  0  4  -- 
                      
   Sodium gluconate  --  --  --  --  --  26  8  40  0  7  22 
   Sorbates  41  37-47  --  --  42  13  20  Pend.  0  12  12 
                            
Vitamins bulk:  26.7 --  --  --  24.3  17.5
d 12.1 11.2  --  23.5  10 
   A&E  31        28  --  --  8        
   B1  10        9  0  0  0
c        
   B2  16        15  --  --  25        
   B3  33        33  --  0  --        
   B5  25        25  --  --  32        
                            
   B6  25        22  0  --  0
c        
   B12  13        33  0  1  0
c        
   Beta carotene  30        27  --  --  16        
   Biotin (H)  --        --  0  --  0
c        
   C  17        17  --  --  9        
                            
   Carotinoids, two  60        28  0  0  16        
   D3  --        --  0  0  38        
   Folic acid  23        23  0  0  0
c        
   premixes  --        --  --  --  0        
                            
EU Food & Agriculture:                           
   Belgium beer, HORECA  0  0  --  0  --  0  0  1.6  0  0  1.6 
   Belgium beer, private label  0  0  --  0  --  0  0  --  0  0  -- 
   British sugar  0  0  50  0  50  0  0  4.2  0  0  4.2 
   Vitamin B4, Europe  0  --  9  0  9  0  1.5  --  0  0  -- 
                            
Other Food & Agriculture:                           
   Aluminum phosphide, U.S.  9.5  0  0  0  9.5  0.25  --  --  --  0.15  0.4 
   Cigarettes, Italy  0  0  --  0  --  0  0  --  1.13  0  1.1 
   Infant formula, Italy  0  0  --  0  --  0  0  --  4
g 0 4
g 
   Insecticide, Canada BT  0  1.7  0  0  1.7  0  71
g 0  0  0  71
g 
   Insecticide, chemical, CAN  0  --  0  0  --  0  25  0  0  0  25 
   Maltol, U.S.  --  0  0  0  --  4  0  0  0  --  4 
   Prawns, Netherlands  0  0  --  0  --  0  0  --  6.2  0  6.2   
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   Sodium erythorbate, U.S.  --  --  0  0  --  12.5 -
18.0  12.5 --  --  1.4  14-19 
   Tampico fiber, U.S.  --  0  0  0  --  22  --  --  --  --  22 
   Vitamin B4, North America  9.5  11  0  0  10  0.9  4  0  0  24.5  24 
                            
Global Nonfood:                           
   Carbon black  6
E 6
E 6
E 0 3 --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Carbon fiber  25
E --  --  -- -- --  --  -- --  --  -- 
   Carbon, electrical products  --  --  --  --  --  30-90  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Fine arts auctions  90-200  --  100-
200  --  92-
192  19  0  4 0 106  52 
   Graphite electrodes  51-65  50-63  50  54
E 52 26 9  8  54  36  20 
                            
   Graphite isostatic  --  --  --  --  --  3-4  1.2  10-15  0  0  4-7 
   Graphite, extruded  --  --  --  --  --  0  0  4-5  --  --  4-5 
   Methyglucamine  --  75  --  --  --  --  29  12  --  --  4.9 
   Shipping, FETTSCA  --  --  34-37  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
                            
EU-Wide Nonfood:                           
   Carbonless paper  0  0  10-24  0  10-24  0  0  10  0  0  10 
   Cartonboard  0  0  20-26  0  20-26  0  0  0.9  0  0  0.9 
   Cell phone roaming fees, UK    
       & DE  0 0  200-
700  0  200-
700  0 0 --  0  0  -- 
   Cement  0  0  --  0  --  0  0  0.3  0  0  0.3 
   Danish air route  0  0  --  0  --  0  0  12  0  0  12 
                            
   Ferries, Channel  0  0  10  0  10  0  0  0.3  0  0  0.3 
   Ferries, Adriatic  0  0  --  0  --  0  0  0.3  0  0  0.3 
   Pipe, district heating  0  0  17  0  17  0  0  22-
26
g  0 0  22-
26
g 
   Plasterboard  0  0  --  0  --  0  0  7.4  0  0  7.4 
   Seamless steel tubes  0  0  9-15  0  9-15  0  0  27  0  0  27 
                            
   Soda ash  0  0  --  0  --  0  0  1.0-
1.1  0 0  1.0-
1.1 
   Steel beams  0  0  20-30  0  20-30  0  0  1.7  0  0  1.7 
   Steel, flat stainless  0  0  60  0  60  0  0  1.7  0  0  1.7 
   Zinc phosphate  0  0  8-18  0  8-18  0  0  20  0  0  20 
                            
Other Nonfood:                           
   AIIC, U.S.  --  --  --  --  --  0
f 0 0  0  0  0 
   Asphalt, Sweden  0  0  --  0  --  0  0  0  3.5  0  3.5 
   Ball bearings, France  0 0  18  0 18 0 0 0 --  0  -- 
   Bromine, U.S.  --  0  0  0  --  0.9  0  0  0  --  0.9 
   Cell phone fees, Italy  0 0  11  0  11  0  0  0  1.3  0  1.3 
                      
   Cement, Germany 1993-  
       2003  0 0  11-23  0  11-23  0  0  5-11  0 0  5-11 
   Compressed gasses,  
      Canada  0  21-40 0  0 21-40  0 2.3 0  0  0  2.3 
   Compressed gasses,   
      Netherlands  0 0  --  0  --  0  0  2.4  0 0  2.4 
   Concrete, Germany, 1995-  0 0  9  0 9 0  0  0  15.5  0  15.5   
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      1998 
   Construction, heavy marine,  
      U.S.  -- 0  --  --  --  46
g 0  0  0  --  4.9
g 
                      
   Construction, Netherlands  0  0  8.8  0  8.8  0  0  0  --
g 0  -- 
   Construction, Norway  0  0  37  0  37  0  0  0  --
g 0  -- 
   Construction, USAID, Egypt  33  0  0  0  33  47
g 0  0  0  20  67
g 
   Diabetes testing devices,  
      Italy  0 0  --  0  --  0  0  0  20.3
g 0 20.3
g 
   Drugs, anti-anxiety, U.S.  1600-
3500  0 0 0  1900-
3500 
1600-




                   
   Drugs, cholesterol, Italy  0 0  50  0  50  0  0  0  3.0
g 0 3.0
g 
   Drugs, generic, UK  0  0  163  0  163  0  0  0  --g  0  -- 
   Drugs, obesity, Italy  0 0  --  0  --  0  0  0  4.5
g 0 4.5
g 
   Drugs, respiratory, Italy  0 0  50  0  50  0  0  0  3.0
g 0 3.0
g 
   Elevator repairing, Italy  0 0  --  0  --  0  0  0  1.6  0  1.6 
                      
   Explosives, U.S.  4  0  0  0  4  0.5  0  0  0  1.1  1.6 
   Ferrosilicon, U.S.  5-15  0  0  0  5-15  0.6  0  0  0  --  0.6 
   Fuels, military, Japan  0 0  0  -- -- 0  0  0  1.25
g 0 1.25
g 
   Fuels, military, Korea  0 0  0  17 17 0 0 0 27
g 0 27
g 
   Gasoline, retail, Czech  
      Republic  0  0  0  -- -- 0  0  0  0.3 0 0.3 
                   
   Gasoline, retail, France  0 0  25  0 25 0 0 0  0.1  0  0.1 
   Gasoline, retail, Italy  0 0  3.6  0 3.6 0 0 0 3.5  0  3.5 
   Gasoline, retail, Sweden  0 0  50  0 50 0 0 0  75
h,g 0 75
h,g 
   Glass containers, U.S.  --  0  0  0  --  0  0  0  0  0.3  0.3 
   Glass food jars, Italy  0 0  --  0  --  0  0  0  3.0  0  3.0 
                      
   Paper, thermal fax, U.S. +  
      CAN  10 10 0  0 10  6.9  13.8  0 0 6.3 11 
   Plastic dinnerware, U.S.  33  0  0  0  33  9.1  0  0  0  --  9.1 
   Power equipment, Norway  0 0  0  9 9 0  0  0  1.1
g 0 1.1
g 
   Radiological media, Italy  0 0  --  0  --  0  0  0  5.5
g 0 5.5
g 
   Recorded music, Italy  0 0  --  0  --  0  0  0  1.4  0  1.4 
                      
   Sulfuric acid, U.S.  32-53  0  0  0  32-53  --  0  0  0  0  -- 
   Toys & games, UK  0  0  42  0  42  0  0  0  --  0  -- 
   Transformers, Australia  0  0  0  19  19  0  0  0  2.3  --  2.3 
   Tubes, laminated, U.S.  --  0  0  0  --  0
f 0 0  0  --  0 
   Water heaters, gas, Italy  0 0  --  0  --  0  0  0  2.5  0  2.5 
                                   
Source: -- Pending. 
E = Estimated by author; less precise than other estimates 
a This was a case of big rigging against the government prosecuting the case; such cases tend to pursued more      
   aggressively than other types, and sanctions often include restitution. 
b Reduced by a national court, but still under appeal. 
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Appendix Table 6B. The Severity of Sanctions Relative to Harm, International Cartels, 1990-
2003. 
Ratio of Sanctions to Overcharges 
Cartelized Market  U.S. 
DOJ 
Canada 




i  Total 
   Percent 
Global Food & Agric:             
   Citric acid  50  43  21  0  100  31 
   Lysine  117  68  94  --  111  107 
   Methionine  --  --  --  0  31  -- 
   Sodium gluconate  --  --  --  0  --  -- 
   Sorbates  32  48  --  0  29  29 
               
   Bulk vitamins:  66  --  --  --  88  41 
   A&E  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   B1  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   B2  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   B3  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   B5  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
               
   B6  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   B12  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Beta carotene  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Biotin (H)  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   C  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
               
   2 carotinoids  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   D3  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Folic acid  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   MCAA  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   MSG  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
               
   premixes              
               
EU Food & Agriculture:             
   Belgium beer, HORECA  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Belgium beer, private label  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   British sugar  --  --  8.4  --  0  8.4 
   Vitamin B4, Europe  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
               
Other Food & Agriculture:             
   Tampico fiber, U.S.  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Aluminum phosphide  2.6  --  --  --  1.6  4.2 
   Cigarettes, Italy  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Infant formula, Italy  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Insecticide, CAN  --  4,176
g --  --  0 4,176
g 
               
   Insecticide, chemical, CAN  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Maltol, U.S.  --  --  --  --  --  --   
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   Prawns, Netherlands  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Sodium erthorbate, U.S.  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Vitamin B4, North America  9.5  36  --  --  258  240 
               
Global Nonfood:             
   Carbon black  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Carbon fiber  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Carbon, electrical products  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Fine arts auctions  13  --  2.7  --  75  37 
   Graphite electrodes  45  16  16  100  62  38 
               
   Graphite isostatic  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Graphite, extruded  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Methyglucamine  --  39  --  --  --  -- 
   Shipping, FETTSCA  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
               
EU-Wide Nonfood:             
   Carbonless paper  --  --  59  --  0  59 
   Cartonboard  --  --  3.9  --  0  3.9 
   Cell phone roaming fees, UK & DE  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Cement  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Danish air route  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
               
   Ferries, Channel  --  --  3  --  0  3 
   Ferries, Adriatic  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Pipe, district heating  --  --  141
g --  0  141
g 
   Plasterboard  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Seamless steel tubes  --  --  225  --  0  225 
               
   Soda ash  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Steel beams  --  --  6.8  --  0  6.8 
   Steel, flat stainless  --  --  2.8  --  0  2.8 
   Zinc phosphate  --  --  154  --  0  154 
               
Other Nonfood:             
   AIIC, U.S.  0
f  --  -- -- --  -- 
   Asphalt, Sweden  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Ball bearings, France  -- -- --  --  0 -- 
   Bromine, U.S.  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Cell phone fees, Italy  -- -- --  12  0 12 
           
   Cement, Germany 1993-2003  --  --  47  --  0  47 
   Compressed gasses, Canada  --  7.5  --  --  0  7.5 
   Compressed gasses, Netherlands  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Concrete, Germany, 1995-1998  -- -- --  172  0  172 
   Construction, heavy marine, U.S.  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
           
   Construction, Netherlands  --  --  --  --g  0  -- 
   Construction, Norway  --  --  --  --g  0  --g 
   Construction, USAID, Egypt  142
g --  --  -- 61  203
g 
   Diabetes testing devices, Italy  -- -- --  --
g 0  --
g   
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   Drugs, anti-anxiety  100  --  --  --  29  129 
           
   Drugs, cholesterol, Italy  -- -- --  6
g 0  6
g 
   Drugs, generic, UK  --  --  --  --g  0  --g 
   Drugs, obesity, Italy  -- -- --  --g  0  --g 
   Drugs, respiratory, Italy  -- -- --  6
g 0  6
g 
   Elevator repairing, Italy  -- -- --  --  0 -- 
           
   Explosives, U.S.  10  --  --  --  28  40 
   Ferrosilicon, U.S.  6  --  --  --  --  6 
   Fuels, military, Japan  -- -- --  --g  0 --
g 
   Fuels, military, Korea  --  --  --  158
g 0  158
g 
   Gasoline, retail, Czech Republic  -- -- --  --  0 -- 
           
   Gasoline, retail, France  -- -- --  0.4  0  0.4 
   Gasoline, retail, Italy  -- -- --  97  0 97 
   Gasoline, retail, Sweden  -- -- --  150
h,g 0  150
h,g 
   Glass Containers, U.S.  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Glass food jars, Italy  -- -- --  --  0 -- 
           
   Paper, thermal fax, U.S. + CAN  69  138  --  --  63  110 
   Plastic dinnerware, U.S.  28  --  --  --  --  28 
   Power equipment, Norway  -- -- --  12
g 0  12
g 
   Radiological media, Italy  -- -- --  --g  0  --g 
   Recorded music, Italy  -- -- --  --  0 -- 
           
   Sulfuric acid, U.S.  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Toys & games, UK  --  --  --  --  0  -- 
   Transformers, Australia  --  --  --  12  --  12 
   Tubes, laminated  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
   Water heater, gas, Italy  -- -- --  --  0 -- 
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Appendix Table 7. Characteristics of International Cartels by Product and Geographic Type                              




Food & Agric.  Organic Chemicals  Other (Nonfood)  Total 
Global:        
   No. of cartels  24  33  27  51 
   No. of companies (N)  97 (24)    175 (27)  272 (51) 
   Affected sales (N)  $79,832 (23)    $129,429 (16)  $209,261 (39) 
   Median sales (N)  $1,080 (23)    $6,170 (16)  $3,168 (39) 
   Average overcharge (N)  24.0% (15)    46.2% (8)  32.1% (23) 
   Median overcharge (N)  25.0% (15)    30.0 (8)  % (23) 
        
EU only:         
   No. of cartels   8  8  25  33 
   No. of companies (N)  14 (4)       349 (25)  363 (29) 
   Affected sales (N)  $9,987 (4)    $90,855 (15)  $100,842 (19) 
   Median sales (N)  $2,456 (4)    $3,360 (15)  $3,170 (19) 
   Average overcharge (N)  29.5% (2)    69.9% (9)  62.5% (11) 
   Median overcharge (N)  29.5% (2)    20.0% (9)  % (11) 
        
NAFTA only:         
   No. of cartels   8  8  24  32 
   No. of companies (N)  24 (8)    245 (24)  269 (32) 
  Affected sales (N)  $3,024 (8)    $43,977 (18)  $47,001 (26) 
  Median sales (N)  $48 (8)    $800 (18)  $569 (26) 
  Average overcharge (N)  40.3% (3)    31.1% (8)  28.2% (11) 
  Median overcharge (N)  47.0% (3)    26.0% (8)  % (11) 
        
Single European:         
   No. of cartels  4  0  40  44 
   No. of companies (N)  30 (4)    355 (40)  385 (44) 
   Affected sales (N)  $5,815 (3)    $45,765 (22)  $51,580 (25) 
   Median sales (N)  $240 (3)    $835 (22)  $764 (25) 
   Average overcharge (N)  -- (0)    31.4% (14)  31.4% (14) 
   Median overcharge (N)  -- (0)    18.3% (14)  % (14) 
        
Other nations:         
   No. of cartels  0  0  6  6 
   No. of companies (N)  --    32 (6)  32 (6) 
   Affected sales (N)  --    $3,024 (4)  $3,024 (4) 
   Median sales (N)  --    $999 (4)  $999 (40 
   Average overcharge (N)  --    18% (2)  18% (2) 
   Median overcharge (N)  --    18% (2)  18% (2) 
        
Total:        
   No. of cartels  44  49  122  167 
   No. of companies (N)  165 (40)    1,156 (122)  1,331 (163) 
   Affected sales (N)  $98,658 (38)    $313,050 (75)  $436,604 (114) 
   Median sales (N)  $941 (38)    $2,478 (75)  $1,961 (75) 
   Average overcharge (N)  27.0% (20)    40.1% (41)  35.8% (61) 
   Median overcharge (N)  28.8% (20)    22.5% (41)  24.6% (61) 
        
Source: Tables A.1-A.12 
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Appendix Table 8. Industrial Distribution of International Cartels 
 
Affected Sales 
Industry Group of Cartels  Total 
Sales  Mean Median 
   U.S. million dollars 
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries    240  240  240 
Mining 0  --  -- 
Construction 1,647  549  347 
       
Manufacturing:       
   Food, feed, tobacco products  13,720  1,960  240 
   Textiles and clothing  0  --  -- 
   Lumber and furniture  0  --  -- 
   Paper and printing  22,476  3,746  3,350 
   Organic chemicals, food & agriculture  84,832  2,651  964 
   Organic chemicals, other  98,610  6,574  800 
   Other chemicals  24,795  2,755  750 
   Petroleum and coal  10,100  2,525  2,075 
   Rubber & plastic products  100  100  100 
   Stone, clay, glass, graphite  111,852  12,428  6,340 
   Primary metals  28,000  28,000  28,000 
   Metal products  27,045  5,409  1,170 
   Machinery and equipment  3,206  458  292 
   Electronic products  6,000  6,000  6,000 
       
Transportation 6,852  1,713  1,867 
Communications 6,204  6,204  6,204 
Power and water  0  --  -- 
Wholesale-retail trade  25,252  6,313  3,250 
Finance and insurance  374  374  374 
Other services  2,250  750  549 
       
            TOTAL  473,546  3,830  1,961 
      
= Not applicable 
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Appendix Table 9. Maximum Number of Corporate Members, International Cartels, 1990-2003 
Types of Cartels  Number with 
Data 
2 3 4 5 6  7-9  10 or 
more 
average 
   Number 
G l o b a l :              
    Food  and  agriculture  25  5 7 5 2 3 2  0  4.0 
    Other  products  23  5 3 2 4 3 2  4  6.0 
              
E U   R e g i o n a l :               
    Food  and  agriculture  4  1 0 3 0 0 0  0  4.5 
    Other  products  19  2 1 1 1 2 5  7  10.2 
              
Other  Regional              
    Food  and  agriculture  7  3 2 2 0 0 0  0  2.9 
    Other  products  18  6 2 4 4 1 1  0  3.8 
              
TOTAL  96  22 15 17 11  9  10  11  5.6 
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Appendix Table 10.  U.S. Convictions of Individual Price Fixers, Selected Global Cartels. 
 
Sanctions  Name Nationality  Corporate  Position 
Fines Prison 
     U.S. dollars  Months 
LYSINE (1999):         
Michael D. Andreas  U.S.  Vice Chairman, ADM  350,000  36
a 
Terrance Wilson  U.S.  Pres., Corn Products 
Division, ADM 
350,000 33 
Mark Whitacre  U.S.  Pres., Bioproducts 
Division, ADM 
350,000 30 
Kanji Mimoto  JP  Div. Mgr., Ajinomoto  75,000  0 
Hirozaku Ikeda  JP  Div. Mgr., Ajinomoto  0  0 
Kaztoshi Yamada  JP  Mng. Dir., Ajinomoto  Fugitive  0 
Masaru Yamamoto  JP  Div. Mgr., Kyowa  50,000  0 
Jhom Su Kim  SK  Pres., Sewon America  75,000  0 
        
CITRIC ACID (1997-98):         
Hans Hartmann  DE  Pres., Bayer subsidiary  150,000  0 
Udo Haas  DE  Managing Director, Roche 
subsidiary 
150,000 0 
Rainer Bilchbauer  CH  President, Jungbunglauer  150,000  0 
Silvio Kluzer  CH  Mng. Dir., Eridania sub.  40,000  0 
        
VITAMINS (1999):
 c        
Kuno Sommer  CH  Mng. Dir., Roche  100,000  4 
Roland Brönnimann  CH  Div. Pres., Roche   150,000  5 
Andreas Hauri  CH  Mktg. Dir, Roche  350,000  4 
Reinhardt Steinmetz  DE  Div. Pres., BASF  125,000  3.5 
Dieter Suter  CH  Div. Pres., BASF  75,000  3 
Hugo Strotmann  DE  Group V.P., BASF  75,000  3 
        
SORBATES (2001):         
Yuji Komatsu  JP  Genl. Mgr. Sales + 
Director, Ueno 
Fugitive  0 
Yoshihiko Katsuyama  JP  Dep. Sales Mgr., Ueno  Fugitive  0 
Wakao Shinoda  JP  Genl. Mgr., Ueno USA  Fugitive  0 
Hitoshi Hayashi  JP  Salesman, Organic Chem. 
Div., Daicel 
Fugitive  0 
        
ART AUCTIONS (2002):         
A. Alfred Taubman  US  Chairman, Sotheby’s  7,500,000
a 12 
Sir Anthony Tenant  UK  Chairman, Christies’  Fugitive  0 
Dianna Brooks  US  CEO, Sotheby’s  Pending  0 
        
SODIUM GLUCONATE 
(1997): 
      
Cornelius Nederveen  NL  Mgr. Dir., Glucona  100,000  0 
Marcel van Eekhout  NL  Mgr. Dir., Glucona  100,000  0   
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Bertrand Dufour  F  Mgr. Dir., Roquette  50,000  0 
Akira Nakao  JP  Asso. Div. Dir., PMP  200,000  0 
        
GRAPHITE ELECTRODES 
(1998-99): 
      
Robert Krass  US  Pres., UCAR Intl.  1,250,000  17 
Robert Hart  US  COO, UCAR Intl.  1,000,000  9 
Robert Koehler  DE  CEO, SGL Carbon  10,000,000
b 0  
 
Note: Not shown here are convictions of Canadian and Swedish executives who were imprisoned. 
a Largest litigated personal antitrust fine. 
b Largest personal antitrust fine.   















































   
 
137 
Appendix Table 11.  EU Global Price-Fixing Convictions and Fines, 1992-2003. 
  
Year Product  Company  (Parent)  Fine 
         Million dollars
a 
1992 Europe-Cent.  W. 
Africa shipping 
conference 
13 companies  15.3 
           
1992 French-West  African 
shipping conference 
17 companies  15.3 
           
           
2000 Lysine  ADM  42.1 
      Ajinomoto  25.2
b 
      Kyowa Hakko  11.8
b 
      Cheil Sugar  10.9 
      Sewon  7.9 
           
2000 FETTSCA  Europe-Far 
East shipping 
conference 
15 companies  7.7 
           
2001  Citric acid  Hoffmann-La Roche  56.5 
      ADM  35.3 
      Jungbunzlauer  15.7 
      Bayer  12.7 
      Eridania  0.2 
           
2001 Vitamins  Hoffmann-La  Roche  408.0 
      BASF  261.5 
      Takeda  32.7 
      Daiichi  20.7 
      Eisai  11.7 
      E. Merck  8.2 
      Solvay  8.0 
      Rhône-Poulenc (Aventis)  4.5
c 
      Höechst (Aventis)  1.6 
      Lonza  0
c 
      Sumitomo  0
d 
      Sumika  0
d 
      Tanabe  0
d 
      Kongo  0
d 
           
2001 Sodium  gluconate  Jungbunzlauer  18.2 
      Roquette Frères  9.6 
      Akzo Nobel  8.0   
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      ADM  9.0 
      Avebe  3.2 
      Fujisawa  3.2 
           
2001 Graphite  electrodes SGL  Carbon  68.5 
      UCAR International  43.1 
      Tokai Carbon  20.9 
      Showa Denko  14.9
b 
      VAW Aluminum  9.9 
      SEC  10.4 
      Nippon Carbon  10.4 
      Carbide Graphite  8.8 
           
2002 Methionine  Rhône-Poulenc/Aventis  0
b 
      Degussa-Hüls  116.3 
      Novus International  125.2 
      Nippon Soda  8.9 
           
2002   MCAA  Akzo Nobel  3.2 
      Clariant & Hoescht  6.8 
           
2002 Nucleotides  Ajinomoto    58.0 
      Takeda Chemical Indus.  22.0 
      Chiel Jedang  42.0 
      ADM  1.25 
           
2002 Extruded  Graphite SGL  Carbon  8.8 
      UCAR/GrafTech  0 
           
2002  Fine Arts Auctions  Sotheby’s  20.1 
      Christie’s/Artemis  0 
           
2003 Sorbates  Hoechst/Aventis  180.7 
      Daicel Chemical Industry  111.2 
      Ueno  42.5 
      Nippon Gohsei  51.4 
      Eastman Chemical  42.5 
      Chisso  8.0 
           
           
           
   Total     2,442.4 
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          (pending) 
        
   Wine alcohol       
   MCAA       
   Organic peroxides       
   Sodium erythorbate       
   Maltol       
   Bromines       
   Isostatic graphite       
   Art auctions       
   Carbon cathode black       
  
Source: EC (2003). Tables A.1 –A.12. 
a Translated to dollars in the month announced.  Actual fines may be larger due to rise in the value of the euro since 
2000 and delays in payment dates. 
b Vary large leniency reductions (50 to 70 percent). 
c Amnesty or near amnesty. 
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Appendix Table 12. EC Regional Price-Fixing Convictions and Fines, 1990-2003 
Year Product  Company  Fine 
1990 Soda  ash  Solvay  41.5 
      ICI  23.5 
           
1994 Cartonboard  19  companies  117.6 
           
1994  Steel beams  British steel  35.4 
      Preusag  10.5 
      Usinor  13.6 
      Arbed  12.3 
      Saarstahl  5.1 
      Ferdofin  10.5 
      Sidugica Aristrain  11.7 
      Tlyssen  7.2 
      6 others  4.6 
           
1994  PVC plastic  13 companies  20.3 
           
1996  Ferries, Channel  5 companies  0.7 
           
1998  British sugar  British sugar  47.1 
      Tate & Lyle  8.3 
      Napier Brown  2.1 
      James Budgett  2.1 
1998  District heating pipe  ABB  58.3 
      Logstor  7.4 
      Henss  4.1 
      Tarco  2.5 
      Pan-Isovit  1.2 
      5 others  3.8 
           
1998  Stainless steel, flat  6 companies  25.4 
           
1999  Ferries, Adriatic  7 companies  11.0 
           
1999  Seamless steel tubes  British steel  12.9 
      Dalmine  11.1 
      Mannesmann  13.8 
      Vallourec  8.3 
      Kawasaki  13.8 
      NKK  13.8 
      Sumitomo  13.8 
      Nippon  13.8 
           




      A. Koehler  29.8 
      Zanders  26.8 
      Bollore  20.4 
      Mitsubishi  19.1 
      Torraspapel  12.8 
      4 others  7.7 
           
2000  Cement, EU  23 companies  103.3 
           
2000  Euro-Zone banks  5 German banks  89.7 
           
2001  Beer, Belgium, store brand  Haacht  0.2 
      Martens  0.2 
      Interbrew  0.7 
      Danone  0.5 
           
2001  Danish air route  SAS  33.8 
      Maersk Air  11.3 
           
2001  Zinc phosphate  Britannia Alloys  3.4 
      H. Heuback  3.8 
      James Brown  0.9 
      SNCZ  1.5 
      Trident Alloys  2.0 
      Waardals  0.4 
           
2002  Compressed gasses, 
Netherlands  8 companies  22.9 
           
2002  Mobile phones, Netherlands  5 companies  92.1 
           
2002 Plasterboard  Lafarge  250.6 
      BPB  138.6 
      Knauf  85.8 
      Gyproc Benelux  4.3 
           
2003  Beer, Belgium, HORECA  Interbrew  40.1 
      Damone  39.2 
           
2003 Vitamin  B4  BASF  Pending 
      Akzo Nobel  Pending 
      UCB  Pending 
           
2003 Beef,  France  FNSEA 
FNB 
13.6 












           
           
   Total     1,816.0 
           
                                                                                                                                                              
Source: Same as App. Table 11  
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Appendix Table 13. Durability of International Cartels by Number of Companies 
 
Number of companies 
a  Durability of Cartel  Number of Observations 
Months 
    
2 67  17 
3 57  14 
4 61  21 
5 39  10 
6 75  14 
7 62  3 
8 73  6 
9 54  2 
10 65  1 
    
Weighted average  61 88 
    
                                                                                                                                                                                         
a) Because some cartels have not been fully prosecuted and official reports not yet finalized, the number of 
participants is underreported for a minority of cartels. Eleven cartels had 11 or more members with an average 
durability of 128 months; however most of these were liner conferences prosecuted by the EC. 
 
 
 
 